





This publication-based dissertation covers research on corporate venturing activities of estab-
lished companies over six chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction into corporate 
venturing and a summary of the four research papers comprising this dissertation. The second 
chapter is a structured literature review analyzing the heterogeneity inherent in corporate ven-
turing activities. The characteristics that differentiate corporate venturing activities from each 
other are comprehensively identified, and a framework that integrates existing activities into six 
clusters is derived. The third chapter is a research paper that explores a recent corporate ventu-
ring activity – namely corporate accelerators – in depth. This empirical study, based on 13 case 
studies, identifies the objectives pursued with these programs and its design configurations and 
derives four common types of corporate accelerators. The fourth chapter is a research paper that 
analyzes empirically entrepreneurial start-ups as knowledge sources for established companies 
in the context of corporate accelerators and incubators. The paper identifies knowledge need, 
knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange as knowledge elements in these programs. Based 
on the comparative analysis of 12 case studies, typical combinations of the knowledge elements 
are found. The fifth chapter is a teaching case study building on the decision of Media-Saturn-
Holding, Europe´s leading consumer electronics retailer, to develop the company´s own corpo-
rate accelerator program called SPACELAB. The sixth chapter summarizes the contributions of 
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1 Introduction 
 Motivation and research gap 
Over the last few years, more and more established companies have launched activi-
ties in order to interact with entrepreneurial start-ups. Literally not a month passes in 
which there are no headlines such as ‘How Microsoft wants to lure start-ups to Berlin’ 
(Heuzeroth, 2013), ‘Telekom launches new 500 million fund for start-ups’ (Hofmann, 
2014), ‘Bahn-CEO Grube fears start-ups – and launches a new fund’ (Brisslinger, 
2016), or ‘Siemens: One billion Euro for start-ups and good ideas’ (Kamp, 2016) in 
business press. In the media, the growing phenomenon of established companies 
approaching entrepreneurial start-ups is also referred to as startupization (Hüsing, 
2015) or as a hunt for start-ups (Doerner, 2014), and it is even said that companies 
develop faster one start-up support program after another than Lucky Luke shoots 
(Roettger, 2013).  
The specific activities behind this phenomenon are diverse and include among others 
the foundation or extension of corporate venture capital initiatives or direct participa-
tions in start-ups, the launch of corporate accelerator or incubator programs, or the 
establishment of a company’s own corporate start-up. All these diverse activities can 
be considered forms of corporate venturing. Despite the lack of a universally agreed 
upon definition of corporate venturing in existing literature, it is widely acknowledged 
that the central idea of corporate venturing is that an established company cooper-
ates with a small autonomous entity (the venture) to develop new business models 
(Hill, Maula, Birkinshaw, & Murray, 2009; Reimsbach & Hauschild, 2012) or to pursue 
other financial or non-financial objectives by the use of internal and external means 
(Narayanan, Yang, & Zahra, 2009). Furthermore, corporate venturing is character-
ized by a heterogeneity in its activities (Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, & Tan, 2009), as 
also shown in the examples above. 
Corporate venturing activities in practice are a cyclical phenomenon (Basu & 
Wadhwa, 2013; Lerner, 2013).  Corporate venture capital was very popular among 
US-American corporations in the late 1960s and early 1970s as well as in the mid 
1980s, but interest and activity eventually declined, mainly due to changes in market 
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and corporate environments as well as mixed success of these activities (Tidd & Tau-
rins, 1999). In Germany, the first occurrence of corporate venturing activities is 
thought to go back to the year 1983 when Siemens co-founded the corporate venture 
capital fund Techno Venture Management with the aim to finance and give manage-
rial support to new ventures (Reimsbach & Hauschild, 2012). Another wave of corpo-
rate venturing activities took place in the late 1990s with high investments of estab-
lished companies in new ventures within the new economy followed by a hasty re-
treat as the economy took a turn for the worse in the early 2000s (Chesbrough, 
2002). 
Since the early 2010s, the interest of established companies in corporate venturing 
activities has once again begun to increase significantly (Lerner, 2013; Leten & Van 
Dyck, 2012). In 2011, eight of the 30 German DAX-companies reported ongoing cor-
porate venturing activities, and further companies announced plans for launching 
such initiatives (Reimsbach & Hauschild, 2012). Recent data from the venture capital 
database CB Insights about corporate venturing activities shows that corporate ven-
ture capital investments have achieved new heights with more than $28bn globally in 
2015. Additionally, the number of new corporate venture capital initiatives has been 
growing continuously over the last years, leading up to 85 newly launched initiatives 
in 2015. Beyond these dedicated corporate venture capital initiatives, corporates 
have invested an additional $27bn directly in start-ups (CB Insights, 2016). According 
to recent estimates, the number of corporate accelerator programs has increased to 
more than 120 active programs worldwide in early 2016, and it appears the upward 
trend will continue (Desai, 2016). Indeed, a recent survey of the Stern Stewart Insti-
tute among international business leaders from diverse industries shows that 33% of 
respondents consider executive sponsorship of a start-up as relevant for their com-
panies, adding support to this prediction (The Stern Stewart Institute, 2014). 
There are several indications that the current developments in corporate venturing 
are different from previous trends in this field, and they have also been described as 
hallmarks of the golden age (Mawson, 2011). Firstly, recent corporate venturing ac-
tivities can be observed in companies across all industries and not only in technolo-
gy-driven segments, which was the case during previous peaks of corporate ventur-
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ing activity (Frank, 2013). Secondly, the development appears to be independent of 
traditional venture capital climate (Lerner, 2013), which reflects an increase in the 
non-financial interests of established companies in their corporate venturing activi-
ties. Thirdly, new forms of corporate venturing activities such as corporate incubators 
(Becker & Gassmann, 2006) and corporate accelerators (Dempwolf, Auer, & D'Ip-
polito, 2014; Hochberg, 2015; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015) have emerged on the 
corporate venturing agendas of established companies, which also contributes to a 
further increase in the heterogeneity of corporate venturing activities. 
Academic discussions of corporate venturing are usually framed within the larger 
body of literature on corporate entrepreneurship (Narayanan et al., 2009). The 
stream of literature on corporate entrepreneurship emerged within the 1980s and 
focused on organizational efforts for the stimulation of proactive responses to in-
creasing environmental dynamism, risk-taking, and product innovativeness (Zahra, 
1991). Corporate entrepreneurship is interpreted as a way for established companies 
to revitalize their ability to compete effectively, enhance employee motivation, and 
increase financial performance while minimizing business risk (Serpa, 1987). The 
early period of corporate entrepreneurship literature provided numerous case stud-
ies, but only a few studies systematically analyzed the impact of corporate entrepre-
neurship on corporate performance (e.g. Block, 1989; Miller & Camp, 1986), resulting 
in mainly testimonial evidence on the utility of CE (Zahra, 1991). Since the beginning 
of the 21st century, research on corporate entrepreneurship has been receiving in-
creasing attention driven by researchers’ arguments for positive impact on organiza-
tional performance (Dess et al., 2003; Hornsby, Kuratko, Shepherd, & Bott, 2009; 
Ireland, Kuratko, & Morris, 2006) and its growing practical relevance (Lerner, 2013).  
Within existing corporate venturing research, however, there are two fields that de-
serve more attention and that are addressed in this dissertation. First, the heteroge-
neity of corporate venturing activities especially with regard to new activities such as 
corporate accelerators and incubators. Second, the strategic objectives of corporate 
venturing activities especially related to accessing external knowledge. 
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The first field that deserves further research is the heterogeneity in corporate ventur-
ing activities described above, which has been acknowledged in existing research 
but has received surprisingly little academic attention. Therefore, several calls for 
further examination of this nature have been made as the corporate venturing land-
scape includes a large variety of activities, all with specific characteristics (e.g. Nara-
yanan et al., 2009; Phan et al., 2009). In particular, existing research remains very 
scant on newly emerging activities such as corporate accelerators and incubators 
(Hochberg, 2015; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). Through these structured pro-
grams, companies provide various services and infrastructure to external start-ups, 
such as office space, mentoring, training, and networking opportunities, and interact 
with them very closely, at least for a specific amount of time that usually lasts three to 
four months (Hochberg, 2015; Kohler, 2016; Mian, Lamine, & Fayolle, 2016). These 
characteristics differ significantly from more established approaches in corporate 
venturing and change the way companies interact with start-ups, making such pro-
grams interesting research objects. 
Corporate accelerator and incubator programs are phenomena that have significantly 
increased in number over the last couple of years. According to a recent study, 44% 
of the 30 top companies in seven industries worldwide used corporate accelerators 
and incubators in 2015, compared to only 2% in 2010 (Brigl, Hong, Roos, Schmieg, & 
Wu, 2016).  
Research on these new forms of activities is highly relevant, as they significantly 
change the corporate venturing landscape and the traditional notion of corporate ven-
turing activities, resulting in a higher physical exchange between established compa-
nies and entrepreneurial start-ups. However, research on these programs is still lim-
ited with only a few studies describing the phenomenon (e.g. Hochberg, 2015; Wei-
blen & Chesbrough, 2015) not providing a full understanding of program characteris-
tics, objectives, and organizational implications. 
The second field that deserves further research is the non-financial dimension of cor-
porate venturing activities. It is widely agreed that companies pursue various financial 
and non-financial or strategic objectives with their corporate venturing activities (Bat-
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tistini, Hacklin, & Baschera, 2013; Campbell, Birkinshaw, Morrison, & Batenburg, 
2003; Chesbrough, 2002). While there is more research on the financial success of 
corporate venturing activities, research on the strategic dimension remains limited 
(Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Narayanan et al., 2009). However, a recent study of 48 cor-
porate venturing units worldwide by Battistini et al. (2013) argues that a majority of 
almost 75% of their analyzed corporate venturing units pursue strategic objectives. 
Therefore, the non-financial dimension of corporate venturing activities is highly rele-
vant in practice, something for which current research does not account.  
One of the most frequently mentioned non-financial objectives for companies to pur-
sue corporate venturing activities is organizational learning through accessing 
knowledge external to its own boundaries (Covin & Miles, 2007; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2005; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005; Tidd & Taurins, 1999). While there are a few stud-
ies that find positive effects of corporate venturing activities on the innovation perfor-
mance of the company (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009), it 
remains unclear which various knowledge-related objectives companies pursue with 
their corporate venturing activities and how they try to access the external knowledge 
(Narayanan et al., 2009; Yang, Narayanan, & Zahra, 2009). However, transparency 
about these facets is relevant to understand the potential contribution of such pro-
grams and to enable managers to set up and run their corporate venturing activities 
accordingly. 
This publication-based dissertation centers around the described two areas of re-
search on corporate venturing activities, namely specific activities in the heterogene-
ous field of corporate venturing and the non-financial dimension of such activities, 
especially with regards to getting access to external knowledge. In order to contribute 
to closing these gaps, the remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows (see 
Figure 1). In the next paragraphs, a summary of the research papers comprising this 
dissertation is provided, including the current publication status and the conferences 
at which they were presented. The second chapter is a research paper on typologies 
of corporate venturing activities. It is a structured literature review that analyzes exist-
ing research in the field, particularly with regards to characteristics that differentiate 
corporate venturing activities. The third chapter is an empirical research paper that 
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examines corporate accelerator programs as a new form of corporate venturing activ-
ity. The fourth chapter is another empirical research paper that analyzes the ways in 
which established companies access external knowledge through the use of corpo-
rate accelerator and incubator programs. The fifth chapter is a teaching case study 
that discusses in detail the application of the corporate accelerator concept in the 
consumer electronics retail industry. The sixth and final chapter summarizes the con-
tribution of the cumulative dissertation for research and practice and outlines its limi-
tations as well as potential avenues for further research.  
 
Figure 1: Overview chapters of cumulative dissertation 
 Summary of research papers 
The first research paper “Corporate venturing activities: a review of typologies and 
proposed framework” is a structured literature review of existing typologies in corpo-
rate venturing research that analyzes the heterogeneity in corporate venturing activi-
ties. 
Corporate venturing is characterized by its diverse activities through which estab-
lished companies engage with entrepreneurial start-ups. Existing research has identi-
fied numerous different forms of corporate venturing activities (e.g. Chesbrough, 
2002; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015) but lacks to compre-
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differentiation is of high relevance for a discussion on the potential benefits of the 
various corporate venturing activities for companies making use of them. 
The research paper applies the approach for structured literature reviews developed 
by Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart (2003), a method that aims to ensure high quality 
and replicability of results and has become a widely used technique for literature re-
views. Two complementary sets of results are derived. First, six characteristics on 
which corporate activities are different from each other are identified. Second, 37 
corporate venturing activities described in the reviewed studies are analyzed and in-
tegrated into one framework with six clusters of corporate venturing activities based 
on the locus of opportunity (internal or external) and the prioritization of objectives 
(strategic, financial, or balanced). 
As such, the literature review contributes to corporate venturing research and ac-
counts especially for the heterogeneity of activities by integrating existing research 
on different corporate venturing activities. Furthermore, as it discusses various stra-
tegic objectives, the review contributes to a better understanding of the non-financial 
dimension of corporate venturing activities.  
The research paper was presented at the Society of Interdisciplinary Business Re-
search (SIBR) Conference on Interdisciplinary Business & Economics Research 
2015 in Hong Kong. 
The second research paper “Corporate accelerators as new form of start-up en-
gagement: the what, the why, and the how” empirically explores the phenomenon of 
corporate accelerators as a new form of corporate venturing activity. It is co-authored 
with Stephan Stubner. 
Corporate accelerators have become a more commonplace phenomenon across the 
world, and numerous companies have launched such a program since the beginning 
of the 2010s. The phenomenon includes companies from diverse industries, Walt 
Disney and Spring in the USA, Citigroup and Samsung in Israel, and Allianz and Axel 
Springer in Germany. Additionally, some corporate accelerator programs have multi-
ple international locations, such as Microsoft’s accelerator program in seven cities in 
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Europe, Asia, North America, and the Middle East and Google’s program in three 
countries in Latin America. Therefore, corporate accelerators are today a global, 
cross-industrial phenomenon. 
Despite its practical relevance, research on corporate accelerators remains scarce. 
There is a basic understanding that corporate accelerators are typically time-limited 
programs with a standard duration of roughly three months, that they conduct a se-
lective admission of a cohort of start-ups on a specific date, and that they provide 
various services, such as office space, mentoring, training, and networking opportuni-
ties, in addition to investment capital for start-ups (Cohen, 2013; Hallen, Bingham, & 
Cohen, 2014; Hochberg, 2015; Hoffmann & Radojevich-Kelley, 2012; Malek, Maine, 
& McCarthy, 2014). Apart from this basic understanding, however, there is a lack of 
common understanding of what comprises a corporate accelerator, how existing pro-
grams differ from each other, and how to set up such a program according to its spe-
cific objectives. Though, having this comprehensive understanding of the corporate 
accelerator phenomenon is required for further research on the efficacy of these pro-
grams and for practitioners that recently show a high interest in this topic. 
The paper follows the inductive research approach based on multiple case studies by 
Eisenhardt (1989). The sample consists of 34 semi-structured interviews with man-
agers in corporate accelerators and participating start-ups conducted over a six-
month period between August 2015 and February 2016, out of which a total of 13 in-
depth case studies were created. Building on these case studies, four common types 
of corporate accelerator programs are derived. These distinct types are specific ac-
cording to their overall program objective, the program focus, and the program organ-
ization. The empirical analysis therefore provides practitioners with clear guidance on 
how to design a corporate accelerator program according to the overall program ob-
jective. This in-depth empirical study is one of the most comprehensive studies in this 
field and significantly contributes to the understanding of corporate accelerator pro-
grams. 
The research paper was presented at two international conferences: first, at the 
World Business Institute (WBI) 10th Asia-Pacific Business and Humanities Research 
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Conference 2016 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and second, at the Society of Business, 
Economics, Social Science & Humanities (BESSH) 5th International Conference on 
Business, Economics, Social Sciences & Humanities 2016 in Osaka, Japan. Fur-
thermore, the paper was presented at the 20th Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation (G-Forum) 2016 in Leipzig, Germany.  
The research paper was published in the Journal of Applied Business Research 
(JABR), which is classified “C” in the current VHB-JOURQUAL 3 ranking.1 It is in-
cluded in the issue November/December 2016 (vol. 36, issue 6, pp. 1761-1776). 
The third research paper entitled “Start-ups as knowledge sources for companies: an 
analysis of corporate accelerators and incubators” is an empirical study that analyzes 
the use of corporate accelerators and incubators by established companies in order 
to access external knowledge. It is co-authored with Stephan Stubner. 
Established companies pursue corporate venturing activities for financial and strate-
gic rationales (Battistini et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2003; Chesbrough, 2002). The 
ability to access new knowledge is often mentioned as one of the main motives for 
companies to engage with entrepreneurial start-ups (Covin & Miles, 2007; Dushnitsky 
& Lenox, 2005; Schildt et al., 2005; Tidd & Taurins, 1999). Corporate accelerator and 
incubator programs are relatively new forms of start-up engagement for established 
companies and offer unique possibilities to access external knowledge through the 
intense interaction between the start-ups and the company including co-working 
spaces, events, mentoring, and the integration of a company´s employees. However, 
existing research does not explain which specific knowledge companies seek to ac-
cess, the ways by which they try to obtain such access, and how the different pro-
gram rationales are connected to this matter. Nonetheless, having this understanding 
is crucial for managers to design corporate accelerators and incubators for accessing 
knowledge in line with their program rationale and for corporate venturing research 
on the potential contribution of such programs. 
                                            
1 The JOURQUAL 3 Ranking by the German Academic Association for Business Research (VHB) can 
be retrived from www.vhbonline.org (accessed on September 5th, 2016. 
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Applying the inductive approach for concept development by Gioia, Corley, and Ham-
ilton (2012), this research paper builds on a sample of 28 recent interviews with cor-
porate accelerator and incubator program managers as well as participating start-
ups. Two complementary sets of results are derived. First, the paper identifies 
knowledge need, knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange as knowledge ele-
ments in corporate accelerator and incubator programs. Second, it identifies typical 
combinations of these elements, and they show which knowledge exchange mecha-
nisms are used most intensively under specific conditions. 
The paper was presented at the American Society of Business and Behavioral Sci-
ences (ASBBS) 20th Annual International Conference 2016 in Bangkok, Thailand. 
Furthermore, the paper was presented at the 20th Annual Interdisciplinary Confer-
ence on Entrepreneurship and Innovation (G-Forum) 2016 in Leipzig, Germany. 
The fourth research paper entitled “Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH - the SPACELAB 
accelerator: a teaching case study” provides in-depth insights into management deci-
sions and the application of a corporate accelerator program in practice. It is co-
authored with Stephan Stubner. 
In late 2014, Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH, Europe´s leading consumer electronics 
retailer, decided to set up SPACELAB, the first corporate accelerator program for 
consumer electronics. However, a proven corporate accelerator concept was not yet 
existent. Therefore, the management team working with CEO Pieter Haas had to de-
velop a novel accelerator setup to meet the requirements of the consumer electronics 
retail industry and the specifics of Media-Saturn.  
The case study consists of two parts. In the first part, the case introduces the back-
ground and the potential accelerator design options with regards to which the man-
agement team of Media-Saturn had to make decisions. The second part involves a 
discussion surrounding the decisions made and the SPACELAB concept. 
The case study has two main learning objectives structured along the two parts of the 
case: to provide knowledge about the potential design options companies have when 
setting up a corporate accelerator (part 1) and to understand how and why Media-
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Saturn has made the decisions for their SPACELAB accelerator (part 2). It is appro-
priate for use in entrepreneurship, strategic management, and innovation manage-
ment courses in the context of modules or discussions on corporate entrepreneurship 
and venturing, entrepreneurial strategies, entrepreneurial ecosystems, and managing 
corporate innovation. 
An accompanying teaching note outlines recommendations for additional material, 
questions for classroom discussion, potential answers, and board plans for visualiza-
tion of results in a classroom setting. 
The teaching case study was published as HHL Working Paper (no. 159). 
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 Presentation / publication information of research papers 
To date, the presentation / publication information of each of the four research pa-
pers of this cumulative dissertation is as follows: 
No. Title Presentation / publication information 
1 Corporate venturing activi-
ties: a review of typologies 
and proposed framework 
§ Presented at the Society of Interdisciplinary Business Re-
search (SIBR) Conference on Interdisciplinary Business & 
Economics Research 2015 (double blind peer reviewed) in 
Hong Kong (October 3-4, 2015) 
2 Corporate accelerators as 
new form of start-up en-
gagement: the what, the 
why, and the how 
 
§ Presented at the World Business Institute (WBI) 10th Asia-
Pacific Business and Humanities Research Conference 
2016 (double blind peer reviewed) in Kuala Lumpur, Malay-
sia (February 21-22, 2016) 
§ Presented at the Society of Business, Economics, Social 
Science & Humanities (BESSH) 5th International Conference 
on Business, Economics, Social Sciences & Humanities 
2016 (blind peer reviewed) in Osaka, Japan (June 29-30, 
2016) 
§ Presented at the 20th Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation (G-Forum) (double blind 
peer reviewed) 2016 in Leipzig, Germany (October 6-7, 
2016) 
§ Published in the Journal of Applied Business Research in 
Vol 32, No 6 (2016), pp. 1761-1776 
3 Start-ups as knowledge 
sources for companies: an 
analysis of corporate accel-
erators and incubators 
 
§ Presented at the American Society of Business and Behav-
ioral Sciences (ASBBS) 20th Annual International Confer-
ence 2016 (peer reviewed) in Bangkok, Thailand (July 29-
31, 2016) 
§ Presented at the 20th Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation (G-Forum) (double blind 
peer reviewed) 2016 in Leipzig, Germany (October 6-7, 
2016) 
4 Media-Saturn-Holding 
GmbH - the SPACELAB 
accelerator: a teaching case 
study 
§ Published as HHL Working Paper No. 159 
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2 Corporate venturing activities: a review of typologies and proposed frame-
work 
Research paper 1 
Author: Dominik K. Kanbach 
 
Abstract 
Corporate venturing is characterized by heterogeneity, as diverse activities in this 
field can be identified. In this context, existing research has failed to holistically dif-
ferentiate the various corporate venturing activities and their characteristics. Howev-
er, this differentiation is of high relevance for a discussion of the potential benefits 
companies can experience when they apply these activities. This systematic litera-
ture review aims to integrate existing research on corporate venturing activities by 
first identifying and describing the characteristics that differentiate various activities 
from each other and second by deriving a framework that categorizes these activi-
ties. Analyzing 37 corporate venturing activities in the studies under review, six clus-
ters of activities according to their locus of opportunity (internal vs. external) and their 
prioritization of objectives (mainly strategic vs. mainly financial vs. balanced) are de-
rived. Furthermore, potential avenues for further research are identified, mainly with 
regards to recently emerging activities and the non-financial dimension of corporate 
venturing activities.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Venturing, Corporate Entrepreneurship, Corporate Venturing 
Typology, Corporate Venturing Activities, Corporate Venturing Characteristics 
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 Introduction 
Corporate venturing has continued to pique the interest of scholars as well as practi-
tioners since the 1960s (Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005; Rind, 1981). The last decade has 
witnessed more research on corporate venturing, and numerous empirical and theo-
retical publications in the field are the result of this growing academic interest (Nara-
yanan, Yang, & Zahra, 2009). In this context, scholars have identified different activi-
ties and argue that the corporate venturing phenomenon is characterized by hetero-
geneity in its activities (Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, & Tan, 2009). This variety includes 
corporate venture capital activities (Chesbrough, 2002; Lerner, 2013), corporate 
start-ups (MacMillan, Block, & Narasimha, 1986), and more recent forms of start-up 
programs such as corporate accelerators (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015), making the 
landscape of different corporate venturing activities complex and bewildering. How-
ever, existing research has not holistically differentiated the various activities and 
their characteristics. Still, different activities are suitable for pursuing different objec-
tives, such as for example gaining a better perspective on technological, market, or 
business developments (Rind, 1981), achieving strategic renewal (Guth & Ginsberg, 
1990), identifying acquisition candidates (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010), gaining 
knowledge (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009), accessing innovation (Chesbrough, 2000), 
or achieving superior financial returns (Lerner, 2013). Therefore, transparency on the 
differences of corporate venturing activities is important for a discussion on the po-
tential benefits for companies that apply these various activities. 
Over the last decade, researchers have developed several typologies that differenti-
ate various corporate venturing activities, though they often fail to build on the results 
of other studies or integrate extant findings (Narayanan et al., 2009). This shortcom-
ing, however, leaves a gap in existing research with regards to a holistic understand-
ing of the differentiating characteristics of corporate venturing activities.  
Consequently, this systematic literature review aims at identifying and integrating ex-
isting research on corporate venturing activities by first describing the different char-
acteristics that differentiate activities from each other and second by deriving how 
corporate venturing activities can be categorized within one framework. 
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By providing transparency on different categorization dimensions and deriving an 
integrated framework of existing activities, this literature review strengthens and con-
tributes to an understanding of the heterogeneity of corporate venturing activities 
(Phan et al., 2009), laying the groundwork for further research on specific corporate 
venturing activities with regard to their potential contribution. Furthermore, this study 
answers the call to enhance the understanding of strategic objectives (Hill & Birkin-
shaw, 2008) as well as potential non-financial benefits (Yang, Narayanan, & Zahra, 
2009) by linking specific activities with objectives to be achieved. 
This study also has implications for practice. Although they are considered a rising 
star on the horizon for many established companies, corporate venturing activities 
entail an adventurous journey with an unknown outcome for the parent company, one 
that often leads to a termination of the activities (Breuer, 2013). Having a clearly de-
fined model of corporate venturing is one of the main criteria of success for compa-
nies that set up these activities (Campbell, Birkinshaw, Morrison, & Batenburg, 
2003). Therefore, by identifying and discussing the different characteristics of activi-
ties, this literature review also provides relevant insights for practitioners that are in 
charge of setting up or managing their company´s corporate venturing activities. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section provides an in-
troduction on the method of research for the structured literature review as well as a 
descriptive analysis of the reviewed studies. The next section discusses the dimen-
sions for categorization applied in the reviewed studies in order to differentiate corpo-
rate venturing activities, building the basis for the introduction of an integrated 
framework in the following section. This section includes the discussion of the six 
clusters of corporate venturing activities. Finally, an outline for further research and a 
summary of findings conclude this study. 
 Research method and descriptive analysis of reviewed studies 
The findings presented in this paper are the outcome of a systematic analysis and a 
review of extant publications based on the approach of Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart 
(2003). Following this method, three consecutive steps have been applied: (1) plan-
ning the review, (2) conducting the review, and (3) reporting and synthesizing the 
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findings. In line with other literature reviews in the field of management science (e.g. 
Rashman, Withers, & Hartley, 2009), the author applied this methodology for a quali-
tative analysis of extant studies.  
Planning the review, the first step, includes identifying the need for a structured re-
view, which is outlined in the introduction. In order to ensure the main characteristics 
of a structured literature review and the objectivity and replicability of results, three 
steps for the selection of studies were followed (Tranfield et al., 2003). Firstly, a key-
word search in the EBSCO Global Search database was conducted. Following extant 
structured reviews (e.g. Jones, Coviello, & Tang, 2011), the search was limited to 
peer-reviewed scholarly journals, excluding books, book chapters, and conference 
papers due to variability in the peer review processes and limited availability. Sec-
ondly, an additional manual key journal search in three relevant journals for publica-
tions of corporate venturing research was performed in order to avoid overlooking 
articles that were relevant for the review.2 Finally, citations in the identified studies 
were screened to pinpoint additional potentially relevant studies. 
This approach led to the identification of 222 potentially relevant studies.3 It was nec-
essary to review the abstracts of the studies to ensure they were pertinent with re-
gards to the study´s objectives. Most studies were excluded from the review, as they 
were applying rather than developing typologies or categorizations of corporate ven-
turing activities. Overall, this process resulted in the identification of ten relevant stud-






                                            
2 The manually analyzed journals are: Research-Technology Management, Venture Capital: An Inter-
national Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, and Journal of Business Venturing. 
3 The review includes studies published until end of September 2015. 
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  activities 
derived 
Chesbrough (2002)   ü 
 
  ü 2 4 
Miles, Covin (2002)   ü   ü (21)   2 4 
Campbell et al. (2003)   ü   ü(>100)   n/a 4 
Weber, Weber (2005)   ü ü(25) ü (19)   2 4 
Markham et al. (2005)   ü     ü 2 2 
Hill, Birkinshaw (2008)   ü ü(95) ü (50)   2 4 
Reimsbach, Hauschild (2012) ü         3 n/a 
Battistini et al. (2013)   ü ü(48)     1 3 
Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015)   ü   ü (12)   2 4 
Biniari et al. (2015) ü         4 8 
              37 
Table 1: Overview studies included in review and their categorization approach 
After completing the second step of conducting the review, the final step of the struc-
tured review process involved reporting and synthesizing the findings, which are out-
lined in the remainder of this paper. 
The reviewed studies were published in nine different journals. In order to conduct a 
quality assessment of the included studies (Tranfield et al., 2003), the JOURQUAL 3 
Ranking of the German Academic Association for Business Research was used.4 To 
ensure the academic rigor of the included studies, a minimum rating of “C” was re-
quired for selection. Out of the ten included studies, two were published in a journal 
with “A” ratings, two with “B” ratings, and the remaining six with “C” ratings. The stud-
ies were published from 2002 onwards, with six publications before 2008 and the 
remaining four publications from 2012 until 2015. These two waves in publications 
reflect a short time-delay in the practical relevance of corporate venturing activities. 
The studies of the first wave build mainly on empirical findings from activities during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. After the burst of the dotcom bubble, corporate ven-
turing activities were to a wide extent discontinued, and therefore research interest in 
this field also declined. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, however, practical interest 
in the topic heightened once again, and research activities have increased. 
Eight out of the ten studies reviewed are empirical, whereas only two are conceptual. 
The empirical studies are mainly based on interviews or surveys. Three studies use 
                                            
4 The JOURQUAL 3 Ranking by the German Academic Association for Business Research (VHB) can 
be retrived from www.vhbonline.org (accessed on August 21st, 2015).  
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interviews only, one study uses surveys only, and two studies combine surveys and 
interviews. The remaining two empirical studies do not specify the means of their da-
ta collection. Nine out of the ten studies reviewed use different dimensions for build-
ing up a typology of corporate venturing activities. The majority of the studies (six) 
use a two-dimensional approach, whereas the remaining studies employ a one-
dimensional (one), three-dimensional (one), and four-dimensional (one) approach. 
One study builds up a corporate venturing activity typology without the use of dimen-
sions. 
In total, nine of the reviewed studies describe the characteristics of 37 specific activi-
ties, and they also build the basis for the analysis. Only one conceptual study does 
not provide specific forms of corporate venturing activities and focuses on the dimen-
sions for categorization of activities only. Appendix 1 provides further publication in-
formation and Appendix 2 provides an overview of the activities described in each 
study. 
 Dimensions of corporate venturing activities 
The reviewed studies use in total six dimensions for categorizing corporate venturing 
activities (see Table 2 for an overview), namely (1) locus of opportunity, (2) objec-
tives, (3) strategic logic, (4) link to extant capabilities and organization, (5) investment 
mediation, and (6) equity involvement. These dimensions are used in the reviewed 
studies to identify 37 corporate venturing activities. In the following paragraphs, the 
six dimensions are discussed laying the foundation for the proposed framework that 
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Link to extant 
capabilities / 
organization  




(yes / no) 
              Chesbrough (2002) ü ü 
 
 ü  
Miles, Covin (2002) ü  ü    
Campbell et al. (2003) 
 
     
Weber, Weber (2005) ü ü   ü  
Markham et al. (2005) ü  ü    
Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) ü  
 
ü   
Reimsbach, Hauschild (2012) ü  ü ü   
Battistini et al. (2013) 
 
ü     
Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015) ü     ü 
Biniari et al. (2015) ü   ü ü 
   8 3 3 3 3 1 
Table 2: Overview of dimensions applied for categorization of corporate venturing activities 
2.3.1 Locus of opportunity (internal vs. external) 
Differentiating between internal and external corporate venturing activities is the most 
common approach in the studies reviewed. In total, eight studies build on this dimen-
sion for categorization, out of which five studies explicitly differentiate between these 
forms of activities. Three studies implicitly use this categorization, as they focus on 
external corporate venturing activities only. The reviewed studies apply different ter-
minologies to describe this dimension: focus of entrepreneurship (Miles & Covin, 
2002), locus of opportunity (Biniari, Simmons, Monsen, & Moreno, 2015; Hill & 
Birkinshaw, 2008), direction of innovation flow (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015), and 
focus (Reimsbach & Hauschild, 2012).  
Despite the variety in the terminologies used, there is a broad consensus that internal 
corporate venturing activities focus on ideas or opportunities that are created inside 
the parent company, whereas external activities focus on ideas or opportunities out-
side the company (Biniari et al., 2015; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Miles & Covin, 2002; 
Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). Only the study by Reimsbach and Hauschild (2012) 
interprets this dimension from an organizational perspective, arguing that internal 
corporate venturing units are organizationally integrated into the parent organization 
whereas external units are located outside the parent company.  
According to various researchers, external corporate venturing activities can take 
many different forms. The most prominent example are corporate venture capital 
Corporate venturing activities: a review of typologies and proposed framework           24 
funds that include all activities in which an established company makes minority equi-
ty investments in start-up companies. As the funding is usually staged, corporate in-
vestors have the option to discontinue funding if the development of the venture does 
not fulfill their expectations (Reimsbach & Hauschild, 2012). Besides the pure provi-
sion of funding for a start-up company in exchange for equity, the established com-
pany might also provide additional benefits such as technical or management assis-
tance, leading to a nurturing relationship (Miles & Covin, 2002). Other forms of exter-
nal corporate venturing activities include strategic partnerships with smaller, entre-
preneurial firms (Miles & Covin, 2002) or instances where established companies 
engage in the recent activity of start-up programs (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015), 
sometimes without providing venture capital to the start-ups. 
It is argued that external corporate venturing activities often operate with the objec-
tive of getting access to innovations outside the parent company (Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015), gaining insights into new technologies that are on the market 
(Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008), accessing new markets, strengthening reputation through 
interaction with innovative start-ups, gaining potential access to acquisition candi-
dates, and seizing the potential for financial gains (Miles & Covin, 2002). Overall, in-
vestments in external start-ups are frequently targeted at achieving a transfer of 
technology, resources, or capabilities to the established company, as they clearly 
offer a much broader field of opportunities than focusing on company-internal ideas 
alone (Markham, Gentry, Hume, Ramachandran, & Kingon, 2005). 
Internal corporate venturing activities are considered to be the simplest form of cor-
porate venturing, as employees of the parent company work on internally generated 
business ideas that the company then funds, further develops, and commercializes 
through the use of company resources (Miles & Covin, 2002). In these programs, 
companies invest in new opportunities that arise from within and develop them for 
sources of further growth (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). Ideally, these internal corporate 
venturing activities are targeted at in-house ideas that would be impossible to carry 
out without support, as the operating units of a company focus on daily business and 
quarterly results (Markham et al., 2005). Internal corporate venturing activities can 
also aim at making use of and commercializing existent corporate innovation that 
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might not be relevant for the current core-business (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). It 
is furthermore argued that internal venturing can create real options by developing 
the organization´s capabilities and tangible and intangible resources. In addition, it 
might lead certain people to engage in more autonomous entrepreneurial behavior in 
the organization, resulting in cultural change (Miles & Covin, 2002).  
It is argued that the external or internal nature of corporate venturing activities has a 
specific impact on the organization and management of the respective unit (Hill & 
Birkinshaw, 2008), making this characteristic highly relevant for differentiating corpo-
rate venturing activities. 
2.3.2 Objectives (strategic vs. financial) 
Three of the studies under review apply the dimension of strategic and financial ob-
jectives for differentiating corporate venturing activities. Companies pursue a range 
of diverse objectives with their corporate venturing activities, which can be catego-
rized as either strategic or financial (Chesbrough, 2002). Particularly in the context of 
corporate venturing activities, the discussion of objectives is of high importance as it 
is argued that the main difference between corporate venture capital and venture 
capital lies in the strategic objectives of the corporate investor (Reimsbach & 
Hauschild, 2012). Furthermore, some suggest that strategic objectives often repre-
sent the underlying rationale for corporate investors, whereas the financial objectives 
are considered a necessary condition for the sustainability of corporate venturing ac-
tivity (Battistini, Hacklin, & Baschera, 2013). 
Financial objectives of corporate venturing activities focus on the achievement of de-
sirable financial returns (Chesbrough, 2002). The main rationale is that the parent 
company’s industry expertise or market knowledge can be leveraged to achieve a 
financial return through corporate venturing activities (Battistini et al., 2013). In order 
to meet financial objectives, the model of independent venture capitalists is often 
transferred to the corporate context, and investments are made into start-ups that do 
not provide any strategic value or synergies except for a potential for financial return 
(Campbell et al., 2003). The most common form of corporate venturing activity with 
financial objectives are corporate venture capital funds (Campbell et al., 2003; 
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Chesbrough, 2002). However, financial objectives can also be relevant for other ac-
tivities such as internal corporate venturing activities that focus on the commercializa-
tion of extant patents or technologies (Campbell et al., 2003; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 
2015). 
The strategic objectives of corporate venturing activities are numerous and more di-
verse than the financial objectives. Frequently listed strategic objectives include the 
creation of an entrepreneurial climate (Battistini et al., 2013), encouragement of vari-
ous kinds of learning through interaction with start-ups (Miles & Covin, 2002), identifi-
cation and exploitation of synergies with start-ups (Chesbrough, 2002), fostering of 
internal idea creation and incorporation of external intelligence (Battistini et al., 2013), 
further development of innovativeness (Campbell et al., 2003; Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015), the provision of opportunities for strategic partnerships (Battistini 
et al., 2013), and the creation of an outlook on emerging technologies, market oppor-
tunities, and new business models (Markham et al., 2005). 
Weber and Weber (2005) find in their empirical study that 42% of corporate venture 
capital units have primarily strategic objectives, 21% are primarily financial, and 37% 
have equally strategic and financial objectives. Battistini et al. (2013) witness similar 
results: 29% of corporate venture capital units have primarily strategic objectives, 
23% have primarily financial, and 48% have equally strategic and financial objec-
tives. Although given the differences in the values for the strategic and mixed objec-
tives, it can be argued that the minority of cases cite primarily financial, underlining 
the importance of strategic objectives in the corporate venturing context. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the management of financially-oriented corporate ven-
turing activities differ from that of strategically-oriented activities (Weber & Weber, 
2005), which makes objectives an even more important dimension for the classifica-
tion of corporate venturing activities. 
2.3.3 Strategic logic (exploration vs. exploitation) 
Building on the general need for differentiation between exploration- and exploitation-
oriented activities in a firm (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; March, 1991), three studies in 
the review characterize different corporate venturing activities. On the one hand, ex-
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ploration-oriented activities are characterized by experimentation with new alterna-
tives, which have an uncertain, distant, and sometimes negative outcome. Therefore, 
exploration-oriented activities often try to identify and acquire new competencies that 
do not yet exist within the parent company (March, 1991; Reimsbach & Hauschild, 
2012).  
On the other hand, another element of exploitation-oriented activities is the idea that 
they build on existing competencies, technologies, or paradigms, elements that are 
then refined or extended. Therefore, exploitation-oriented activities also make use of 
existent competencies in the parent company and apply these to new but related 
product markets with the goal of increasing revenues (Covin & Miles, 2007; 
Reimsbach & Hauschild, 2012). These activities lead to proximate, predictable, and 
positive results (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; March, 1991). Overall, exploration-oriented 
activities are considered to be more long-term oriented, as they do not deliver imme-
diate results and comprise a high degree of uncertainty (March, 1991; Reimsbach & 
Hauschild, 2012). 
Hill and Birkinshaw (2008) are the first researchers to introduce this concept in the 
discussion on corporate venturing activities, and they argue that research efforts 
have mainly focused on the explorative character, thereby neglecting the exploitative 
aspect. Overall, it can be assumed from this discussion that explorative corporate 
venturing activities mainly concentrate on strategic objectives whereas exploitative 
activities focus primarily on making use of extant capabilities and resources, ele-
ments that are generally more financially oriented. 
2.3.4 Link to extant capabilities or organization (tight vs. loose) 
Three studies under review use the program`s proximity to extant capabilities or the 
organization of the parent company as a criterion for differentiating corporate ventur-
ing activities. The degree to which start-ups are linked to the parent company`s re-
sources and processes (and therefore its extant capabilities and organizational struc-
tures and processes) is considered a defining characteristic of corporate venturing 
activities (Chesbrough, 2002; Weber & Weber, 2005). Strong linkages might provide 
an opportunity for start-ups to make use of the parent`s manufacturing plants, distri-
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bution channels, technologies, or even the brand itself to build, sell, or service its own 
products. However, especially in the context of changing environments and disruptive 
technologies, a company`s extant resources might very well become liabilities in-
stead of useful capabilities. In these cases, start-ups with loose links to extant capa-
bilities might provide the parent company with a promising opportunity to establish 
new capabilities (Chesbrough, 2002).  
Corporate venturing activities with a high degree of operational relatedness are also 
considered to support the extant core business of the parent company whereas a 
high strategic relatedness might additionally lead to an opportunity of expanding the 
extant core business (Biniari et al., 2015). 
2.3.5 Investment mediation (direct vs. indirect) 
Three studies use the presence of an investment mediator to differentiate corporate 
venturing activities. In this context, investment mediation is described as an inde-
pendent investment mechanism, typically a venture capital fund that links the parent 
company with the start-up (Miles & Covin, 2002). Therefore, a direct form of corpo-
rate venturing activity occurs when a parent company makes investments directly 
into a start-up company, and an indirect form takes place when an investment is 
made in a venture capital fund that serves as an intermediary between the parent 
company and the start-ups (Miles & Covin, 2002; Reimsbach & Hauschild, 2012).  
Markham et al. (2005) argue that when deciding between a direct or indirect form of 
investment, those involved should take into consideration the objectives the company 
wants to achieve with its corporate venturing activities. When the parent company is 
targeting financial returns exclusively, an investment into an external venture capital 
fund is a reasonable option. Although doing so also provides a gateway to outside 
technologies, access to and interaction with the start-ups is limited. With direct in-
vestments, however, gaining a comprehensive view on a smaller number of specific 
external technologies is possible, making direct investments the best option if the 
company wants to achieve mainly strategic objectives. Therefore, direct investments 
are useful when it is certain that a specific start-up has a desired technology, market 
access, or distribution channel. Furthermore, risk with direct investments is higher 
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based on a less diversified investment portfolio and potential lack of qualified em-
ployees with investment management experience (Markham et al., 2005).  
Overall, from this discussion one can arrive at the conclusion that the higher the rele-
vance of strategic objectives in corporate venturing activities, the more sensible it is 
to pursue direct activities, whereas partaking in indirect activities is more logical un-
der conditions where meeting financial objectives is of higher importance. 
2.3.6 Equity involvement (yes vs. no) 
One study applies the criterion of equity involvement for separating the different op-
tions established companies have with regards to engaging with start-ups. Weiblen 
and Chesbrough (2015) argue that compared to more traditional models such as 
corporate venture capital funds and internal incubation of business ideas, new forms 
of corporate venturing activities that do not include equity involvement (e.g. start-up 
programs) exist. They suggest that equity stakes might provide valuable insights, a 
form of control, and an upside potential, whereas not taking equity stakes provides 
less management complexity.  
This dimension for categorizing corporate venturing activities is rather uncommon, 
and it is the only dimension in the studies reviewed that is mentioned only once. The 
reason might be that this particular paper deals with a very recent and rather unex-
plored phenomenon in the corporate venturing landscape, namely start-up programs, 
an idea that is also reflected in the recent publication of this paper. 
 Clustering of corporate venturing activities  
The studies under review identify a total of 37 corporate venturing activities with vari-
ous characteristics according to the dimensions discussed in the preceding para-
graphs. Despite the use of different names, these described activities are not without 
overlaps. Based on an in-depth analysis of each of these activities, a clustering of 
activities that share similar characteristics is derived. In order to do so, a framework 
including two of the previously discussed dimensions for categorization of activities is 
proposed. The first component is the locus of opportunity, which can either be inter-
nal or external. This dimension was chosen as it is the most frequently applied one in 
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the studies under review, and therefore 30 out of 37 activities have already been 
analyzed on the dimension. For the remaining seven activities, a categorization as 
either internal or external was done based on its descriptions in the studies. The se-
cond element involves the objectives that can be mainly financial, mainly strategic, or 
balanced. This dimension, which is explicitly applied to 11 out of 37 activities in the 
reviewed studies, was selected as the characteristics of the remaining dimensions 
provide evidence with regards to its overall objective. For example, with regards to 
the investment mediation dimension, indirect investments are considered suitable for 
the achievement of mainly financial objectives only because access to the start-ups 
is limited whereas direct investments enable the pursuit of mainly strategic objectives 
thanks to direct access to the start-ups. Furthermore, descriptions of the activities in 
the studies under review provided insights on the overall objective pursued enabling 
a categorization on this dimension. 
Based on these two dimensions, six clusters of corporate venturing activities can be 
derived, namely (1) intrapreneur, (2) commercializer, (3) intrapreneurial commercial-
izer, (4) connector, (5) investor, and (6) connecting investor (see Figure 2). In the 
following paragraphs, each cluster of activities is discussed including their character-
istics and objectives, and provide examples of companies applying these activities 
are provided. Appendix 3 presents an overview of the allocation of activities. 
 
Figure 2: Clustering of 37 described activities5 
                                            
5 The total number of activities sums up to 40, as three activities are described to be focusing on opportunities 
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2.4.1 Internal-strategic activities: ‘intrapreneur’ 
Strategically oriented corporate venturing activities based on internal ideas come in 
several forms. These activities are considered to be the most well-known form of 
corporate venturing, and the focus of this activity centers on exploration in the early 
years of development of new opportunities that arise inside the boundaries of the 
parent company (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). As these activities focus on strengthening 
entrepreneurial activities within the existing organization the cluster is named ‘intra-
preneur.’ See Table 3 for an overview of studies describing activities of this cluster. 
      Study type 
Allocation  Author(s) (year) CV activity Conceptual Empirical 






Miles, Covin (2002) Direct-Internal 
 
ü
  Indirect-Internal   ü 
Campbell et al. (2003) Innovation Venturing   ü 
Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) Internal Explorer   ü 
Biniari et al. (2015) Corporate strategy logic ü 
     Ad hoc logic ü   
    Hybrid strategic ecology logic ü   
    Real options logic ü   
Table 3: Overview studies with internal-strategic activities 
In its simplest form, the activities are executed directly by encouraging employees 
with an idea to develop the idea further. Employees typically receive support in the 
form of corporate funding made available through operating or strategic budgets and 
the utilization of internal resources. However, it is also possible to carry out this ac-
tivity in an indirect way where a separate investment intermediary that functions as 
an internal corporate venturing fund grants the funding for the activity (Miles & Covin, 
2002). 
Activities of this type serve as explorative vehicles (Biniari et al., 2015; Hill & Birkin-
shaw, 2008) for internal ventures that are connected with the parent company´s 
strategy and are operationally highly related to the core business driving the devel-
opment of internal intellectual property and financial and human resources (Biniari et 
al., 2015). The logic behind using this form of corporate venturing is the idea that ac-
tively nurturing and developing business ideas ultimately lead to sources of growth 
for the company in the future (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). These activities can either be 
directed towards new venture development within the current core business and/or 
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they can focus on a strategic renewal of the core business. Within business units, 
internal venturing activities can also be executed to experiment without the launch of 
a formal venturing program (Biniari et al., 2015). 
This form of corporate venturing is frequently used to increase existing functional per-
formance, often in the field of R&D. These internal activities are meant to overcome 
underperformance with regards to commercially oriented innovation and creativity, 
but in order to do so, sufficient entrepreneurial thinking that can be stimulated 
through corporate venturing activity must already exist within the company (Campbell 
et al., 2003). Although it is argued that internal corporate venturing activities can also 
lead to a more entrepreneurial-minded culture within the parent company, it is not 
reasonable to expect a broad impact on cultural change within the company because 
of these activities (Campbell et al., 2003). An advantage of this activity lies in the high 
level of control the parent company has in designating the areas of innovation within 
existing domains, but it comes with the disadvantage of not being able to access up-
coming opportunities outside the company (Biniari et al., 2015). 
One example is the GameChanger program by the Royal Dutch Shell Group, a pro-
gram launched to increase innovation in the technical function of the exploration 
business. The idea was to spend 10% of the technical budget on innovative internal 
business ideas from anywhere within the Shell group. After a stage gate process, 
which started from screening the ideas to selecting the most promising ones, funding 
to develop and commercialize these ideas was provided to the internal venture. Alt-
hough not all ideas were successful, the program screened more than 400 ideas in 
the first six years, out of which 32 new technologies could be commercialized and 
three new businesses were created (Campbell et al., 2003; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008).  
The American conglomerate 3M has used this form of corporate venturing for quite 
some time. Through a management control system, business resources were allo-
cated to innovative business ideas for development and commercialization. To sup-
port this approach, the company granted 15% of the technical personnel`s time as 
spare time to spark innovative ideas and to encourage the employee to work on his 
or her own innovative projects (Miles & Covin, 2002). 
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Further examples of established companies that use these internal corporate ventur-
ing activities include Procter & Gamble, General Motors, and AT&T (Miles & Covin, 
2002). 
2.4.2 Internal-financial activities: ‘commercializer’ 
Internal corporate venturing activities with mainly financial objectives try to make use 
of existing company assets and monetize them. These assets are usually patents, 
technologies, raw ideas, or managerial talent, all of which can usually be monetized 
within a short timeframe and are frequently spun out as new businesses (Hill & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). The basic idea of these corporate venturing activities is therefore 
to convert existing corporate technologies into commercial ventures and then into 
cash (Campbell et al., 2003), which is also reflected in the name of this cluster of ac-
tivities: ‘commercializer.’ 
These internal units are thus considered to be exploitation driven and are referred to 
as harvesting units (Campbell et al., 2003; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008), internal exploi-
ters (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008), or corporate incubators (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 
2015). This corporate venturing activity is especially relevant if individuals inside the 
company can develop promising ideas or technologies that do not adhere to the cur-
rent strategy or business model (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). The strategic and 
operational relatedness of the new ventures to be commercialized through these ac-
tivities with the current strategic and operational orientation of the parent company is 
considered to be low (Biniari et al., 2015). The units for this form of corporate ventur-
ing need to provide a start-up like environment in which the idea can efficiently flour-
ish more than it would in the often slow and bureaucratic environment of the estab-
lished company (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015).  
The advantage of this corporate venturing activity is that resources such as equip-
ment or access to corporate parent customers can often be used to incubate new 
businesses. However, these benefits also come with a downside; overprotection of 
the corporate parent might occur, and too close ties with the parent company might 
prevent the start-ups from developing products that could disrupt the existing busi-
ness of the parent (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). Another main pitfall of these activ-
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ities is that instead of seeing them as pure harvesting vehicles, companies often ex-
pect them to be platforms for new growth (Campbell et al., 2003). Table 4 provides 
an overview of studies describing these internal-financial activities. 
      Study type 
Allocation  Author(s) (year) CV activity Conceptual Empirical 




Campbell et al. (2003) Harvesting Venturing 
 
ü
Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) Internal Exploiter   ü 
Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015) Corporate Incubation   ü 
  Biniari et al. (2015) Hybrid corporate finance logic ü   
Table 4: Overview studies with internal-financial activities 
Lucent, the telecommunications equipment company that merged with Alcatel in 
2006, used this form of corporate venturing to exploit underused assets by commer-
cializing technologies that were developed in the internal R&D departments but not 
immediately used by the business units of the company. After four years of operation, 
35 ventures out of more than 300 screened opportunities had been created, and the-
se ventures raised more than $350 million in external venture capital. In 2001, how-
ever, the activity was discontinued, as the environment for new ventures was consid-
ered not optimal (Campbell et al., 2003). 
Another example is British Telecommunications Plc, which established a similar unit 
with the objective of creating financial value from their R&D database of more than 
14,000 patents and 2,500 inventions. After two years of operation, four businesses 
had been created, delivering revenues of more than £30 million (Campbell et al., 
2003; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
In addition, the research facility of XEROX spun off the successful companies 3COM 
and Adobe through the use of these corporate venturing activities (Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015). 
2.4.3 Internal-balanced activities: ‘intrapreneurial commercializer’ 
The combination of financial and strategic objectives in corporate venturing are pre-
sent in a hybrid alliance logic (Biniari et al., 2015). These activities combine internal 
and external means by serving as a combination of exploiting internal opportunities to 
drive the existing core business and, at the same time, to allow for exploration of up-
Corporate venturing activities: a review of typologies and proposed framework           35 
coming external opportunities. Alliances with venture capital firms compliment the 
internal activities, linking them to the overall achievement of strategic and financial 
objectives (Biniari et al., 2015). As this cluster combines elements of the other two 
clusters of internal activities it is named ‘intrapreneurial commercializer.’ 
However, it is necessary to mention that this form of corporate venturing is a theoret-
ical construct for which no empirical examples can be found in the reviewed papers. 
Furthermore, such activity is only described in one conceptual study, as outlined in 
Table 5. Therefore, practical relevance has to be considered as low. 
      Study type 
Allocation  Author(s) (year) CV activity Conceptual Empirical 
          Intrapreneurial 
commercializer 
(Internal-Balanced) 
Biniari et al. (2015) Hybrid alliance logic ü 
 
Table 5: Overview studies with internal-balanced activities 
2.4.4 External-strategic activities: ‘connector’ 
Corporate venturing activities that focus on opportunities external to the company´s 
boundaries for mainly strategic objectives make up a very common form of corporate 
venturing, an idea that becomes evident when considering the fact that in the studies 
under review, most described activities fall into this category (see Table 6 for an 
overview). The cluster´s name ‘connector’ results from the idea that for the achieve-
ment of strategic objectives the established companies get connected with external 
start-ups through these activities.  
      Study type 
Allocation  Author(s) (year) CV activity Conceptual Empirical 




Chesbrough (2002) Driving Investments   ü
  Enabling Investments   ü 
Miles, Covin (2002) Direct-External   ü 
  Campbell et al. (2003) Ecosystem Venturing   ü 
  Weber, Weber (2005) Strategic Dependent   ü 
    Strategic Independent   ü 
  Markham et al. (2005) Direct Investment   ü 
  Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) External Explorer   ü 
  Battistini et al.  (2013) Strategic Model   ü 
  Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015) Start-Up Program (Outside-in)   ü 
    Start-Up Program (Platform)   ü 
  Biniari et al. (2015) Hybrid strategic ecology logic ü   
    Real options logic ü   
     
Table 6: Overview studies with external-strategic activities 
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The importance of strategic objectives for external corporate venturing activities is 
argued to be high because shareholders of companies might oppose activities for 
purely financial reasons, as they prefer to invest their wealth and diversify their port-
folios to their own preferences and have the opportunity to do so in the market. It is 
therefore argued that in order to be accepted by shareholders, corporate venturing 
activities should be linked to the strategic direction of a company or provide clear op-
erational benefits for it (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). 
Strategically focused activities are frequently conducted in a direct way, meaning the 
investments are made directly into the start-ups without a financial intermediary. By 
using this form of direct external corporate venturing activities, the interaction with the 
start-ups is more intense, and the companies facilitate their strategic objectives re-
garding the transfer of specific technologies, resources, or capabilities. Indirect in-
vestments with a financial intermediary do not provide this strong interaction, making 
direct investments more relevant for the pursuit of strategic objectives (Miles & Covin, 
2002). 
One form of corporate venturing activity in this field is targeted at enhancing the ex-
isting strategy of the parent company. There is a tight coupling of the selected start-
ups with the extant processes and operational capabilities of the parent company, 
and investments are therefore made in domains in which the company is already ac-
tive. This practice comes with the drawback of having to sustain the extant strategic 
direction, and it most likely does not support the parent company in dealing with dis-
ruptive changes or the identification of completely new opportunities based on envi-
ronmental change (Chesbrough, 2002).  
An example of this form of external-strategic corporate venturing activities is Agilent 
Technologies, an American healthcare equipment and services company that focus-
es on investments in three strategic growth areas closely related to its current busi-
ness. In this case, the corporate venturing unit works closely with the business units 
and connects the start-ups with ongoing initiatives within the company (Chesbrough, 
2002). Another example is Siemens with its corporate venture capital unit Siemens 
Venture Capital GmbH, which strategically invests in external companies that have a 
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connection to their businesses either as a potential partner or as a supplier. These 
investments sometimes lead to an acquisition in a later stage (Hill & Birkinshaw, 
2008). 
In their empirical study, Battistini et al. (2013) find that the majority of corporate ven-
turing units (56%) focus on investments into adjacent business areas of the parent 
company. More than a quarter of units (27%) engage in areas even closer to their 
recent activity by pursuing the strategic objectives of strengthening and reinforcing 
the extant core business of the corporate parent. In their study, only the remaining 
minority of corporate venturing units (17%) focuses on white spot opportunities be-
yond the boundaries of existent business areas. This orientation towards corporate 
venturing activities in well-known fields is a phenomenon the findings of Weber and 
Weber (2005) support. They argue that the focus on mainly strategic objectives and a 
dependence on organizational structures and processes are considered to be more 
promising than activities that are less dependent on organizational structures and 
processes. One explanation might be the higher explorative character in independent 
activities, which is generally considered to deliver more uncertain results. 
Activities that have a high explorative character are focused more on looking at tech-
nologies or businesses outside the current strategic focus, which could be disruptive 
to the extant products and services offered. An example is a corporate venturing unit 
that focuses on investments in start-ups with growth potential in a business domain 
that might have future strategic importance for the parent company (Hill & Birkin-
shaw, 2008). 
Corporate venturing activities directed at complementing the current business of the 
parent company are termed enabling investments (Chesbrough, 2002), or ecosystem 
venturing (Campbell et al., 2003). This form of corporate venturing is especially rele-
vant when the company´s business depends on the activity of a community of com-
plementary products and the start-ups in this field lack a sufficient provision of capital 
(Campbell et al., 2003). The overall logic is evident in the idea that the company can 
stimulate demand for their own products by supporting the relevant parties in the 
ecosystem (Chesbrough, 2002). 
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A prominent example for this form of strategic corporate venturing activity is Intel 
capital, which actively nurtured start-ups making hardware and software in the fields 
of video, audio, and graphics, areas that required increasingly powerful microproces-
sors in the computers. By advancing these start-ups, they thus fueled demand for 
their own products (Campbell et al., 2003; Chesbrough, 2002). 
Whereas these described forms of corporate venturing activities are built on the es-
tablished approach of corporate venture capital investments, Weiblen and 
Chesbrough (2015) argue that new activities of established companies for the en-
gagement with start-ups in recent years are less focused on equity. This develop-
ment underlines the fact that there is less financial orientation and higher strategic 
orientation involved. In their study, they specifically refer to start-up programs for in-
side-out innovation flow, platform programs, and outside-in innovation flow with, for 
example, corporate accelerator programs that support start-ups without taking shares 
in exchange. 
Platform programs basically follow the rationale of enabling investments or ecosys-
tem venturing to support complementary external innovation in order to enhance the 
value of its own products. One example is SAP, which launched the Startup Focus 
platform and has more than 1,500 young companies active in the program after two 
years. These companies receive support for developing their products, leading to an 
increased attractiveness of the HANA database SAP is offering to its customers 
(Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). 
For outside-in innovation flow, corporate accelerators are time-limited programs in 
which cohorts of start-ups in a specific product category receive support in the form 
of funding, coaching, office space, and close interaction with the parent company. 
Examples of this new activity in the context of interaction with start-ups include Nike, 
which launched an accelerator program for the development of innovative apps for 
their Nike+ products in 2013, and Intel, which launched an accelerator program spe-
cifically for start-ups in the field of wearable technologies in 2014 (Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015). 
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2.4.5 External-financial activities: ‘investor’ 
External corporate venturing activities that focus mainly on financial objectives often 
make use of the independent venture capital model, applying it to the corporate con-
text. As such, this form of venturing can be called a venture capital market logic (Bi-
niari et al., 2015). Additional terms used to describe these activities are passive in-
vestments (Chesbrough, 2002), private equity venturing (Campbell et al., 2003), or 
external exploiter (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). The name ‘investor’ of this cluster reflects 
the notion of external-financial activities. Table 7 provides an overview of the studies 
describing these activities. 
      Study type 
Allocation  Author(s) (year) CV activity Conceptual Empirical 






Chesbrough (2002) Passive Investments 
 
ü
Miles, Covin (2002) Indirect-External   ü 
Campbell et al. (2003) Private Equity Venturing   ü 
Weber, Weber (2005) Financial Dependent   ü 
  Financial Indepedent   ü 
  Markham et al. (2005) VC fund investment   ü 
  Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) External Exploiter   ü 
  Battistini et al.  (2013) Financial Model   ü 
  Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015) Corporate Venturing   ü 
  Biniari et al. (2015) VC market logic ü   
    Hybrid joint venture logic ü   
     
Table 7: Overview studies with external-financial activities 
Although there might be some explorative activity involved, the main focus is on ex-
ploitation in the form of leveraging a parent company`s assets, which can include 
brand reputation, contacts, or industry knowledge, in order to gain access to a good 
deal flow (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). These advantages differentiate the corporate in-
vestor from independent investors on the market (Campbell et al., 2003). As there is 
no requirement for the support of existing businesses or the identification of new 
growth opportunities with these investments, companies taking part in this kind of 
investing are considered to do basically no more than to simply diversify into the pri-
vate equity business (Campbell et al., 2003). 
Indirect investments in particular fall into this category. In these activities, a company 
(among other investors) invests into a venture capital fund that might be outside of 
the company and is managed by non-corporate employees who invest in start-ups 
within certain industries. Although these forms of corporate venturing activities might 
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also provide insights into new technologies, a direct transfer of technologies, capabili-
ties, or intellectual property is usually not an included benefit, making it a mainly fi-
nancially-oriented corporate venturing activity (Miles & Covin, 2002). 
In their recent study, Battistini et al. (2013) find that almost one out of four of the 48 
analyzed corporate venturing units (23%) are primarily focused on delivering sustain-
able financial returns by using the parent company’s industry expertise and channels. 
They also find that these activities are usually organized as an independent entity 
with access to a committed pool of financial resources. The findings of Weber and 
Weber (2005) support the importance of having independence from the parent com-
pany for the performance of mainly financially oriented corporate venturing activities. 
They argue that having a higher decision-making autonomy, at least to a specific 
amount of deal size, leads to higher success rates.  
A common pitfall is that taking this approach might be considered an easy path to 
success merely because other companies have experienced success with external 
corporate venturing activities. Justification for diversifying into the private equity busi-
ness is only provided if a parent company has better access to a deal flow than inde-
pendent investors do. This access, however, is only given in rare circumstances 
through leveraging the parent company´s position in the market or proprietary tech-
nology (Campbell et al., 2003).  
In order to be successful with such activities, it is argued that the interference of the 
corporate parent, especially with regards to investment strategy, must be strictly lim-
ited. Furthermore, frequently unsuitable incentive schemes derived from the corpo-
rate parent hinder the corporate venturing unit from recruiting required experts with a 
venture capital background (Battistini et al., 2013). 
The most prominent example of financially oriented external corporate venturing ac-
tivities is GE Equity (Campbell et al., 2003; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). Founded in 
1996 by General Electric, the program is considered to be very successful; it had 
more than 200 employees by the year 2000 and invested more than $4 billion in 
more than 300 companies (Campbell et al., 2003). Another example is British Gas 
Technology, which uses indirect investments into a venture capital fund within their 
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overall corporate venturing strategy to generate substantial financial returns. In order 
to achieve a change in corporate culture and strategic benefits, other activities were 
used (Miles & Covin, 2002). Finally, Nokia Venture Partners, which operates like a 
venture capital firm, acts as a mainly financially oriented corporate investor on the 
market (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
2.4.6 External-balanced activities: ‘connecting investor’ 
A balanced mix of strategic and financial objectives characterizes these external cor-
porate venturing activities which are outlined in Table 8. Empirical studies show that 
this balanced mix of objectives is a common phenomenon in practice, with almost 
half (Battistini et al., 2013) and more than one third (Weber & Weber, 2005) of ana-
lyzed corporate venturing units applying this model. As this cluster combines ele-
ments of the other two clusters of external activities it is named ‘connecting investor.’ 
      Study type 
Allocation  Author(s) (year) CV activity Conceptual Empirical 
          Connecting investor 
(External-Balanced) 
  
Chesbrough (2002) Emergent Investments ü
Battistini et al.  (2013) Balanced Model  ü 
  Biniari et al. (2015) Hybrid alliance logic ü 
 
Table 8: Overview studies with external-balanced activities 
Battistini et al. (2013) find that the main strategic objective of employing this balanced 
model is the potential to gain insights into new technologies and business models 
while at the same time delivering financial returns to ensure the sustainability and 
credibility of the corporate venturing activities. However, an unclear or unspecified 
mandate of such a balanced model focusing on strategic and financial objectives can 
lead to inefficient resource allocations and an unfocused investment strategy, conse-
quences that might dilute performance and credibility of the activity. Therefore, it is 
also important to combine strategic as well as financial expertise in the teams of cor-
porate venturing units to create balance (Battistini et al., 2013). 
Corporate venturing activities might also witness a shift in objectives over time. In a 
short timeframe, financial benefits might be more relevant, whereas in the long run 
strategic benefits might dominate, making these different objectives part of a bal-
anced approach. Chesbrough (2002) provides the example of emergent investments 
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in which a company makes investments in start-ups with tight links to operational ca-
pabilities but little enhancement of strategy. This approach provides mainly financial 
returns, but it can also serve as a strategic upside in case of change in business en-
vironment or change in company strategy. 
An example for corporate venturing activity in which the objectives changed over time 
is the investment of Intel in a start-up called Berkley Networks. This company made 
routers and switches for communication networks, a field in which Intel was not ac-
tive, meaning they considered their involvement as a primarily financial investment. 
After some time, Intel realized the value of the products and adapted its strategy, 
culminating in the launch of the Intel Exchange Architecture products. Therefore, with 
the help of the investment in Berkley Networks, Intel was able to identify and benefit 
from a promising business opportunity more quickly than it might have without the 
corporate venturing activity (Chesbrough, 2002). 
 Further research 
Based on the discussion of different corporate venturing characteristics and activities, 
two potential areas for further research can be identified, namely (1) recent forms of 
corporate venturing activities and (2) the strategic objectives of corporate venturing 
activities. These areas will be outlined in the following paragraphs. 
2.5.1 Recent forms of corporate venturing activities 
This literature review suggests that activities with a focus on external opportunities 
and strategic objectives in particular seem to be quite multifaceted. As corporate ven-
turing activities have become increasingly popular and as companies from diverse 
industries have begun to apply them over the last few years (Frank, 2013), the heter-
ogeneity of different activities used in this field has also been increased, with new 
forms of venturing emerging. The latest developments in this heterogeneity are the 
new forms of corporate venturing activities, namely the described start-up programs 
(Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). These programs refer in particular to corporate ac-
celerators, time-limited programs in which start-up companies receive funding and 
various kinds of support such as training, mentoring, workshops, network-access, 
and office-space (Cohen, 2013; Dempwolf, Auer, & D'Ippolito, 2014; Miller & Bound, 
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2011). Only the most recent study in this review by Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) 
describes these activities but lacks to provide in-depth insights about their character-
istics.  
Despite its growing practical relevance, research on this phenomenon is still very lim-
ited, and only very few additional studies identify the general characteristics of corpo-
rate accelerators (e.g. Malek, Maine, & McCarthy, 2014; Hochberg, 2015). Indeed, a 
fundamental understanding of this phenomenon has not yet been achieved. Howev-
er, this understanding is necessary, as these new forms of corporate venturing activi-
ties comprise fundamentally different approaches from more traditional activities 
characterized by a more involved interaction with the start-ups. Furthermore, they are 
frequently used as extensions and not as substitutes of existing activities. Research 
on the objectives and the structures of such programs could provide additional in-
sights into potential benefits for companies should they engage with start-ups, and 
new efforts would complement existing corporate venturing research.  
This shortcoming is in line with a general lack of empirical research on the nature of 
corporate venturing activities, which makes it difficult to build up a solid foundation for 
extended research (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). Further research in the field of specific 
corporate venturing activities should be empirical and focus on the provision of a 
clear understanding of corporate accelerator programs in the context of venturing 
activities of established companies. This includes research questions regarding the 
transparency on the underlying objectives of these programs, the organizational 
structures, and the potential value propositions. The research design to achieve this 
fundamental understanding should be explorative and based on qualitative data col-
lected through interviews with representatives of companies active in this field. 
2.5.2 Strategic objectives of corporate venturing activities 
The review of existing studies shows that the overall objective is a highly relevant, 
and frequently applied differentiating characteristics for corporate venturing activities. 
In the provided analysis strategic objectives dominate in more than half of the 37 ac-
tivities discussed. However, the potential non-financial impact of corporate venturing 
activities remains vaguely explored and is only described superficially. This lack of 
Corporate venturing activities: a review of typologies and proposed framework           44 
analysis is underlined by the fact that empirical research on the strategic dimension 
of activities remains scarce (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010). One reason for this lack of 
information might be that measuring the financial performance of corporate venturing 
activities is comparably easier than measuring the strategic impact of various meth-
ods of measurement and still requires further development (Narayanan et al., 2009).  
The relevance of strategic objectives of corporate venturing activities has been dis-
cussed in this study and further examination of this dimension is required. As one of 
the main strategic objectives of the reviewed activities is focused on knowledge ac-
quisition and learning, future research should focus on this important facet of the 
strategic dimension. This suggestion is in line with the ideas of Narayanan et al. 
(2009), who also identify a lack of theoretical grounding in extant corporate venturing 
publications and argue for the analysis of corporate venturing in the light of existing 
theories, for example from the field of organizational learning. 
This potential avenue of further research with regards to the strategic dimension and 
specifically organizational learning can also be combined with the gap in understand-
ing surrounding the heterogeneity of corporate venturing activities and new emerging 
forms such as corporate accelerators, stimulating discussion on the real value con-
tributed by these programs. 
 Summary of findings and conclusion 
The literature review builds on the heterogeneity of corporate venturing activities and 
analyzes extant typologies in the field of corporate venturing research. First, six 
characteristics of activities that are used as categorization dimensions to differentiate 
corporate venturing activities in the reviewed studies are identified and discussed. 
These dimensions include locus of opportunity, objectives, strategic logic, link to ex-
tant capabilities and organization, investment mediation, and equity involvement. Se-
cond, a framework and categorize 37 activities described in the analyzed studies is 
proposed. Based on the locus of opportunity (which can be either internal or external 
to the parent company´s boundaries) and the main focus of the objectives (which can 
be strategic, financial, or balanced), six clusters of activities are derived, providing 
transparency with regards to their characteristics and objectives. The highest number 
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of activities (13) can be classified as external-strategic corporate venturing activities, 
a fact that underlines the strategic relevance of corporate venturing. 
The discussion of the objectives of the companies behind corporate venturing activi-
ties reveals a number of non-financial purposes. A majority of these objectives is re-
lated to accessing knowledge outside the company, such as information about new 
markets or technologies. Extending the still limited understanding of these objectives 
is one of the proposed areas for further research. Furthermore, new activities that 
have received very limited scholarly attention so far are identified, namely start-up 
programs such as corporate accelerators. These activities present another opportuni-
ty for further research. 
Overall, the study provides transparency on the characteristics which differentiate 
corporate venturing activities and proposes six clusters of activities. By doing so, the 
study contributes to research on the heterogeneity of activities. The transparency on 
the differentiating characteristics can be applied in further research about start-up 
programs (e.g. corporate accelerators) in order to explore this phenomenon in detail 
and can be the basis to develop a typology of different programs. Practitioners bene-
fit from the overview of different characteristics and existing activities which support 
them in designing or improving their own corporate venturing activities. 
  
Corporate venturing activities: a review of typologies and proposed framework           46 
 List of appendices 
Appendix 1: Studies selected for review .................................................................... 47	
Appendix 2: Overview corporate venturing activities per study .................................. 48	
Appendix 3: Overview of corporate venturing activity allocation ................................ 48	
 
  
Corporate venturing activities: a review of typologies and proposed framework           47 
 Appendix 
Appendix 1: Studies selected for review  
Author(s) (year) Title Journal JOURQUAL3  
        Miles, Covin (2002) Exploring the Practice of Corporate Venturing: 
Some Common Forms and Their Organization-
al Implications 
Entrepreneurship Theory & 
Practice 
A 
Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) Strategy–organization configurations in corpo-
rate venture units: Impact on performance and 
survival 
Journal of Business Venturing A 
Weiblen, Chesbrough 
(2015) 
Engaging with Startups to Enhance Corporate 
Innovation 
California Management  
Review 
B 
Biniari et al. (2015) The configuration of corporate venturing logics: 
An integrated resource dependence and institu-
tional perspective 
Small Business Economics B 
Chesbrough (2002) Making Sense of Corporate Venture Capital Harvard Business Review C 
Reimsbach, Hauschild 
(2012) 
Corporate venturing: An extended typology Journal of Management 
Control 
C 
Campbell et al. (2003) The Future of Corporate Venturing MIT Sloan Management 
Review 
C 





Battistini et al.  (2013) The State of Corporate Venturing: Insights from 




Weber, Weber (2005) Corporate Venture Capital Organizations in 
Germany 
Venture Capital: An Interna-
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Appendix 2: Overview of corporate venturing activities per study 
    




          
          Allocation 
Author(s) 




financial Balanced 1st 2nd 
Chesbrough 
(2002) 
Driving Investments   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Enabling Investments   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Emergent Investments   ü     ü External-Balanced  
Passive Investments   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Miles, Covin 
(2002) 
Direct-Internal ü   ü     Internal-Strategic  
Direct-External   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Indirect-Internal ü   ü     Internal-Strategic  
Indirect-External   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Campbell et 
al. (2003) 
Ecosystem Venturing   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Innovation Venturing ü   ü     Internal-Strategic  
Harvesting Venturing ü     ü   Internal-Financial  
Private Equity Venturing   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Weber,  
Weber (2005) 
Strategic Dependent   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Strategic Independent   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Financial Dependent   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Financial Indepedent   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Markham et 
al. (2005) 
Direct Investment   ü ü     External-Strategic  
VC fund investment   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Hill, Birkin-
shaw (2008) 
Internal Explorer ü   ü     Internal-Strategic  
Internal Exploiter ü     ü   Internal-Financial  
External Explorer   ü ü     External-Strategic  
External Exploiter   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Battistini et 
al.  (2013) 
Strategic Model   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Financial Model   ü   ü   External-Financial  




Corporate Venturing   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Corporate Incubation ü     ü   Internal-Financial  
Start-Up Program (Outside-in)   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Start-Up Program (Platform)   ü ü     External-Strategic  
Biniari et al. 
(2015) 
Corporate strategy logic ü   ü     Internal-Strategic  
Hybrid corporate finance logic ü     ü   Internal-Financial  
Ad hoc logic ü   ü     Internal-Strategic  
VC market logic   ü   ü   External-Financial  
Hybrid strategic ecology logic ü ü ü     Internal-Strategic External-Strategic 
Hybrid alliance logic ü ü     ü Internal-Balanced External-Balanced 
Real options logic ü ü ü     Internal-Strategic External-Strategic 
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Appendix 3: Overview of corporate venturing activity allocation 
      
Allocation  Author(s) (year) CV activity 
      Internal-Strategic Miles, Covin (2002) Direct-Internal 
    Indirect-Internal 
  Campbell et al. (2003) Innovation Venturing 
  Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) Internal Explorer 
  Biniari et al. (2015) Corporate strategy logic 
    Ad hoc logic 
    Hybrid strategic ecology logic 
    Real options logic 
Internal-Financial Campbell et al. (2003) Harvesting Venturing 
  Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) Internal Exploiter 
  Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015) Corporate Incubation 
  Biniari et al. (2015) Hybrid corporate finance logic 
Internal-Balanced Biniari et al. (2015) Hybrid alliance logic 
External-Strategic Chesbrough (2002) Driving Investments 
    Enabling Investments 
  Miles, Covin (2002) Direct-External 
  Campbell et al. (2003) Ecosystem Venturing 
  Weber, Weber (2005) Strategic Dependent 
    Strategic Independent 
  Markham et al. (2005) Direct Investment 
  Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) External Explorer 
  Battistini et al.  (2013) Strategic Model 
  Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015) Start-Up Program (Outside-in) 
    Start-Up Program (Platform) 
  Biniari et al. (2015) Hybrid strategic ecology logic 
    Real options logic 
External-Financial Chesbrough (2002) Passive Investments 
  Miles, Covin (2002) Indirect-External 
  Campbell et al. (2003) Private Equity Venturing 
  Weber, Weber (2005) Financial Dependent 
    Financial Indepedent 
  Markham et al. (2005) VC fund investment 
  Hill, Birkinshaw (2008) External Exploiter 
  Battistini et al.  (2013) Financial Model 
  Weiblen, Chesbrough (2015) Corporate Venturing 
  Biniari et al. (2015) VC market logic 
    Hybrid joint venture logic 
External-Balanced Chesbrough (2002) Emergent Investments 
  Battistini et al.  (2013) Balanced Model 
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Abstract 
An increasing number of established companies have recently started to launch cor-
porate accelerator programs to engage with entrepreneurial start-ups, making this a 
worldwide, cross-industrial phenomenon. Nevertheless, there is a lack of understand-
ing of the various objectives and approaches adopted by companies. This article ex-
amines 13 in-depth case studies of corporate accelerator programs and is the first to 
empirically derive and discuss a typology for corporate accelerators, assessing ob-
jectives and design configurations. Thereby, the article contributes to the emerging 
discussion about corporate accelerators in corporate entrepreneurship literature. 
Moreover, the findings provide corporate managers with an understanding of corpo-
rate accelerators and guidance for how to make design choices for start-up engage-
ment programs.  
Keywords: Corporate accelerator, start-up engagement, corporate entrepreneurship 
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 Introduction 
There has been a recent surge of corporate accelerator programs worldwide. Espe-
cially since the beginning of the 2010s, an increasing number of companies have 
established these programs to internalize the opportunities presented by external 
start-ups (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). By early 2016, the “Corporate Accelerator 
Database” listed more than 65 active programs in 25 countries (The Corporate Ac-
celerator Database, 2016), whereas other sources estimate there to be more than 
120 programs (Desai, 2016). 
In contrast to the existing corporate venture capital initiatives, corporate accelerators 
not only provide direct and indirect financial support to start-ups, but also aim to 
achieve additional objectives with more comprehensive start-up support models. 
Self-descriptions of corporate accelerator programs provide a variety of objectives, 
including endeavors to “support entrepreneurs and start-ups” (ProSiebenSat.1, 
2016), to “develop new business ideas and bring them to life” (E.On :agile Accelera-
tor, 2016), and to “support digital transformation” (Techstars Metro Accelerator, 
2016). 
Companies launching corporate accelerators are from diverse industries, for in-
stance, Walt Disney and Spring in the USA, Citigroup and Samsung in Israel, and 
METRO and Bayer in Germany. Several corporate accelerator programs have multi-
ple international locations, such as Microsoft’s accelerator program in seven cities in 
Europe, Asia, North America, and the Middle East, and Google’s in three countries in 
Latin America. As such, corporate accelerators are a global, cross-industrial phe-
nomenon. 
It is understood that corporate accelerators are typically time-limited programs with a 
standard duration of roughly three months that conduct a selective admission of a 
cohort of start-ups on a specific date. Furthermore, they provide various services, 
such as office space, mentoring, training, and networking opportunities, in addition to 
investment capital for start-ups (Cohen, 2013; Hallen, Bingham, & Cohen, 2014; 
Hochberg, 2015; Hoffmann & Radojevich-Kelley, 2012; Malek, Maine, & McCarthy, 
2014). Apart from this basic understanding, however, there is a lack of common un-
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derstanding of what comprises a corporate accelerator. 
Neither practical nor academic studies offer companies guidance for how to establish 
a corporate accelerator. More importantly, given the variety of objectives for corpo-
rate accelerator programs, different design configurations, such as the organizational 
integration of the program into the parent company or equity involvement in the start-
ups, might be necessary to foster the specific objectives of an organization.  
This article assesses these two elements of objectives and configurational choices, 
and empirically derives a typology for different corporate accelerator programs. 
Based on a sample of 34 recent interviews with managers of corporate accelerators 
and participating start-ups, we analyze 13 in-depth case studies of corporate accel-
erator programs. As a result, we identify four specific types of corporate accelerators 
and show that the typical configurations throughout eight categories differ according 
to the primary objective of the program. 
 Literature review  
Existing literature on accelerator programs only provides a limited and high-level un-
derstanding. Most studies address the non-corporate context, such as independent 
accelerator programs (e.g., Y Combinator, USA) (Hoffmann & Radojevich-Kelley, 
2012; Kim & Wagman, 2014) or public accelerator programs (e.g., MaRS Accelera-
tor, Canada) (Malek et al., 2014). Only three studies in peer-reviewed journals specif-
ically refer to corporate accelerators (Hochberg, 2015; Kohler, 2016; Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015). 
In contrast to the anecdotal evidence outlined in our introduction, two studies claim 
that corporations typically have rather uniform objectives for their corporate accelera-
tor activities, namely to insource external innovation and to stimulate and achieve 
corporate innovation through interaction with entrepreneurial start-ups. Simultane-
ously, these studies highlight a variety of design configurations for existing accelera-
tor programs (Hochberg, 2015; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). Only one study high-
lights additional strategic objectives of corporate accelerators, such as the rejuvena-
tion of corporate culture and talent attraction (Kohler, 2016). However, these objec-
tives are not linked to specific program configurations. 
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An initial categorization of these configurations simply provides high-level design op-
tions. Companies must decide whether to build an accelerator program independent-
ly or outsource the activity to an external partner like TechStars. Alternatively, com-
panies can partner with other companies to build a joint accelerator or join an existing 
accelerator as an additional partner (Hochberg, 2015). This categorization offers ini-
tial guidance, but lacks further conceptualization regarding specific company objec-
tives and subsequent design choices. For example, further dimensions of the design 
choices, such as equity involvement, operational proximity, or organizational integra-
tion, are not addressed.  
One existing study postulates a 4P approach, proposition, process, people, and 
presence, for the development of corporate accelerators (Kohler, 2016). While this 
framework is an important addition to understanding corporate accelerators, the in-
terdependencies of the various configurations of those dimensions are not consid-
ered. 
Thus, the existing knowledge of corporate accelerators provides a foundation for an 
elaborate discussion, but only a limited orientation for practitioners and insufficient 
guidance for the clear configuration of a corporate accelerator. 
 Analysis approach 
3.3.1 Methodology 
We follow an inductive research approach based on multiple case studies to achieve 
generalizable results (Eisenhardt, 1989). First, we analyzed each case to establish 
an understanding of the individual corporate accelerator. Then, we compared the 
cases to identify their commonalities and differences. We completed this iterative da-
ta analysis process when four specific types of corporate accelerators were clearly 
differentiated. Through this approach, we followed extant publications in the field of 
corporate entrepreneurship research (Malek et al., 2014; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 
2015). According to past research with a case study approach, three to five in-depth 
case studies are an acceptable number for adequate results (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hoffmann & Radojevich-Kelley, 2012). 
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3.3.2 Sample and data collection 
Our sample consists of 13 case studies selected according to a structured approach. 
We focus on corporate accelerator programs that fulfill the following criteria: (1) 
sponsorship by one established company with its main business not being invest-
ment in start-ups, (2) the location of the accelerator in Germany, and (3) ongoing ac-
tivity with at least one employee working full-time for the program. With the sponsor-
ship of one established company only, we purposely excluded a small number of 
programs that are managed jointly by several established companies. Public organi-
zations occasionally offer additional support to these programs, making the investiga-
tion of the objectives of and connections to specific companies more complex. Thus, 
we excluded these accelerators from our analysis. We focus on corporate accelerator 
programs in Germany due to our access to program managers and the strong pres-
ence of corporate accelerators in this country. According to database information, the 
second largest number of corporate accelerator programs worldwide is located in 
Germany. Furthermore, we exclude regional differences within our typology by in-
cluding only one country in our sample. We also focus on active programs with at 
least one employee working full-time for the program for data availability and access 
to program managers. 
We identified 13 corporate accelerator programs that meet these criteria and con-
tacted them via email or telephone to request an interview for our study. Additionally, 
start-up companies that participated in these corporate accelerator programs were 
identified through the corporate accelerator websites and we asked them to partici-
pate in our study as a matched-pair triangulation. As a result, we conducted inter-
views with the founders and co-founders who currently or recently participated in one 
of the identified corporate accelerator programs. Considering the two relevant per-
spectives of the program, namely the corporation and the start-up, allows for a more 
holistic view of accelerator programs and also reduces bias.  
In total, our sample consists of 34 semi-structured interviews that were conducted 
between July and September 2015 and in February 2016. Of the 31 interviews con-
ducted on the telephone or in person, 29 were recorded and transcribed shortly after 
the interviews occurred following the guidelines of Dresing and Pehl (2011). We re-
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lied on written notes for two interviews as the interviewees requested we not record 
the exchange. An additional three interviewees preferred to answer our questions in 
written form. Based on the publicly available data and the interviews conducted, a 
case study was compiled for each of the 13 corporate accelerator programs. There-
fore, our sample covers all programs that fulfill the definition criteria. Of these, 12 
cases are based on interview data and publicly available information and one is 
based on publicly available information only. Table 9 provides an overview of the 
corporate accelerators in the sample. 
Parent Company Corporate accelerator Location Foun-ded 
Allianz SE  Allianz Digital Accelerator  Munich 2013 
Axel Springer SE Axel Springer Plug&Play Accelerator  Berlin 2013 
Bayer AG Grants4Apps Accelerator Berlin 2013 
Deutsche Telekom AG hub:raum Accelerator Berlin 2012 
Deutsche Bahn AG DB Accelerator Berlin 2015 
E.ON SE :agile accelerator Dusseldorf / Berlin 2013 
Immobilien Scout GmbH YOU IS NOW Accelerator Berlin 2013 
MediaSaturn Holding SpaceLab Accelerator Munich 2015 
Merck AG Merck Accelerator Darmstadt 2015 
METRO AG Techstars Metro Accelerator Berlin 2015 
Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Ventures Accelerator Berlin 2013 
ProSiebenSat.1 Media SE ProSiebenSat.1 Accelerator Berlin 2013 
Telefónica, S.A. Wayra Accelerator Munich 2012 
Table 9: Sample of corporate accelerators 
 Results of empirical analysis 
From our empirical analysis of the 13 case studies of corporate accelerators, we de-
rive two complementary sets of results. First, we identify different objectives of corpo-
rate accelerator programs and the various categories that companies must consider 
when designing the configuration of a corporate accelerator. In total, our results iden-
tify two configurational dimensions, specifically program focus and program organiza-
tion, resulting in eight different categories as presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Corporate accelerator differentiation dimensions 
Second, building on these eight categories and the analysis of the primary objectives 
for corporate accelerators, we deduct four archetypes of corporate accelerators: (1) 
listening post, (2) value chain investor, (3) test laboratory, and (4) unicorn hunter. Our 
results also show the design choices with which these archetypical corporate accel-
erators are typically associated. This categorization provides a comprehensive over-
view of the current status of the corporate accelerator landscape and indications for 
their suitable setup based on the main objective of the program. 
As the basis for the deduction of these four archetypical corporate accelerator types, 
the next sections discuss the two elements of corporate accelerator objectives and 
configurations. 
3.4.1 Corporate accelerator objectives 
The case analysis reveals a variety of objectives for corporate accelerator programs 
with varying priority. Therefore, we identify the primary objectives that provide the 
dominant program rationale as well as additional objectives that supplement the 
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overall program rationale. 
3.4.1.1 Primary objectives 
The primary objectives can be categorized as being either financial or strategic. In 
comparison to financial objectives, strategic objectives are multifaceted, providing a 
more concrete understanding of the generally acknowledged objective of supporting 
corporate innovation. 
3.4.1.1.1 Financial objectives 
The practice of generating financial returns by using corporate accelerator programs 
is rooted in the rationale that start-ups increase in value through participation in the 
program, and the parent company benefits financially. Based on the provision of 
coaching, mentoring, and training as well as an environment conducive to develop-
ment, the start-ups improve and therefore increase the value of the parent compa-
ny´s shares in the start-up. In the corporate accelerator programs in our sample, fi-
nancial objectives are always combined with additional non-financial objectives. 
However, financial objectives are not always of the utmost importance. In this case, 
financial returns are frequently defined as a necessary condition for program sustain-
ability. 
3.4.1.1.2 Strategic objectives 
There are diverse strategic objectives of corporate accelerator programs, and we 
identify three primary strategic objectives that extend the existing understanding of 
corporate accelerator objectives regarding insourcing innovation. 
Firstly, gaining an understanding of current market developments, trends, and tech-
nologies is one strategic objective of corporate accelerators. For the parent compa-
nies in our sample, the exchange with entrepreneurial start-ups in a respective mar-
ket is valuable since it allows the company to identify developments and recent and 
upcoming trends. The accelerator program in this context is a precursor for the inter-
nal innovation or research and development departments. Due to the start-ups usual-
ly working closely together with representatives of the parent company, exchanges 
about these topics are intensive and frequent. This objective is also described as a 
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way to ascertain emerging technologies. 
Secondly, in addition to understanding trends and technologies in the market, the 
further development and integration of the products and services from the start-ups is 
a strategic objective. The products and services of the start-ups are expected to im-
prove while in the accelerator, mainly by leveraging the competencies, resources, 
and networks of the parent company and potential external experts. After the pro-
gram, the start-up’s integration into the value chain of the company is desired. The 
targeted integration can vary, including the marketing of products through the parent 
company´s sales channels, the use of the product or service by the parent company, 
the increase of the parent company´s shares in the start-up, or a full take-over and 
integration of the start-up into the parent company.  
Thirdly, another strategic objective involves evaluating innovative products and ser-
vices that have the potential to disrupt the current business of the parent company. 
The main rationale is that constraints stipulated by corporate regulations often pre-
vent the testing and launching of new and potentially disruptive business models. 
Therefore, the corporate accelerator is designed as a protected environment that 
provides the resources and expertise required for development and testing without 
corporate interference.  
3.4.1.2 Additional objectives 
There are two additional strategic objectives. First, corporate accelerator programs 
strive to create a spirit of entrepreneurship within the established organization. 
Knowledge about entrepreneurial ways of working and cultural aspects is exchanged 
through the interaction of the start-ups with the employees from various departments, 
such as marketing, product development, corporate development, research and de-
velopment, or other functions of the corporate parent. From an organizational per-
spective, corporate accelerators often report to these departments and frequently 
have access to top management, which further facilitates the creation of an entrepre-
neurial spirit within the established company.  
Second, corporate accelerator programs impact the marketing and public relations 
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internal and external communication activities targeted at creating an image of being 
an innovative, agile, and flexible organization open to new developments in the mar-
ket and industry. Parent companies frequently mention their corporate accelerator 
programs in external communication, such as press releases or annual reports, and 
the corporate accelerator programs use social media for publicity. This communica-
tion also positions the company as an attractive employer and thereby aims to attract 
young talent. Furthermore, positioning the parent company within the start-up eco-
system as an active investor is also a public relations objective. 
3.4.2 Corporate accelerator configurations 
In addition to these various objectives, we identify two dimensions of corporate ac-
celerator configurations: program focus and program organization. Altogether, these 
dimensions include eight categories.  
3.4.2.1 Program focus 
The first dimension, program focus, includes five of the eight categories that com-
prise the corporate accelerator configuration. 
3.4.2.1.1 Locus of opportunity 
Corporate accelerators differ in their program focus in terms of locus of opportunity. 
Where several programs focus on external start-ups exclusively, other programs also 
target internal business ideas and start-ups. However, we do not find a corporate ac-
celerator program that focuses on internal business ideas exclusively.  
3.4.2.1.2 Strategic logic 
Regarding strategic logic following March (1991), we find a few differences among 
corporate accelerators. Exploration-oriented programs focus on understanding mar-
ket trends and developments as well as identifying the responsible entrepreneurial 
start-ups. Exploitation-oriented programs use existing parent company competencies 
to improve start-up development. Although our analysis reveals that most programs 
follow exploration and exploitation logic simultaneously, usually one form of logic 
dominates. 
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3.4.2.1.3 Industry focus 
Our analysis reveals a variety in the industry focus of the start-ups and in the opera-
tional proximity to the parent company. The heterogeneity in this dimension ranges 
from programs that clearly focus on start-ups within a specific industry relevant to the 
parent company to programs that have a very broad or no focus and admit start-ups 
with diverse industrial backgrounds. 
3.4.2.1.4 Equity involvement 
We find programs with and without equity involvement in the start-ups. Equity in-
volvement is usually between five and nine percent, which is transferred either direct-
ly by giving shares to the investor or in the form of a convertible loan that converts 
into equity at the next financing round of the start-up. 
3.4.2.1.5 Venture stage 
We find the venture stage of the start-ups also differs across corporate accelerators. 
Several programs admit start-ups that are in the idea stage and may not even be reg-
istered companies, some that are in the prototype stage, and some in later stages 
that have business with customers and generate revenue.  
3.4.2.2 Program organization   
The second dimension, program organization, includes the remaining three catego-
ries that comprise the corporate accelerator configuration. 
3.4.2.2.1 External partner 
There are corporate accelerator programs that are initiated and run internally, and 
others that contract an external partner. TechStars and Plug&Play Techcenter are 
such external partners, and are also the two most frequent global partners.6 Selecting 
an external partner is often due to the launch and execution of a corporate accelera-
tor program being complex and the parent company lacking the required capabilities.  
                                            
6 The corporate accelerator database (www.corporate-accelerators.net) lists 22 out of 67 corporate 
accelerator programs with an external partner (as of March 12, 2016), thereof nine TechStars and 
three Plug&Play Techcenter. 
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3.4.2.2.2 Connection to parent 
Corporate accelerators are either integrated within the parent company organization 
as part of a specific business unit, such as digital or online business, or a specific 
department, such as innovation management, corporate strategy, or product devel-
opment. This integration into one specific department also determines the reporting 
line of the accelerator management team, which usually reflects the objectives of the 
programs. As an alternative to integration into the parent company, the corporate ac-
celerator can be launched as an independent organization in the form of an inde-
pendent legal entity that usually acts as a 100% subsidiary of the parent company, 
ensuring a higher level of independence. 
3.4.2.2.3 Leadership experience 
The management of the corporate accelerator can either be the responsibility of 
someone with work experience in the parent company or of someone hired external-
ly. We find examples of heads of corporate accelerators with more than 15 years of 
experience within the parent company and a large network of internal contacts, and 
others with experience in the start-up ecosystem and a network of relevant external 
stakeholders, such as investors.  
 Corporate accelerator typology: Four distinct types 
Based on our empirical analysis, we identify four distinct types of corporate accelera-
tors specific to the primary objectives and the program configuration (see Table 10). 
Three types, (1) listening post, (2) value chain investor, and (3) test laboratory, are 
based on mainly strategic rationale. The fourth, (4) unicorn hunter, is based on main-
ly financial rationale, and, therefore, applies the business model of an independent 
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Table 10: Corporate accelerator typology 
3.5.1 Listening post 
The listening post corporate accelerator has a purely strategic orientation without any 
direct financial objectives. The main rationale for running this accelerator is to under-
stand the overall developments and trends in a respective market or industry and 
initiate cooperation with start-ups in these areas. This objective is frequently de-
scribed as the creation of a window into the new technologies and developments that 
might become relevant for the parent company or might disrupt the industry. 
A major differentiating factor for this type of corporate accelerator is that there is no 
equity involvement of the parent company in the start-ups, which underlines its purely 
strategic rationale. Instead, the listening post corporate accelerator follows a cooper-
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ative approach, which also involves less steering complexity for the parent company. 
The strategic rationale is also reflected in the focus of the programs, as the listening 
post corporate accelerators with an exclusive focus on external start-ups are explora-
tion-oriented towards external developments and recent and upcoming trends. In this 
explorative context, the programs focus on business areas that are mainly adjacent 
to the parent company, but not in very strict sense. Therefore, start-ups that have 
promising ideas in fields that are not a source of revenue for the parent company are 
frequently admitted to these programs. As the exchange with the start-ups and their 
ideas and technologies are of high relevance to the program, start-ups that are not 
yet legally founded but have promising ideas can regularly be admitted to these pro-
grams. The venture level of the start-ups, however, seems to depend on the industri-
al focus. In the field of complex technologies, for example, start-ups must have 
passed the idea stage to gain admission. Frequently, however, programs of this type 
are open to start-ups in very early stages. 
The importance of strong collaboration and proximity to the start-ups is also reflected 
in the organization of these programs. Listening post corporate accelerators are inte-
grated into the parent company organization and not established as independent le-
gal entities. 
The You Is Now Start-up Accelerator by the Scout24 portals is a listening post corpo-
rate accelerator. The program provides start-ups with a seed investment of 15,000 
Euro without an exchange for equity. Additionally, co-working space in Berlin, internal 
and external mentoring, and special training sessions, such as pitch training, are of-
fered. The program occurs twice a year and focuses on early-stage web-technology 
start-ups and entrepreneurial teams with promising ideas related to real estate. It is 
one of the longest lasting active programs in Germany, and concludes with a demo-
day in Berlin to which renowned international speakers from the fields of start-ups 
and venture capital are invited. 
The Microsoft Ventures Accelerator in Berlin was launched in the autumn of 2013 as 
part of Microsoft´s global start-up community with accelerators in seven cities world-
wide. The four-month program offers technology start-ups with diverse industrial 
Corporate accelerators as recent form of start-up engagement: the what, the why, and the how           67 
backgrounds mentorship, training, technical support, and networking opportunities 
with Microsoft executives. Instead of investment capital, the start-ups are granted the 
use of Microsoft products to further develop their businesses. After completing the 
program, start-ups become part of the global alumni network that includes more than 
400 start-ups. 
3.5.2 Value chain investor 
The value chain investor corporate accelerator also has a strategic orientation. The 
main objective is to identify and develop start-ups with new and innovative products 
and services from which the parent company can benefit somewhere along its value 
chain. These benefits might include the marketing of products or services through the 
existing distribution channels of the parent company. For example, additional prod-
ucts and services that complement or support, but do not necessarily replace, the 
parent company’s existing offerings. Therefore, start-ups are usually active in busi-
ness areas with strong linkages to the parent company´s business or target similar 
customer groups. 
Equity involvement in the start-ups is obligatory for value chain investor corporate 
accelerators to ensure access to technologies and strengthen cooperation. Usually, 
the objective is to maintain strong relationships with the most successful and relevant 
start-ups beyond the program’s duration. This relationship might include an increase 
in equity shares in the start-up, a full take-over, or the integration of the product or 
service into the parent company´s offerings. 
The rationale behind these programs is that during the accelerator program, the start-
ups can take advantage of the extensive expertise of the parent company in a specif-
ic business area. For start-ups, using the customer base of the parent company for 
product tests or trials is a highly relevant practice. Finally, the start-ups can use the 
parent company’s distribution channels, which frequently consist of thousands of out-
lets and millions of potential opportunities, to find customers. The start-ups are fre-
quently in later stages than those in listening post corporate accelerator programs. 
Typically, they have developed a product or service, or are at least in the prototype 
stage, and some companies already generate revenues with their offerings.  
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From an organizational perspective, the value chain investor corporate accelerators 
are part of the corporate parent organization in departments focusing on digital busi-
nesses and innovation. Due to the more complex equity investments than the non-
equity based cooperation of the listening post corporate accelerators, value chain 
investor corporate accelerators can also be run with the support of an external accel-
erator specialist. 
The TechStars METRO Accelerator is an example of a value chain investor corpo-
rate accelerator with the support of an external partner. The program was initiated by 
METRO Group, a global retail and wholesale group, with the objective to support the 
development of innovative solutions for the hospitality industry by engaging with en-
trepreneurial start-ups. The program admitted its first cohort of 11 start-ups from five 
countries focusing on the digital transformation of hotels, restaurants, and catering 
companies in the autumn of 2015. The program has a duration of three months, and 
staff from METRO, the accelerator company TechStars, and the digital marketing 
agency RG/A run the program.  
An additional example is the SPACELAB accelerator of the Media-Saturn-Holding 
GmbH, a leading German consumer electronics retailer active in 15 European coun-
tries with more than 1,000 retail outlets and online shops. The accelerator program, 
which launched in 2015, supports start-ups along the entire value chain of the parent 
company from logistics applications to innovative gadgets. Numerous dedicated sup-
port-partners are integrated from various fields of expertise, including advertising, 
financial planning, market research, business strategy, information technology, and 
logistics. Mentorship from the top management team is another important program 
feature necessary to leverage the success of the start-ups. Located in Munich, the 
program also provides office facilities, a hardware development lab, investment capi-
tal, and access to the resources of Media-Saturn.  
3.5.3 Test laboratory 
The test laboratory corporate accelerator is also strategically oriented. The main ra-
tionale is to provide a protected environment for testing promising new business ide-
as. In contrast to all other corporate accelerator types, the test laboratory corporate 
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accelerator does not exclusively focus on external start-ups. It also, and sometimes 
mainly, is dedicated to internal business ideas. This unique approach regarding the 
locus of opportunity also impacts equity involvement. Although equity involvement is 
obligatory in this accelerator type, two different ways of involvement in external start-
ups can be identified. The first is applied in combination with a stronger focus on in-
ternal business ideas than on external start-ups. This is a selective approach that 
targets a small number of collaborating external start-ups as long-term partnerships 
and potential full takeovers. There is not necessarily a specific end date for start-ups 
participating in the program, but collaboration is evaluated within a specific period 
(e.g., three to six months), at which point whether the idea is developed or terminated 
is decided. The second equity involvement approach is applied if the focus is mainly 
on external opportunities. It focuses on a higher number of investments with minority 
holdings in the external start-ups. This approach is more typical for corporate accel-
erators. 
Business ideas that go through the test laboratory corporate accelerator are at least 
minimally and often strongly related to the parent company’s business or industry, as 
the programs are often intended to find business models for future revenue creation.  
From an organizational perspective, test laboratory corporate accelerators are estab-
lished as independent organizations in the form of independent legal entities acting 
as 100% subsidiaries of the parent company. This independence is crucial for these 
accelerators, as they aim to protect innovative ideas from existing corporate struc-
tures to allow for uninterrupted venture development. 
One example of a test laboratory corporate accelerator is the :agile accelerator of the 
German utility company E.On that was initiated as an open innovation hub for ener-
gy-related business ideas from internal employees and external ventures to develop 
competitive business models. Three to six projects per quarter are admitted and re-
ceive funding of up to 30,000 Euro. At the end of the three-month accelerator phase, 
executives of E.On evaluate the ideas and decide whether to continue and invest in 
the start-ups. The program is located in two cities in Germany, Dusseldorf and Berlin. 
Since its beginning in 2013, the program has accelerated more than 40 start-ups.  
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Another example of a test laboratory is the Allianz Digital Accelerator launched by the 
global insurance company Allianz in Germany as a business incubation program. It is 
the innovation lab and new business building team for the Allianz Group, and focuses 
on building and growing InsurTech companies. This endeavor includes identifying 
future trends in the insurance business, asset management, and assistance services. 
The accelerator is a vehicle to identify and transform promising ideas into business-
es. In addition to the program management of the accelerator, the team also consists 
of experts from various fields, such as user experience creation, graphic design, web 
development, digital product management, and marketing. Beyond focusing on ex-
ternal ideas with which entrepreneurs can apply to participate in the program, the 
program also concentrates specifically on internal business ideas within the Allianz 
Group. 
3.5.4 Unicorn hunter 
The unicorn hunter corporate accelerator is the only identified corporate accelerator 
type that pursues mainly financial objectives. The main objective is to earn a financial 
premium on the numerous minority investments in start-ups, which reflects the busi-
ness model of independent accelerators, such as TechStars or Startup Factory. The 
equity involvement can be conducted in two different ways. The equity can be trans-
ferred directly in fixed terms (e.g., five percent) or in the form of a convertible loan 
that is converted into equity at the next financing round of the start-up. Both ap-
proaches do not require an individual valuation of each of the companies before the 
start-ups enter the program. In the first approach, all companies are valued equally, 
as they have to agree to the fixed conditions. In the second approach, valuation is 
conducted with the next financing in which the convertible loan is transferred into eq-
uity. 
This financial orientation also provides this corporate accelerator type with its name. 
The approach is designed to identify potential future unicorns, companies valued at 
more than $1 billion, by investing in numerous promising companies with the objec-
tive of at least some increasing their value significantly. 
In contrast to the other accelerator types, the unicorn hunter corporate accelerator 
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follows a mainly exploitative logic as these accelerators attempt to make the compa-
nies more valuable by leveraging their assets, such as technologies, networks, com-
petencies, or knowledge. Therefore, the start-ups are frequently not related to the 
core business of the parent company. Instead, they are chosen if they will most likely 
benefit from the parent company´s assets. One interviewee emphasized that the ac-
celerator program must somehow be able to help the venture become more valuable. 
Direct interaction with the parent company is therefore focused on transferring the 
capabilities to start-ups that help them to become more valuable companies.  
From an organizational perspective, programs are run as independent legal entities. 
The rationale behind this design choice is that it decreases the complexity of approv-
ing the numerous investments made into external start-ups. 
The Axel Springer Plug and Play Accelerator is one example of this accelerator type. 
The Berlin-based program was launched in 2013 and focuses on digital entrepre-
neurs of diverse industries. Three times a year, a cohort of start-ups is admitted into 
the hundred-day long program that ends with a demo-day with prestigious local and 
international investors. During the program, a variety of workshops, seminars, coach-
ing, and speeches are offered to the start-ups to develop the start-ups according to 
their individual needs so they can become more valuable. The accelerator intends to 
provide an encouraging environment with office space, infrastructure, and support in 
which the start-ups can develop freely. 
A further example of a unicorn hunter corporate accelerator is the program of ProSi-
ebenSat.1 Group, one of the largest independent media corporations in Europe. The 
three-month program runs twice a year and is located in Berlin. The focus is on B2C 
start-ups across all industries with the goal of strengthening the start-ups and sup-
porting them by securing follow-on funding. In addition to 25,000 Euro of investment 
capital, the start-ups receive TV media volume with a value of 500,000 Euro to air 
spots on all channels of the group, provided in the form of a convertible loan valued 
at 175,000 Euro. The start-ups also receive support, mentoring, and networking op-
portunities within the ProSiebenSat.1 Group. 
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 Discussion and implications 
Our study shows that corporate accelerators are not uniform and that four distinct 
types of corporate accelerators exist, each of which pursues different objectives and 
consists of specific configurations regarding their focus and organization. As such, 
our study reveals that corporate accelerators exist not only for the single strategic 
objective of insourcing innovation, as previous studies suggest, but also for various 
strategic and financial reasons.  
Based on our in-depth case analysis, we provide two main fields of operationalization 
of our findings for practitioners in established companies that plan to or already em-
ploy a corporate accelerator. First, we create a link between the objectives and de-
sign configurations, and second, we highlight the success factors for corporate ac-
celerator programs. 
3.6.1 Linking objectives and design configurations 
The four distinct types of corporate accelerators represent the current landscape and 
provide a foundation for the evaluation of existing or new accelerator activities. The 
primary concern for an established company is determining the main objective of the 
accelerator. Companies can better understand developments in a respective market, 
identify and potentially integrate new products or services, create a protected envi-
ronment from corporate structures for internal and external entrepreneurs, or gener-
ate a financial return by investing in diverse promising start-ups. Determining this 
guides the specific configuration, as outlined and illustrated with recent examples in 
Table 2. The design choices that managers can make regarding the program focus 
and organization are distinct for each corporate accelerator type and are discussed in 
the next sections.  
3.6.1.1 Program focus 
Each of the four corporate accelerator types features a unique characteristic regard-
ing program focus. The listening post corporate accelerator is the only type that re-
nounces equity involvement in the start-ups. Following transaction cost logic, equity 
involvement bears additional costs stemming from search and information, bargain-
ing, and monitoring and enforcement (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). As the main 
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objective of listening post corporate accelerators is to create an understanding of re-
cent developments, it follows cooperation logic instead of investment logic, avoiding 
the additional costs from equity involvement. However, companies following this ap-
proach can make selected investments in successful or relevant start-ups at a later 
stage.  
The value chain investor corporate accelerator is specific concerning the venture 
stage of the start-ups. Compared to all other types, start-ups in these corporate ac-
celerators are more mature, being at least in a prototype stage, and frequently al-
ready offer their products or services on the market and generate revenue. As the 
objective is to identify innovative products and services for the parent company´s 
business, start-ups in an idea stage are considered too undeveloped. As a result, the 
investment capital for start-ups also appears to be the highest among all types of 
corporate accelerators. 
The test laboratory corporate accelerator has the objective of creating a protected 
environment for work on promising business ideas and is unique regarding its locus 
of opportunity. It is the only type of corporate accelerator that admits internal and ex-
ternal start-ups into the program. The priorities, however, seem to vary. Where some 
test laboratory corporate accelerators focus on internal business ideas, making them 
mainly intrapreneurship programs, others have a more balanced ratio of internal to 
external start-ups. 
The unicorn hunter corporate accelerator is specific regarding its industrial focus. Un-
like the start-ups in the other corporate accelerator types, start-ups in unicorn hunter 
corporate accelerators are not required to have a relationship with the industry or 
business context of the parent company. Financial objectives dominate this type, and 
the program is not intended to identify and develop promising business models with 
future relevance for the parent company. Therefore, start-ups with the highest diver-
sity of industrial backgrounds are found in these corporate accelerators. 
3.6.1.2 Program organization 
The listening post and value chain investor corporate accelerators are both integrat-
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ed into the parent company organization. For these programs, the strong exchange 
and interaction with the parent company is of high relevance for achieving objectives. 
The listening post corporate accelerator involves exchanges regarding developments 
and market trends, whereas the value chain investor corporate accelerator develops 
products that can be integrated into the value chain of the parent company. A strict 
separation from the parent company is not necessarily required in these contexts, 
and might also hinder the achievement of these objectives.  
The test laboratory and unicorn hunter corporate accelerators, however, differ in that 
integration into the parent company is considered an obstacle. For the test laboratory 
corporate accelerator, the strict separation from the daily business of the parent 
company is considered a major factor for the testing of new business ideas that 
would not easily find a space in the existing organization. It is generally thought that 
the financially oriented unicorn hunter corporate accelerator requires the freedom to 
make investment decisions without corporate interference. This independence from 
the parent company also appears to be reflected in the work experience of the man-
aging directors. In unicorn hunter corporate accelerators, management usually has 
external work experience, mainly within the start-up ecosystem or in consulting. In all 
other corporate accelerator types, extensive work experience within the parent com-
pany can be identified, which reflects the greater importance of interaction with busi-
ness units to achieve strategic objectives.  
3.6.2 Success factors for corporate accelerators 
Our case analysis sheds light on the factors that our interviewees consider as highly 
relevant for successful corporate accelerator programs independent of the specific 
accelerator type.  
The aspect that is perhaps the most important is the support and commitment from 
the top management team. As engagements with start-ups in the corporate environ-
ment may be discontinued during economic downturns to cut cost, commitment from 
and access to the management board and top management team is highly important 
to ensure the sustainability of the program. This stipulation is the basis for the poten-
tial medium- and long-term payoff and value contribution beyond public relations ef-
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fects. Additionally, top management support increases the credibility and acceptance 
of the program within the entire organization. This is also crucial for achieving the 
commitment and encouraging the participation of all employees within the organiza-
tion.  
Networking at events and start-up conferences and with venture capitalists is consid-
ered a further success factor as it identifies and attracts promising start-ups with 
skilled entrepreneurial teams and excellent ideas. Therefore, the active involvement 
within the start-up ecosystem of all members of the accelerator team is considered 
an important responsibility.  
The accelerator team also serves as an important success factor. Across all corpo-
rate accelerator types, it is helpful to have an overall mixed team of people with com-
pany-internal and company–external work experience. Internal experience enables 
the use of extant networks and knowledge about corporate processes and specifics. 
The external experience, however, provides a more unbiased perspective and, ideal-
ly, an in-depth understanding of the start-up ecosystem, which strongly deviates from 
the typical corporate environment.  
The definition of clear objectives and the ways in which companies measure their 
achievements are considered further important factors in designing successful corpo-
rate accelerators. Without clear objectives, the program might develop unclear value 
propositions, which can diffuse activities. Clear objectives, however, require the 
company to have a clear measurement system in place. This element is essential as 
the corporate accelerator acts in an environment in which transparency about added 
value is highly relevant for the sustainability of the activity. This also holds true for 
non-financial objectives, and relevant key performance indicators should be defined 
to demonstrate the program´s contribution.  
Finally, corporate accelerator programs should be designed to deliver real value to 
the start-ups. Otherwise, the programs will be short-term and, as the start-ups do not 
benefit from the program, will attract less promising start-ups. Therefore, corporate 
accelerator programs should not only be launched for public relations reasons, or to 
communicate the entrepreneurial image of the parent company. However, these ad-
Corporate accelerators as recent form of start-up engagement: the what, the why, and the how           76 
vantages are byproducts and can be upheld by a valuable program that delivers 
benefits to both the parent company and the start-ups. 
 Conclusion  
Corporate accelerators have increased in number significantly within recent years. 
However, the different objectives and motives of the established companies behind 
these programs often remain unclear. In this article, we show that there are four 
common types of corporate accelerators that are unique regarding their objectives 
and their configurations of program focus and organization. Existing understanding 
refers to corporate accelerators as one potential form of engagement with entrepre-
neurial start-ups for pursuing the objective of insourcing outside innovation. Our in-
depth empirical study, which is one of the most comprehensive studies in this field, 
significantly extends this basic understanding. Based on 13 case studies of corporate 
accelerators, including two-level data from both the program and start-up level, our 
study provides a clearer picture of the different facets of the strategic objectives. Our 
case analysis shows that the listening post, value chain investor, and test laboratory 
corporate accelerators are three types, each with specific strategic objectives. Fur-
thermore, our study reveals that the unicorn hunter corporate accelerators are used 
for mainly financial purposes, a concept that has not been identified previously.  
However, the recent emergence of corporate accelerators is not without criticism, 
and media even refers to the phenomenon as “corporate accelerator glut” (Roettger, 
2013). It is furthermore argued that the current trend could encourage the launch of 
further programs based on the “me-too” principle. Other forms of business incuba-
tions are considered to have a lead-time of five to seven years before delivering re-
sults to the parent company (Becker & Gassmann, 2006; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 
2015). Therefore, it remains to be seen if corporate accelerators can achieve the var-
ious strategic and financial objectives outlined in our study. This success would set 
the basis for corporate accelerators being an effective and long-lasting concept for 
the engagement of established companies with entrepreneurial start-ups.  
With the transparency of corporate accelerators created by our extensive case anal-
ysis, however, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the overall corpo-
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rate accelerator phenomenon, set the basis for further research on the effectiveness 
of these programs, and provide practitioners with valuable insights for improving ex-
isting or establishing new corporate accelerator programs. 
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4 Start-ups as knowledge sources for companies: an analysis of corporate 
accelerators and incubators7 
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Abstract 
Knowledge is widely considered a strategic resource for companies, and entrepre-
neurial start-ups are frequently seen as valuable sources of knowledge. In order to 
get access to this knowledge, an increasing number of established companies re-
cently launched corporate accelerator and incubator programs. Existing research 
however, does not explain the specific knowledge companies seek access to and the 
ways by which they try to obtain such access. This understanding is relevant for cor-
porate venturing research on the potential contribution of such programs and enables 
managers to set up their programs accordingly. Our inductive study builds on a re-
cent sample of 12 case studies and we derive two complementary sets of results. 
First, we identify knowledge need, knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange as 
the knowledge elements in corporate accelerator and incubator programs. Second, 
based on the program rationale and knowledge focus, we derive typical combinations 
of these elements and discuss the knowledge exchange mechanisms that companies 
apply depending on program rationale and knowledge focus. 
Keywords: New business incubators, corporate accelerators, corporate incubators, 
corporate venturing, intrapreneurship, case studies, strategic cooperation, start-ups, 
external knowledge, knowledge source   
  
                                            
7 The paper is written in British English in line with language requirements of respective paper submis-
sion process. 
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 Introduction 
Established companies engage with entrepreneurial start-ups to pursue various ob-
jectives (Battistini, Hacklin, & Baschera, 2013; Campbell, Birkinshaw, Morrison, & 
Batenburg, 2003; Chesbrough, 2002). Learning is frequently cited as one of the main 
objectives for companies to start such an engagement (Covin & Miles, 2007; Dush-
nitsky & Lenox, 2005; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005; Tidd & Taurins, 1999). It is de-
fined as the acquisition of new knowledge and frequently refers to new technologies 
or markets in this context (Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). Existing studies show that entre-
preneurial start-ups outside the company´s boundaries are valuable sources of such 
knowledge (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Shane, 2001). One 
approach that companies increasingly take to harvest these learning opportunities 
with start-ups is to establish corporate accelerators and incubators. 
Corporate accelerators and incubators are distinct from traditional corporate ventur-
ing activities such as corporate venture capital initiatives, which are common ap-
proaches that companies have been using to engage with start-ups since the 1960s 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2000). Through corporate accelerators and incubators, compa-
nies provide various services and infrastructure including co-working spaces, mentor-
ing, training, and networking opportunities to start-ups, which is the major difference 
from earlier corporate venturing programs (Hochberg, 2015; Kohler, 2016; Mian, 
Lamine, & Fayolle, 2016). These program characteristics lead to an intense interac-
tion between the start-ups and the company, which opens up diverse opportunities 
for established companies to access the knowledge of entrepreneurial start-ups. 
There has been a recent surge in these programs, and companies from diverse in-
dustries have launched them worldwide, including Citi Group and Commerzbank in 
the banking sector, Telefónica and Deutsche Telekom in the telecommunications 
sector, and Microsoft and Google in the information technology sector. According to a 
recent study, 44% of the 30 top companies in seven industries worldwide used cor-
porate accelerators and incubators in 2015, compared to only 2% in 2010 (Brigl, 
Hong, Roos, Schmieg, & Wu, 2016). 
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Anecdotal evidence in the business press supports the notion that companies launch 
these new start-up engagement programs especially to gain access to external 
knowledge (Bruehlmann, 2015; Moyé, Bartel, & Thoma, 2015; Weddeling, 2016). 
Additionally, program descriptions give further reason to assume that companies 
pursue various knowledge-related objectives with these programs. For example, 
Commerzbank`s MainIncubator claims that they ‘nurture path-breaking ideas, crea-
tive concepts, and innovative solutions’ (MainIncubator, 2016), Deutsche Telekom’s 
Hubraum claims that its approach is ‘linking tech entrepreneurs and high growth 
start-up companies with an expert network, capital, and business opportunities’ (Hu-
braum, 2016), and Microsoft Ventures Accelerator targets ‘great founders who are 
proposing solutions that solve real problems’ (Microsoft Ventures Accelerator, 2016). 
According to the knowledge-based view of the firm by Grant (1996), knowledge is an 
important strategic and advantage-generating resource for a company. Based on this 
notion, a few studies analyse corporate venturing activities from a learning and 
knowledge-related perspective. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) argue that companies 
can learn through corporate venture capital activities since they find increases in firm 
patenting. Wadhwa and Kotha (2006) find a positive impact of corporate venture cap-
ital investments on knowledge creation depending on the level of involvement and 
number of investments. Yang (2012) however, finds no such positive relationship, 
arguing that companies might have problems absorbing and integrating the new 
knowledge. While these empirical studies provide relevant insights to explain corpo-
rate venturing activities from a knowledge perspective, they have some limitations 
and their differing findings highlight the requirement for a more detailed understand-
ing of knowledge in this context. The use of archival patent data limits the insights 
into the specific knowledge companies seek access to and how they aim to do so. 
However, this understanding is required to holistically capture the potential benefits 
that corporate venturing activities can have for a company. Furthermore, existing 
studies use corporate venture capital initiatives as research objects exclusively, ne-
glecting corporate accelerator and incubator programs despite their focus on 
knowledge-related objectives. 
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Research on corporate accelerators and incubators however, is still in its infancy. 
Existing studies mainly focus on exploring program characteristics and objectives as 
well as differentiations from other forms of start-up engagement (Clarysse, Wright, & 
van Hove, 2015; Hochberg, 2015; Kohler, 2016; Mian et al., 2016; Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015). These studies show that programs with different characteristics 
exist, and acknowledge the relevance of start-ups as a knowledge source. However, 
neither practical nor academic studies show which specific knowledge companies are 
seeking access to, and how they try to obtain access to it. Nonetheless, this under-
standing is also crucial for managers to design corporate accelerators and incubators 
for accessing knowledge in line with their program objectives. 
Our inductive study builds on a sample of 28 interviews with representatives of 12 
different corporate accelerators and incubators in Germany, as well as the founders 
and co-founders of participating start-ups to understand how companies access 
knowledge through these programs. Our approach has two steps: first, we identify 
knowledge elements within corporate accelerator and incubator programs; and se-
cond, we identify typical combinations of knowledge elements. In this context we also 
explore the overall program rationales of the programs we analyse and use the find-
ings for differentiating specific knowledge-related program configurations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the research ap-
proach, including our sample and analyses. We then discuss the inductively identified 
knowledge elements in the light of existing theories. In the following section, we de-
rive four program configurations with specific combinations of the knowledge ele-
ments. Finally, we discuss the findings, derive conclusions, and outline the study´s 
limitations and potential avenues for further research. 
 Research approach 
We apply Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton’s (2012) inductive approach to explore 
knowledge access through corporate accelerators and incubators. This methodology 
enhances grounded theory development to meet high quality standards in inductive 
studies (Gioia et al., 2012). Recent knowledge-related studies also apply this ap-
proach: van Burg, Berends, and van Raaij (2014) analyse the change in the organi-
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zational actor’s decisions about inter-organisational knowledge transfer over time and 
Rerup, Nag, and Gioia (2012) analyse how knowledge becomes a strategic resource 
by using this inductive approach. 
4.2.1 Sample  
For our sample, we selected corporate accelerator and incubator programs that fulfil 
the following criteria: (1) sponsorship by one established company whose main busi-
ness is not to invest in start-ups, (2) openness to external start-ups, (3) program loca-
tion in Germany, and (4) on-going activity. We purposely excluded programs man-
aged jointly by several established companies because these partnerships blur the 
analysis for an individual company. Furthermore, we excluded programs that focus 
on internal company business ideas exclusively because we aim to identify access to 
knowledge from external start-ups. We focus on corporate accelerator and incubator 
programs in Germany to enable access to program managers. This also excludes 
regional differences within the sample. We also focus on active programs for reasons 
of data availability. In total, our sample consists of interviews from 12 such programs 
with diverse industrial backgrounds that meet the outlined criteria making up 75% of 
the estimated 16 corporate accelerator and incubators programs active in Germany 
in early 2016 (Mahr, 2016). 
4.2.2 Interviews 
In total, we conducted 28 interviews over six months with managers of corporate ac-
celerators and incubators, as well as with founders and co-founders in the portfolio 
start-ups. We followed a semi-structured interview protocol, encouraging the inter-
viewees to provide concrete examples of knowledge elements and exchange mech-
anisms in their activities. In line with the applied methodology (Gioia et al., 2012), the 
interview structure was not designed around existing theories or terminology to avoid 
imposing a preordained understanding of knowledge in the research context. All in-
terviews were conducted in person or by telephone, recorded, and transcribed shortly 
afterwards using Dresing and Pehl’s (2011) guidelines. Most interviews were con-
ducted in German, as summarised in Table 11. Quotes for this study were translated 
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into English, ensuring the tone and structures of the interviewees’ statements as far 
as possible. 
Case Industry Program interview partner(s)  Interview language 
1 Financial Services Managing Director German 
2 Media Director & Investment Manager German 
3 Telecommunications Program Head German 
4 Transportation Investment Manager German 
5 Utilities Managing Director German 
6 Online Services Managing Director German 
7 Retail Investment Manager German 
8 Pharmaceuticals Innovation Manager English 
9 Wholesale Managing Directors German & English 
10 Technology Managing Director German 
11 Media Managing Director German 
12 Financial Services Investment Manager German 
Table 11: Overview cases and interview partners from programs  
4.2.3 Analysis 
Each interview was coded separately based on the in vivo codes or phrases that in-
formants used. 8 In line with Glaser and Strauss (1967), we relied on constant com-
parisons across multiple interviews to detect concept patterns within our data. We 
read each interview several times through an iterative process. With this process, we 
identified similar in vivo codes and consolidated them into first-order categories using 
the informants’ language whenever possible. We simultaneously began to identify 
links between the first-order categories from which we developed the researcher-
centric second-order themes. We then assembled these second-order themes into 
aggregate dimensions, which together form the data structure of the inductive re-
search approach (see Appendix 4 for the complete data structure). Figure 4 illus-
trates the sequence of the analysis steps and shows the number of objects per step. 
                                            
8 We conducted the analysis with MAXQDA software version 12. 
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Figure 4: Analysis steps and number of objects 
The main outcomes of this analysis are three aggregate dimensions that constitute 
the knowledge elements in corporate accelerator and incubator programs. We dis-
cuss these elements in the following sections of this paper. In the second step, we 
identified the typical combinations of these elements in this context based on a com-
parative analysis of the 12 programs in our sample, which we introduce in a later part 
of this paper. 
 Knowledge elements in corporate accelerators and incubators  
Our analysis identifies three knowledge elements in corporate accelerator and incu-
bator programs: Knowledge need, knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange, 
which we discuss in light of existing knowledge-related theories in the following sub-
sections. 
4.3.1 Knowledge need 
Based on Grant’s (1996) knowledge-based view, which is an outgrowth of Barney’s 
(1991) resource-based-view, knowledge is an important strategic resource for a 
company. Expanding the knowledge base and using new information is one of the 
most advantage-generating activities for a company and a basis for sustainable 
competitive advantage (Dada & Fogg, 2016; Sanzo, Santos, Garcia, & Trespalacios, 
2012). 
Knowledge need is the first of the three knowledge elements that we identify in our 
analysis. It reflects the notion that companies see access to new external knowledge 
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as relevant from two aspects: environmental dynamics and internal deficiencies (as 
outlined in Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Data structure of knowledge need 
Environmental dynamics refer to changes in the market and the consequences of 
digitalization that affect the company and its business. For example, one interviewee 
described the market changes that impact his company: ‘The company recognized 
that there is much going on in the FinTech market and wanted to find out what one 
can do in this field’ (Investment Manager, Case 12).  
In addition to these developments outside the company, some companies recognized 
internal deficiencies that create a need for new knowledge. These deficiencies might 
refer to technological backlogs and the need to increase technological knowledge. 
One interviewee stated with regard to a new technology that might be relevant for the 
company´s business: ‘It was said that we need a company that really understands it’ 
(Managing Director, Case 10). 
Corporate managers also recognize the need for a new mentality in their companies 
to create future success. One interviewee described why the existing mentality might 
hinder the company’s progress: ‘People think that they can do things better and are 
unwilling to let others just try and make. (…) This mentality is not very helpful’ (Man-
aging Director, Case 5). 
Overall, the element of knowledge need reflects the main idea of the knowledge-
based view (Grant, 1996) since the companies see the strategic importance of 
knowledge. 
4.3.2 Knowledge forms 
Knowledge in organisations comes in different forms. The most frequently applied 
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tacit and explicit knowledge (Jasimuddin, Klein, & Connell, 2005; Leonard & Sensip-
er, 1998; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Krogh, 2009; Nonaka, Byosiere, Borucki, & Kon-
no, 1994; Polanyi, 1966).  
Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal, systematic lan-
guage and can therefore be expressed in words and numbers. Tacit knowledge is 
hard to formalize and transmit because it has a personal quality, and is rooted in ac-
tion, commitment, and involvement in a specific context (Nonaka et al., 1994; Po-
lanyi, 1966). Some argue that tacit knowledge is something people possess, whereas 
explicit knowledge is codified in tangible form (Jasimuddin et al., 2005; Nonaka & 
Konno, 1998). Examples of tacit knowledge are employees’ skills, experiences, and 
working styles, while explicit knowledge may exist as documents and codes 
(Jasimuddin et al., 2005). Additionally, tacit knowledge is practically useful and be-
cause it is procedural, it can be acquired with little or even no direct instruction (No-
naka, Krogh, & Voelpel, 2006; Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995).  
Our analysis identifies different knowledge forms in corporate accelerators and incu-
bators (as illustrated in Figure 6). Applying the knowledge-as-a-category viewpoint 
(Jasimuddin et al., 2005), we categorize the identified knowledge forms as either tacit 
or explicit. We find seven different forms of knowledge that established companies 
aim to access using their corporate accelerator or incubator programs, of which two 
are tacit and five are explicit (see Appendix 5 for the criteria to distinguish between 
tacit and explicit knowledge). 
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4.3.2.1 Tacit knowledge 
The first knowledge form, working mode knowledge, is tacit. Small entrepreneurial 
start-ups and large established companies frequently have different ways of working. 
Companies are interested in knowledge about these different working modes to im-
prove their own operations, as described by one of the interviewees: ‘This uncompli-
cated way of working, just doing things, is for a large ship like our company with its 
traditional structures and ways of working very welcome’ (Director, Case 2). 
The second knowledge form, cultural knowledge, is also tacit. Similar to working 
modes, established companies value the culture of start-ups, especially with regard 
to their entrepreneurial aspects, described by one of the interviewees as ‘fast, hard-
working, and innovative’ (Investment Manager, Case 7). These aspects, combined 
with the mind-set and spirit, are characteristic of start-ups, and are highly relevant for 
a company to achieve change. 
These two knowledge forms can be considered as tacit since they are rooted in ac-
tion, procedures, routines, ideals, and values and cannot be transferred in written 
language or stored in documents (Connell, Klein, & Powell, 2003; Nonaka, 1994; No-
naka & Krogh, 2009). 
4.3.2.2 Explicit knowledge 
Aside from these the two tacit knowledge forms, five knowledge forms are explicit. 
The first is market knowledge, which includes all information about a specific market 
that can either be very tightly defined to meet the company´s interest or more broadly 
defined to extend the view of potentially relevant adjacent markets. Market 
knowledge includes recognizing general trends, developments, and topics that 
emerge in the market, as one interviewee described: ‘So it was of interest to just sur-
vey what is going on in the world to a certain extent’ (Innovation Manager, Case 8).  
The second explicit knowledge form is business model knowledge and includes the 
understanding of new business models and the development of the company’s own 
new business models. ‘So we can develop new business models for us and in the 
end really bring profit to the company’ (Investment Manager, Case 4). 
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The third knowledge form, technological knowledge, is similar to business model 
knowledge, and refers to both identifying the relevant technologies that exist outside 
the company´s boundaries and the potential to integrate these technologies into the 
company. While identification is frequently referred to as a scouting function, the lat-
ter goes one step further and leads to the use of the technologies that the company 
considers relevant. This was outlined by one of our interviewees, who talked about 
the relevance of the technologies from the portfolio start-ups for the company: ‘Of 
course we have projects (…) that their product is used with inside our company (In-
vestment Manager, Case 12). 
The fourth knowledge form, product knowledge, is rather eclectic compared to the 
other knowledge forms. It ranges from identifying product ideas and new products 
rather than improving existing products, to developing, testing, and integrating new 
products. One interviewee described the product-related benefit of the program: ‘We 
get new products and services for our customers, our customers get new products 
and services from us and that should lead to a strengthening of our customer rela-
tionship’ (Managing Director, Case 9).  
The fifth explicit and final knowledge form, customer knowledge, refers to all infor-
mation about the company’s existing customers and potential future customers. On 
the one hand, the corporate accelerator or incubator program aims to identify new 
customers; on the other hand, it also aims to collect customer feedback, which im-
proves the company’s understanding of customer needs. One interviewee explained 
the benefits of customer interaction: ‘For us, it has an advantage in that we can test 
the product directly with customers for a short period of time and get immediate 
feedback’ (Investment Manager, Case 4). 
These five knowledge forms are explicit since they represent codified information that 
is easy to communicate through spoken language or documentation (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2001; Johannessen, Olaisen, & Olsen, 2001; Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Po-
lanyi, 1966). 
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4.3.3 Knowledge exchange 
Knowledge exchange in an organizational context occurs through interactions among 
employees and with other employees or individuals (Collins & Smith, 2006). The dif-
ferent knowledge forms identified in corporate accelerators and incubators have spe-
cific characteristics in terms of their transferability. While tacit knowledge is rather 
difficult to articulate (Spender, 1996), communicate (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001), 
and store (Connell et al., 2003), explicit knowledge is rather easy to exchange. We 
inductively identify four concepts of knowledge exchange consisting of different inter-
action relationships that include a transfer of knowledge: (1) environment interaction, 
(2) core program interaction, (3) corporate interaction, and (4) integrational interac-
tion (as illustrated in Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Data structure of knowledge exchange 
4.3.3.1 Environment interaction  
The first concept of knowledge exchange is the interaction of the corporate accelera-
tor or incubator program management with the external environment. This includes 
two sub-concepts: program enhancement and information sharing.  
Program managers actively interact with the environment to enhance their corporate 
accelerator or incubator program by creating external mentoring relationships, hiring 
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nies are frequently support partners for specific topic expertise, such as legal adviso-
ry firms, strategy consultants, or marketing experts that are integrated into the pro-
gram for their expertise. 
The interaction with the start-up ecosystem for information sharing makes up a signif-
icant part of the program manager’s job. It includes networking, meeting potential 
investors for lunch or dinner, and conference or event participation, as one invest-
ment manager described it: ‘There are diverse meetups or summer parties by ven-
ture capital firms. (…) at an important event, someone from our team is always pre-
sent’ (Investment Manager, Case 2).  
This interaction enables information exchange related to promising new start-ups, 
market trends, and the overall development of the ecosystem. Additionally, the exter-
nal environment in the form of media and the websites of potentially relevant start-
ups also provides a source of information that program managers use frequently to 
understand external developments. 
4.3.3.2 Core program interaction  
The second concept for knowledge exchange is the interaction of the program man-
agement with the start-ups. This interaction includes three sub-concepts: pre-
program, main program, and post-program interaction. Overall, these interactions 
make up the core of the accelerator or incubator program because the start-ups 
characteristically work closely with the program’s representatives.  
The pre-program interaction begins with due diligence, in which the company as-
sesses and selects the start-up applicants for participation. Afterward, the selected 
start-ups usually undergo an assessment of technological and business-related 
needs, and are required to disclose a certain level of information to the program 
managers.  
The main program interaction typically includes very intensive interaction between 
the start-ups and the program managers, strengthened through proximity with a 
shared office space that the program usually provides for the portfolio start-ups. The 
interactions include support for the start-ups through one-on-one coaching, a contact 
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person for business support, or discussions of any challenges the start-ups might 
face. This enables both parties to work together to develop the start-up further, de-
scribed as company building, conducting tests, or simply testing a working relation-
ship.  
Finally, after completing the program, the start-ups usually prepare for a demo-day in 
which they pitch their business ideas to representatives of the company. The start-
ups are then considered alumni of the program, though interaction continues, as de-
scribed by one managing director of a program: ‘So we keep on working with all of 
them. It is not the case that the program is over and we never hear anything from 
them again. This alumni work is extremely important for us’ (Managing Director, Case 
10). 
4.3.3.3 Corporate interaction  
The third concept for knowledge exchange is the interaction of the company with the 
program management. This interaction includes three sub-concepts: formal ex-
change, ad-hoc exchange, and integration of company employees.  
The organizational connection of the program to the company and its reporting line 
determine the formal exchange between the program and the company. This formal-
ized exchange includes reports and regular meetings in which the program transfers 
information to the company. 
In addition to this formal exchange, there is an ad-hoc exchange of program repre-
sentatives with the company. This exchange frequently seems very intensive and 
exceeds formal exchange, as described by one program manager: ‘The formal ex-
change is not very exciting (…). Informal exchange is much more important, so that 
we have good access to the CEO (…). I can also talk and brainstorm with him, such 
as ‘look, how do you see this’ instead of just saying ‘here is my report’’ (Managing 
Director, Case 9). This ad-hoc exchange not only refers to communication with the 
top management, but also the exchange with representatives from the company’s 
various organizational and hierarchical levels and includes simple information shar-
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ing, discussing trends and developments, or potentially initiating cooperation with one 
of the portfolio start-ups. 
The integration of the company’s employees and top management team is another 
interaction relationship for knowledge exchange. One example is the use of the pro-
gram as a form of professional development for company staff. Employees, interns, 
or apprentices spend some time working in the program and gain experience. Fur-
thermore, the program is sometimes also open for company employees as a working 
space as an alternative to their regular work places, or they can even participate in 
the program with their own business idea. Additionally, the decision making process 
includes the top management team when selecting start-ups, further integrating them 
into the program management. 
4.3.3.4 Integrational interaction  
The fourth concept is the direct interaction of the start-ups with the company. It con-
sists of three sub-concepts: institutionalized formats, on-demand connections, and 
cooperative work. Institutionalized formats refer to all interactions between the start-
ups with representatives from the company that occur through organized events or 
exchange formats. One example is a mentoring initiative in which each portfolio start-
up is assigned at least one mentor, usually from the management level of the com-
pany, who supports the development of the start-ups: ‘Once a week, the start-ups 
have sessions with mentors from the company’ (Investment Manager, Case 4).  
Program managers initiate the on-demand connections and bring together experts 
from business, technology or R&D, or various fields such as law, IT, or marketing 
whenever there is a need or a special fit with the start-up. In this exchange, the com-
pany employees and the start-ups exchange information that might benefit both 
sides, as described by one interviewee: ‘Today we had a call again (…) with our col-
leagues from business unit XYZ, related to drone technology (…).9 They have special 
knowledge (…) but they also have their own needs or desires to use new technolo-
gies’ (Managing Director, Case 1).  
                                            
9 The name of the business unit has been disguised for reasons of confidentiality. 
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Cooperative work goes one step further, in which the start-ups and the company em-
ployees work closely together on a specific topic or project. This usually occurs for a 
limited time at first and might develop into a longer-term cooperation or partnership 
between the start-up and the company. 
4.3.4 Aggregation of knowledge elements  
Our analysis shows that three knowledge elements exist in corporate accelerator and 
incubator programs. The first, knowledge need conceptualizes the companies’ need 
to access external knowledge based on the dynamics in its environment and internal 
deficiencies. The second, knowledge forms, includes seven forms of either tacit or 
explicit knowledge that companies aim to access. The third, knowledge exchange, 
depicts how companies try to obtain access to these different knowledge forms. We 
identify four knowledge exchange interactions, two including and two excluding the 
company behind the corporate accelerator or incubator program. Figure 8 illustrates 
the identified knowledge elements in such programs.  
 
Figure 8: Overview knowledge elements of corporate accelerators and incubators 
 Typical combinations of knowledge elements  
Companies have financial and strategic rationales for their start-up engagement pro-
grams (Campbell et al., 2003; Chesbrough, 2002). Programs with a mainly financial 
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ing them more valuable by leveraging their own industry expertise and market 
knowledge (Battistini et al., 2013; Chesbrough, 2002). Programs with a mainly stra-
tegic rationale pursue various non-financial objectives such as gaining insights into 
new technologies, markets, or businesses (Markham, Gentry, Hume, Ramachan-
dran, & Kingon, 2005), creating opportunities for strategic partnerships (Battistini et 
al., 2013), or further developing innovativeness (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). Fur-
thermore, researchers have identified programs with a balanced rationale of financial 
and strategic rationale for which these two rationales are of equal importance (Battis-
tini et al., 2013).  
The corporate accelerators and incubators in our sample either have a mainly strate-
gic or mainly financial rationale. In our interviews, we asked program managers to 
categorize the rationale of their program and out of the 12 case studies, nine consid-
ered themselves as mainly strategic and three as mainly financial. None of the pro-
grams were considered to have a mixed rationale. 
Based on a comparative analysis of the 12 case studies, we identify four typical 
combinations of knowledge elements in corporate accelerator and incubator pro-
grams. These combinations specifically depend on the program rationale, either 
mainly strategic or mainly financial, and whether the focus includes tacit knowledge. 
This leads to four program configurations (illustrated in Figure 9): (1) financial-tacit, 
(2) financial-non-tacit, (3) strategic-tacit, and (4) strategic-non-tacit, which we discuss 
in terms of their specific combinations of knowledge elements. Appendix 6 provides 
an overview of the program configurations of the 12 cases in the sample. 
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4.4.1.1 Financial-tacit program configuration  
Corporate accelerator and incubator programs with a mainly financial rationale aim to 
create financial returns for the company. Additionally, programs with a financial-tacit 
configuration have the supplemental objective of contributing to change in the com-
pany’s culture and working mode. Therefore, these programs have an additional fo-
cus on creating tacit knowledge. Figure 10 highlights the typical combinations of 
knowledge elements for these programs. 
 
Figure 10: Typical combination of knowledge elements for financial-tacit programs 
Financial-tacit programs address both facets of knowledge need, internal deficien-
cies, and environmental dynamics. By doing so, these programs aim to access ex-
plicit knowledge forms, mainly product, technological, and business model 
knowledge in addition to tacit knowledge forms. 
Knowledge exchange in these programs focuses especially on the interaction of the 
program with the environment and the company with the start-ups. The knowledge 
exchange with the external environment occurs through networking in the ecosystem 
and focuses on information about potentially interesting start-ups, securing the deal-
flow for the program. The direct company exchange with the portfolio start-ups is also 
especially intensive, typically including cooperative work and on-demand connections 
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tive is to make the start-ups more valuable to achieve a financial return. Additionally, 
tacit knowledge transfer can occur via direct interaction with company employees 
and the top management team.  
4.4.1.2 Financial-non-tacit program configuration  
Financial-non-tacit programs have financial return as the main rationale with no focus 
on access to tacit knowledge. These programs do not answer a knowledge need, 
neither with regard to environmental dynamics nor to internal deficiencies. Therefore, 
knowledge access has less relevance for programs with this configuration. Figure 11 
illustrates the typical combinations for these programs. 
 
Figure 11: Typical combination of knowledge elements for financial-non-tacit programs 
With regard to knowledge forms, the only objective is to access the start-ups’ explicit 
knowledge, specifically technological knowledge. This is also reflected in the 
knowledge exchange, which is primarily characterised by strong corporate interac-
tion, meaning knowledge exchange between the company and the program man-
agement. The exchange is mainly formal, including information regarding deal flow 
with other corporate venturing activities in the company, and the integration of com-
pany employees into the program management for training and for attending events 
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knowledge and transfer it through formal exchange to the company, and thus there is 
no desire for strong interactions between the company and the start-ups.  
4.4.1.3 Strategic-tacit program configuration 
Programs with a strategic-tacit configuration have a strategic rationale that includes a 
focus on tacit knowledge, as highlighted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Typical combination of knowledge elements for strategic-tacit programs 
Knowledge need in these programs is based on both environmental dynamics and 
internal deficiencies. These programs have the most holistic approach with regard to 
knowledge forms, including various explicit knowledge forms in addition to the tacit 
knowledge forms. The especially high focus on product knowledge characterizes 
these types of programs, reflecting the strategic rationale of identifying additional 
products or replacing existing products in the company´s product portfolio.  
Knowledge exchange in these programs seems almost equally strong on all four in-
teraction relationships, though with a tendency towards interaction with the start-ups. 
The interaction of the program management with the start-ups mainly includes testing 
the start-up’s products; the interaction of the company with the start-ups is based on 
linking the start-ups with employees from diverse topic areas and businesses as well 
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ups as an especially valuable knowledge source for diverse knowledge forms and 
apply significant direct interactions to obtain access to this knowledge.  
4.4.1.4 Strategic-non-tacit program configuration 
Programs with a strategic-non-tacit configuration have a strategic rationale and focus 
exclusively on creating explicit knowledge and the typical combination of knowledge 
elements is illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Typical combination of knowledge elements for strategic-non-tacit programs 
Knowledge need in these programs is also based on both environmental dynamics 
and internal deficiencies, as in the other strategic programs. Programs with a strate-
gic-non-tacit configuration aim to access various forms of explicit knowledge with a 
strong focus on product knowledge, as in other strategic programs, but with an addi-
tional concentration on customer knowledge. This is a sign that these programs aim 
more to improve existing products instead of changing the culture of the company 
and instituting a disruptive change. 
Knowledge exchange is especially strong in core program interactions, meaning pro-
gram management with start-ups and characterized by joint company building and 
testing of products. Furthermore, the corporate interaction has a special focus on in-
ternal networking and information sharing with regard to potentially relevant products 
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 Discussion  
We empirically identify knowledge need, knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange 
as the knowledge elements in corporate accelerator and incubator programs. 
Knowledge need refers to environmental dynamics and internal deficiencies and 
builds the basis for most programs to seek access to the knowledge of start-ups. This 
finding explains a major driver of the current surge in such programs, showing that a 
combination of environmental dynamics, such as market changes and digitalization, 
and internal deficiencies, such as the need for a new mentality and innovation, as 
well as a lack of technological knowledge, motivates companies to launch these pro-
grams. This finding supports the notion of knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996), 
which interprets knowledge as an important strategic resource for a company. Only 
for programs with a financial rationale and no focus on tacit knowledge there is no 
identifiable knowledge need. In this case, knowledge access is only relevant to the 
extent that it supports the program’s financial objectives, but not to achieve additional 
objectives. This finding extends the existing views on corporate accelerator and incu-
bator programs by showing that there are also programs which are applied for purely 
financial purposes such like some of the more traditional corporate venture capital 
initiatives (Battistini et al., 2013). 
Our analysis shows that companies with corporate accelerator and incubator pro-
grams aim to access various knowledge forms. In line with organizational knowledge 
creation theory (Nonaka, 1994), we identify explicit and tacit knowledge forms. 
Whereas some programs focus exclusively on explicit knowledge such as market, 
product, technological, customer, and business model knowledge, others also focus 
on tacit knowledge in form of cultural and working mode knowledge. These findings 
extend the existing research on corporate venturing in the learning context (Dushnit-
sky & Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006; Yang, 2012) as it shows that companies 
focus on diverse knowledge forms beyond the technologies of the start-ups they in-
teract with. However, the focus on technological knowledge is especially widespread 
across all programs. This supports the findings related to knowledge need, as it fre-
quently relates to a lack of knowledge about new technologies. However, even pro-
grams that do not express a knowledge need and focus mainly on financial goals aim 
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to access technological knowledge. This shows that companies also require access 
to technological knowledge to pursue financial objectives with a corporate accelerator 
or incubator program as many of the start-ups are active in technology-related indus-
tries.  
Programs with a strategic rationale have a higher focus on product knowledge than 
programs with a financial rationale. This finding highlights the use of corporate accel-
erator and incubator programs for the company’s future products since it includes 
knowledge from product idea generation, development, and testing. Financially ori-
ented programs are less interested in the start-ups’ actual products, which is also 
reflected in a more diverse product portfolio in the participating start-ups. 
Furthermore, identifying and understanding new business models is connected to 
knowledge about culture and working modes. Thus, to change their cultures, estab-
lished companies aim to create both tacit and explicit knowledge related to business 
models. This finding indicates that managers cannot adopt the culture and working 
modes in isolation from the specific business context, which requires an understand-
ing of the underlying business models. 
With regard to knowledge exchange, our analysis reveals different interaction rela-
tionships. Interaction with the environment is relevant for knowledge exchange in 
programs of all configurations, but especially in programs with a financial rationale. 
This is mainly due to the importance of exchanging deal flow information with venture 
capitalists in the external environment. However, as all programs interact with the 
environment to some extent, it is important for corporate accelerators and incubators 
to be integrated and well connected to the start-up ecosystem, independent of their 
rationale.  
The interaction of the program management with the start-ups is the core of all pro-
grams. In programs with a strategic rationale, this interaction is especially strong. 
Even interactions beyond the duration of the program are strongly fostered by pro-
grams with a strategic rationale programs, whereas programs with a financial ra-
tionale do not focus on these interactions. This is because programs with a strategic 
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rationale aim to access the various knowledge forms most comprehensively and 
therefore focus on an intense interaction as long as is required to do so. 
Especially for programs with a focus on tacit knowledge, the integrational interaction, 
meaning the direct interaction of the company with the start-ups is especially strong. 
This reflects the notion that companies need to directly interact with the start-ups to 
exchange tacit knowledge such as working modes or cultural knowledge since it 
cannot to be transferred indirectly from the program management to the company. In 
programs with an exclusive focus on explicit knowledge, the corporate interaction of 
the program management with the company is especially intensive. This reflects the 
situation in which explicit knowledge collected by the program management is trans-
ferred into the company.  
Overall, our study enriches the understanding of which forms of knowledge compa-
nies seek access to through corporate accelerator and incubator programs and how 
they do it. It extends the discussion on learning in the corporate venturing context 
(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006; Yang, 2012) by showing that 
learning is not equal in all programs but that different combinations of knowledge el-
ements exist, which also depend on the overall program rationale. 
 Implications 
Our study has implications for both research and practice and contributes to corpo-
rate entrepreneurship research in several ways. First, by identifying knowledge need, 
knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange as the knowledge elements, it provides 
a deeper understanding of corporate accelerators and incubators as recent and still 
under-researched forms of start-up engagement activities (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014; 
Hochberg, 2015). Second, it contributes to the understanding of knowledge in the 
field of corporate entrepreneurship by clarifying which knowledge forms companies 
aim to access from entrepreneurial start-ups and how they try to do so (Narayanan, 
Yang, & Zahra, 2009; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006; Yang, 2012). This understanding also 
sheds light on the potential non-financial impact such programs can have on a com-
pany (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). Third, our study is the first to connect the program 
rationale (Campbell et al., 2003; Chesbrough, 2002), either financial or strategic, with 
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the discussion of knowledge. We show that companies, independent of the program 
rationale, aim to access knowledge through their programs. Further, we illustrate that 
different program configurations aim to access different knowledge forms and em-
phasize different interactions for knowledge exchange. 
For practitioners, we provide valuable insights for the design of existing or new cor-
porate accelerator or incubator programs in terms of the knowledge exchange inter-
actions. Specifically, our analysis shows that programs with a strategic rationale fo-
cus especially on the core program interaction (program management with start-ups), 
whereas programs with a financial rationale emphasize environment interaction (pro-
gram management with external environment). Additionally, programs that focus on 
both explicit and tacit knowledge particularly engage in integrational interaction 
(company with start-up) and programs that focus on explicit knowledge only choose 
strong corporate interaction (program management with company). These findings 
provide corporate managers responsible for corporate accelerator or incubator pro-
grams with insights about how to set up knowledge exchange mechanisms according 
to its rationale and knowledge focus. Table 12 outlines the knowledge exchange fo-
cus and examples according to program focus. 
Program focus Knowledge exchange focus Examples of knowledge exchange  
Rationale: 
strategic  Core program interaction 
Provision of intensive program management 
support to start-ups; conduction of product 
tests; working together 
Rationale: 
financial  Environment interaction  
Creation of external mentoring relationships; 






Making start-ups work together with company 





Corporate interaction Sharing information with other start-up en-gagement programs in the company; reporting 
Table 12: Overview knowledge exchange according to program focus 
 Conclusions and limitations 
This study examines how companies access knowledge through corporate accelera-
tor and incubator programs. We analyse a sample of 28 interviews with program 
managers and participating start-ups from 12 such programs. This analysis, to our 
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best knowledge, is the first that shows how companies use entrepreneurial start-ups 
as knowledge sources through these programs. Building on an inductive approach, 
we derive two complimentary sets of results. First, we identify three knowledge ele-
ments: knowledge need, knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange. Second, 
based on a comparative analysis of the 12 case studies in our sample, we identify 
four typical combinations of these knowledge elements that are specific to the pro-
gram rationale, whether mainly strategic or mainly financial, and the knowledge fo-
cus, which includes or excludes tacit knowledge. We thus also clarify that knowledge 
exchange interactions are specific to program rationale and knowledge focus. 
This study also has some limitations that open avenues for future research. First, our 
sample consists exclusively of 12 German corporate accelerator and incubator pro-
grams. While this covers 75% of programs active in Germany in early 2016, it only 
covers a small share of all such programs worldwide. Studies with a larger sample 
size that includes programs from other countries with a high number of these pro-
grams, such as the US or the UK, would be welcome and could generate additional 
insights. Second, our sample consists of case studies from different industries. 
Therefore, our results do not account for the specifics of any industry. As the total 
population of corporate accelerator and incubator programs is still low compared with 
other corporate venturing activities such as corporate venture capital, collecting data 
in one industry only provides a very limited number of cases. However, if the number 
of corporate accelerators and incubators continues to rise, such industry-specific 
studies can provide further insights. Third, for reasons of data availability, the sample 
includes only active programs. However, this leads to a survivorship bias, although 
there are also examples of terminated corporate accelerator and incubator programs 
due to their lack of success. Studies examining these programs can provide further 
insights about relevant knowledge elements and reveal which of the described ap-
proaches proved successful. Fourth, with our analysis, we identify knowledge ele-
ments qualitatively and neither assess the suitability of the described approaches nor 
measure their impact on the company’s knowledge creation. With this first explorative 
step, our study however sets the basis for a potential quantitative test of corporate 
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accelerator or incubator success, for instance, by financial metrics or based on pa-
tent data.  
Despite these limitations, our study offers contributions to research and practice. By 
clarifying the knowledge elements in corporate accelerators and incubators empirical-
ly, it provides a holistic understanding of knowledge in these programs. Practitioners 
benefit especially from insights on knowledge exchange mechanisms according to 
the program rationale and knowledge focus in order to set up their corporate acceler-
ator and incubator programs. The still limited academic discussion on corporate ac-
celerators and incubators is enhanced with the empirical insights of 12 case studies 
and an increased understanding of corporate accelerators and incubators as tools for 
gaining access to external knowledge as a resource to potentially create a competi-
tive advantage. 
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 Appendix 
Appendix 4: Data structure 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration 
1st order concepts Aggregate dimensions
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Appendix 5: Criteria for distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge 
Criteria Source Tacit Knowledge Explicit Knowledge 




(Ambrosini & Bowman, 
2001; Spender, 1996) Difficult Easy 
Location (Polanyi, 1966) Human brains Computers, artefacts 
Media 
(Connell et al., 2003; 





and other archives 
Storage (Connell et al., 2003) Difficult Easy 
Ownership (Jasimuddin et al., 2005) Personalisation Impersonalisation 
Examples (Jasimuddin et al., 2005) Skills and experiences of employees Documents, codes 
Source: Adopted from Jasimuddin, Klein, Connell (2005) 
Appendix 6: Overview program rationale and knowledge forms of cases 
Case Industry Program configurations 
Rationale Knowledge forms 
1 Financial Services Strategic Excluding tacit 
2 Media Financial Including tacit 
3 Telecommunications Financial Including tacit 
4 Transportation Strategic Including tacit 
5 Utilities Financial Including tacit 
6 Online Services Strategic Including tacit 
7 Retail Strategic Including tacit 
8 Pharmaceuticals Strategic Including tacit 
9 Wholesale Strategic Including tacit 
10 Technology Strategic Including tacit 
11 Media Financial Excluding tacit 
12 Financial Services Strategic Excluding tacit 
Source: Authors’ own illustration 
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Abstract 
Corporate accelerators have become a frequently used form of start-up engagement 
for established companies. However, little guidance on how to set up such a program 
based on the specific requirements of a company is available. When Media-Saturn-
Holding GmbH, Europe´s leading consumer electronics retailer, decided to create a 
corporate accelerator, they were faced with a multitude of questions that required a 
response. The case illustrates which approach the management team surrounding 
CEO Pieter Haas has taken to develop the company’s own accelerator. In the first 
part, the case introduces the background and the potential accelerator design op-
tions. In the second part, the text discusses the decisions made and the SPACELAB 
concept. 
Learning objective 
The case is appropriate for use in entrepreneurship, strategic management, and in-
novation management courses in the context of modules or discussions on corporate 
entrepreneurship and venturing, entrepreneurial strategies, entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems, and managing corporate innovation. The case can be used in undergraduate 
courses and graduate and MBA courses, as well as executive education courses. 
The case study has two main learning objectives structured along the two parts of the 
case: to provide knowledge about the potential design options companies have when 
setting up a corporate accelerator (part 1) and to understand how and why Media-
Saturn has made the decisions they’ve made for their SPACELAB accelerator (part 
2). 
Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH - the SPACELAB accelerator: a teaching case study           114 
 Part 1: background and accelerator design options 
5.1.1 Introduction 
In late 2014 the management board of Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH, Europe´s lead-
ing consumer electronics retailer, decided to set up its own corporate accelerator 
program called SPACELAB. The main idea behind the decision of developing an ac-
celerator was to embrace innovations and to be more open to change as a company. 
The board knew that for future competitiveness, Media-Saturn not only needed inno-
vative products on their store´s shelves, innovative marketing, and know-how at the 
employee level but also access to innovative business models. Especially for this 
purpose, a corporate accelerator program seemed a promising tool as it suggested 
the potential to interact intensively with entrepreneurial start-ups for a specified 
timeframe and to work collaboratively on innovative product ideas and business 
models. 
Pieter Haas, CEO of Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH, and Martin Sinner, experienced 
business angel and founder of the leading German price comparison platform idea-
lo.de, sat together to develop the concept for the SPACELAB, which they intended to 
become Europe´s first accelerator for consumer electronics retail. At this time, com-
panies with diverse industrial backgrounds such as the technology company Mi-
crosoft or the telecommunications company Deutsche Telekom had launched a multi-
tude of corporate accelerator programs. Those companies were trying out different 
program configurations, as a proven concept and implementation approach was not 
yet existent. Furthermore, there were already some examples of failed corporate ac-
celerator programs that were discontinued after a short time such as the Nike+ Ac-
celerator program, which was only active in 2013, and the Volkswagen accelerator 
program in the USA, which was launched in 2012 and terminated two years later.1 Of 
course, Pieter Haas and Martin Sinner wanted to avoid the negative publicity of a 
failed initiative. Therefore, the main question for them was: How can we design the 
SPACELAB accelerator in a way that it successfully supports the overall strategic 
development of Media-Saturn? One thing, however, they knew with certainty: The 
SPACELAB accelerator needed to have a novel setup to meet the requirements of 
the consumer electronics retail industry and the specifics of Media-Saturn.  
Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH - the SPACELAB accelerator: a teaching case study           115 
5.1.2 Media-Saturn Holding 
The company history of Media-Saturn goes back to the two companies Media-Markt 
and Saturn. It all started in the year 1961, when Friedrich Wilhelm Waffenschmidt 
and his wife Anni opened the first Saturn store in Cologne, Germany. This first store 
had a sales area of 120 square meters and offered consumer electronics exclusively 
to diplomats from all over the world. In 1969 the store also opened its doors to private 
customers, and in 1972 they started a large record department with a self-service 
format. The idea was imported from the USA, and at this time the self-service con-
cept was a revolution on the German market. The large selection of records and low 
prices attracted customers to the stores from near and far. During the 1980s the 
company experienced further growth, and Saturn stores in other German cities in-
cluding Munich and Frankfurt were opened offering a wide selection of TV sets, en-
tertainment systems, household electronics, and photo and video equipment, making 
it a leading electronics retailer in Germany.2 
The four entrepreneurs Walter Gunz, Leopold Stiefel, and Helga and Erich Kellerhals 
founded Media-Markt and opened the first store in Munich in 1979. Their idea was to 
build large-scale consumer electronics stores as a counterpart to the existing small 
specialized electronics stores and the mail order business. In subsequent years, nine 
additional stores were opened in the Munich area. In 1989 with already around 20 
stores in Germany, Media-Markt started its international expansion and opened its 
first store in France, followed by Austria in 1990 and Italy in 1991. Openings in more 
and more countries followed, and by 2015 Media-Markt was active in 14 European 
countries.3 
From 1990 onwards the Media-Markt Holding started to acquire the existing Saturn 
stores step by step and created the Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH. The two retail 
brands Media-Markt and Saturn, however, were organized as two independent busi-
ness units, competing on the market with a two-brand-approach.4 
An important characteristic of the Media-Markt and Saturn stores was that each of 
them was an independent company in which the store manager held a share of up to 
ten percent. Therefore, store managers had the entrepreneurial freedom to decide 
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locally on advertising, pricing, product portfolio, and personnel. This made store 
managers and their staff fully responsible for their respective store and motivated 
them to act like entrepreneurs within the Media-Saturn company.5 
With the increasing importance of online retailing in the 2000s, Media-Saturn had to 
extend their offerings beyond their traditional bricks-and-mortar stores. However, 
their first moves into the online-business failed due to the business model of the indi-
vidual pricing in the traditional stores, which differed from those in the online shop, 
which featured nationwide prices. Furthermore, customers bought products online 
and went into the stores for after-sales service, affecting the sales and profitability of 
the traditional stores. After internal tensions the company’s online presence came to 
an end in 2007, and Media-Saturn lagged behind in the online business for several 
years.6 
Therefore, Media-Saturn needed to make another attempt to successfully offer prod-
ucts online. In March 2011, Media-Saturn acquired a majority shareholding in the 
online consumer electronics retailer redcoon, which was one of the leading online 
discounters for televisions, digital cameras, notebooks, hi-fi components and sys-
tems, car audio systems, and domestic appliances in the German-language internet. 
From then on the company unified the three retail brands Media-Markt, Saturn, and 
redcoon under one roof.7 
In November 2014 Media-Saturn decided to bundle all online pure-play activities in 
one division with redcoon as its core. The goal for the division was to enhance organ-
ic growth and achieve further growth through acquisitions and new online concepts. 
The founder of idealo.de, Martin Sinner, who had many years of broad experience in 
the online and start-up scene, was appointed the new managing director of this divi-
sion.8 idealo.de was the leading price comparison platform in Germany including 
more than 200 million offers and 35,000 retailers.9 Pieter Haas described the creation 
of the this division as an important development for the company: “In addition to Me-
dia Markt and Saturn's online activities, we also want to make our mark on the online 
pure-play market. We are pleased that with Martin Sinner we have enlisted a recog-
nized online expert for the further expansion of our pure-play activities. We will also 
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be able to profit from his know-how and experience when it comes to the multichan-
nel business conducted by our Media Markt and Saturn brands.”10 
By 2015, Media-Markt had more than 800 stores, 263 of which were in Germany, and 
Saturn had around 200 stores, 155 of which in Germany, effectively making Media-
Saturn the leading consumer electronics retailer in Europe. With around 1,000 stores 
in 15 European countries and their online offerings, Media-Saturn generated reve-
nues of 22 billion Euro and had approximately 65,000 employees in the business 
year 2014/15.11 
5.1.3 (Corporate) accelerators 
Accelerator programs were considered a rather young phenomenon of start-up sup-
port. Building on the idea of bringing together promising start-ups in a co-working 
space, providing them various kinds of support, and connecting them with potential 
investors, accelerators emerged in the 2000s. The Y Combinator, which was founded 
by Peter Graham in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA in 2005 and later relocated to 
Mountain View, California in Silicon Valley, was widely considered to be the first ac-
celerator program of its kind.12 Shortly after its creation, others adopted this idea, and 
numerous accelerator programs were launched, e.g. Techstars in 2007 along with 
500 Startups in 2010.13 
Accelerators were generally characterized as time-limited start-up support programs 
with a standard duration of around three to four months that conducted a selective 
admission of a batch of usually three to twelve start-ups on a specific date. Further-
more, the programs provided various services such as office space, mentoring, train-
ing, and networking opportunities, in addition to investment capital for the admitted 
start-ups, usually in exchange for a small equity stake.14 
Since the beginning of the 2010s, established companies from diverse industries 
whose main business did not involve investment in start-ups began to launch corpo-
rate-sponsored programs, fueling the worldwide growth of accelerator programs.15 In 
early 2016, estimations saw more than 120 active corporate accelerators programs 
globally, which made it a worldwide, cross-industrial phenomenon.16 
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5.1.4 SPACELAB objectives 
The decision to launch the SPACELAB accelerator was made together with a clear 
vision for its contribution to Media-Saturn and with specific program objectives. The 
SPACELAB accelerator was intended to become an integral part of the strategic de-
velopment of Media-Saturn. As the leading consumer electronics platform in Europe, 
Media-Saturn interpreted itself as a navigator and daily companion in a technological 
world that was becoming more and more complex, and the SPACELAB was consid-
ered one component of the process of putting the company’s intentions into practice. 
Thereby, the main rationale behind the SPACELAB was strategic, specifically with 
regards to the identification and further development of promising innovative products 
and business models for Media-Saturn. 
Pieter Haas underlined this strategic rationale by stating: “Entrepreneurial start-ups 
generally consist of unbiased points of view that large companies have partially lost. 
Many entrepreneurs do not know what does not work and exactly this is one of their 
biggest strengths. In established companies, the answer to a new idea is often a has-
ty ‘yes, but’ or ‘that does not work.’ And then out of nowhere comes an entrepreneur 
who proves exactly the opposite with his or her idea. The SPACELAB Media-Saturn 
wants to support unconventional ideas, to always visualize the ever-changing world 
that will continue to change even if the company does not.”17 
Additionally, Pieter Haas explained that the SPACELAB also aimed at having an im-
pact on the working practices and the culture of Media-Saturn: “The start-ups in the 
accelerator shall help Media-Saturn to better exercise its horsepower on the road. 
Especially through extensive cooperation with start-ups in the program with the crea-
tion of common pilot projects; new structures shall be created, which will quickly bring 
about new offers in the outlets and online shops. Furthermore, Media-Saturn aims at 
positively changing the culture in the company through interactions with start-ups.” 18 
5.1.5 Desgining a corporate accelerator 
In early 2015, Pieter Haas and Martin Sinner sat together with their team to design 
the SPACELAB accelerator. As the corporate accelerator phenomenon was still rela-
tively young, little general knowledge about designing those types of programs exist-
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ed. However, more and more programs had been launched, and they could provide 
insights on how to set up a program. After looking closer at this landscape, it was 
possible to see that existing corporate accelerator programs differed with regards to 
two main categories, program focus and program organization. These two categories 
included a total of eight design dimensions for specifying a corporate accelerator 
program (see Appendix 7 for an overview of the eight design dimensions). Each of 
these dimensions posited several design options for which decisions had to be made 
in order to come up with a configuration for the SPACELAB accelerator that suited 
the context of Media-Saturn in the consumer electronics retail industry and that best 
supported the achievement of the given program objectives.  
5.1.5.1 Design decision: program focus 
Design decisions for the program focus had to be made on four different dimensions, 
namely (1) locus of opportunity, (2) industry focus, (3) venture stage, and (4) equity 
involvement. 
(1) Locus of opportunity  
The decision to be made with regards to the locus of opportunity was to define 
whether the SPACELAB accelerator was open for company-external start-ups only, 
for company-internal start-ups only, or for both. Whereas the majority of existing cor-
porate accelerator programs focused exclusively on external start-ups, some also 
admitted internal start-ups and business ideas from parent company employees. This 
led to a mix of external entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs within the program. Howev-
er, a pure focus on internal start-ups was not observable in the existing corporate 
accelerator landscape. 
The arguments in favor of external start-ups mainly included access to entrepreneur-
ial talent and to new product ideas and business models in a comparably small 
amount of time. An exclusive focus on external start-ups furthermore set a clear pro-
gram focus and separated it from internal incubation activities. Arguments in favor of 
internal start-ups were mainly the possibility to set the company’s own topics and de-
velop business models tailored to the company´s needs. An exclusive focus on inter-
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nal start-ups, however, have made this program a purely incubation program that 
already existed in the Media-Saturn organization. An argument in favor of a mixed 
approach of internal and external start-ups was to bring together intrapreneurs and 
entrepreneurs for intense interaction and thereby achieve a higher rate of knowledge 
transfer into the organization. 
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered:  
- Are internal or external start-ups more likely to develop business models for 
the future development of the company? 
- How can the company ensure access to the most promising external start-ups 
instead of only attract yet less promising start-ups? 
(2) Industry focus  
With regards to the industry focus of the admitted start-ups, it was necessary to make 
a decision about the desired proximity of the admitted start-ups to the business of 
Media-Saturn. Existing corporate accelerators differed greatly on this dimension. 
Whereas some programs were only focused on start-ups from specific, usually par-
ent company-related industries, other programs kept their admission open to compa-
nies from a broad and diverse field of industrial backgrounds that were not at all re-
lated to the parent company´s business. 
Arguments for a broad industrial focus included mainly the provision of insights from 
other industries and the possibility to enhance out-of-the-box thinking. Arguments for 
a tighter industrial focus with touch points to the value chain of Media-Saturn includ-
ed potentially simpler connections with the existing organization, the possibility to 
conduct pilot tests in the Media-Markt and Saturn stores, and a higher chance of 
identifying relevant products or services for the future development of the company. 
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered:  
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- From which industries are business models with future relevance for the com-
pany expected to come? 
- Start-ups with which industrial backgrounds can provide the most value for the 
company? 
(3) Venture stage  
With regards to the venture stage, it was important to decide the extent to which ad-
mitted start-ups to the SPACELAB accelerator had to be developed. The venture 
stage, referring to the maturity level of the admitted start-ups, differed significantly in 
existing programs. Some programs admitted start-ups in very early stages, which 
meant they were not necessarily officially founded and frequently had no prototype or 
developed product at the time of admission. Other programs had a focus on signifi-
cantly further developed companies with at least a prototype or minimum viable 
product available and that were ready to grow their business. 
Arguments for very early stage start-ups, meaning start-ups were not legally founded, 
did not have a prototype, and did not necessarily have a full team, included the po-
tential access to the most promising ideas as early as possible and an overall cheap-
er access to start-ups. Furthermore, these very early start-ups were presumably eas-
ier to convince to participate in the program. Arguments for later stage start-ups that 
were already legally founded and had at least a prototype and a full team were based 
on the fact that these start-ups could better benefit from pilot tests in Media-Markt or 
Saturn stores in the acceleration phase. Furthermore, these companies would pro-
vide access to technologies closer to proof of concept instead of ideas only.  
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered: 
- From start-ups in which venture stage can the company benefit the most?  
- The company can add the most value in the limited timeframe of the accelera-
tor program to start-ups in which venture stage? 
- Do the requirements of later stage start-ups for investment capital exceed the 
given investment capital budget?  
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(4) Equity involvement 
With regards to equity involvement, it was necessary to decide if Media-Saturn want-
ed to provide investment capital to the admitted start-ups and if it wanted to become 
a shareholder in return for its investment or not. Whereas most of the existing pro-
grams provided some amount of investment capital to the admitted start-ups, some 
programs did not provide any financial support with their programs. In the case of 
capital provision, however, there was ambiguity with regards to the share of equity 
start-ups needed to give to the accelerator program in exchange. Three approaches 
could be identified in existing programs: Firstly, a capital provision with no strings at-
tached, meaning that start-ups did not give any equity shares to the program. Se-
cond, in exchange for the provision of investment capital, start-ups gave direct 
shares of equity to the program, usually around 5%. Third, the investment capital was 
provided in the form of a convertible loan, which converted into an equity share at a 
certain trigger event, such as follow-on funding or the moment the corporate acceler-
ator requested it. 
The argument for a capital provision without any equity involvement was its attrac-
tiveness to the start-ups, which made it easier to convince them to participate in the 
program. The argument for a direct equity involvement was to immediately ensure a 
stake in a promising company. The argument for equity involvement over a converti-
ble loan was flexibility in a sense that this option ensured a share in the company but 
that the conversion had not necessarily be executed, e.g. in case no further coopera-
tion was intended.  
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered: 
- What is a reasonable amount of investment capital for the targeted start-ups? 
- Which equity involvement option is most likely to convince the most promising 
start-ups to participate in the program? 
- Does the company want to manage multiple investments in start-ups? 
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5.1.5.2 Design decision: program organization 
With regards to program organization, there were also four different dimensions of 
existing corporate accelerator programs, dimensions for which Media-Saturn had to 
make a design choice. This included (1) connection to the parent company, (2) back-
ground of the accelerator team, (3) inclusion of an external accelerator partner, and 
(4) inclusion of external support partners in the curriculum. 
(1) Connection to the parent company  
With regards to the organizational connection of the SPACELAB, the decision to in-
tegrate the SPACELAB into the existing organization or launch it completely separate 
from the existing organization had to be made. In existing corporate accelerator pro-
grams both options could be found. Integrated programs were usually part of specific 
corporate departments such as strategy, innovation management, or digital / online 
business units. Separate programs were usually founded as separate legal entities 
outside the parent organization.   
Arguments for the integrated approach included a close connection to the operational 
business and the potential use of company infrastructure. Furthermore, the more effi-
cient transfer of knowledge due to organizational proximity was considered an ad-
vantage of this option. The argument for the separated approach was mainly that the 
accelerator provided an independent environment free from corporate interference.  
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered: 
- Do existing corporate structures hinder the development of start-ups in the ac-
celerator and the achievement of the strategic objectives? 
- Where in the existing organization could the accelerator program be located? 
- How is it possible to ensure sufficient exchange with the existing organization, 
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(2) Background of accelerator team  
With regards to the background of the management team of the accelerator, the 
company had to decide if internal people or external hires were the right candidates. 
The management staff of existing corporate accelerator programs consisted of either 
employees from inside the parent company or external candidates who were hired for 
the purpose of managing the program. Internal accelerator managers in existing pro-
grams often had at least a year’s worth of experience in the parent company whereas 
external candidates often had a proven track record in the start-up ecosystem with 
entrepreneurial experience. 
Arguments for internal candidates were their usually strong network within the com-
pany and their knowledge about specifics of the company and its industry. Argu-
ments for external candidates were their unbiased external perspective and their po-
tential of having strong experience in the online and start-up ecosystem. 
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered: 
- Which capability is more relevant to successful program execution: a compre-
hensive understanding of the parent company or of the entrepreneurial start-
up ecosystem? 
- Does an internal candidate have a better chance of being accepted within the 
organization? 
- What is the best method of finding a suitable external or internal candidate? 
 
(3) Inclusion of external accelerator partner  
With regards to an external accelerator partner, it was necessary to determine 
whether such a partner was chosen for program management and execution or if an 
in-house approach would be selected. As for any other project, some corporate par-
ents chose external support for setting up and running their corporate accelerator 
program. Numerous accelerator companies such as TechStars or Plug&Play 
Techcenter offered established companies support for their corporate accelerators. 
Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH - the SPACELAB accelerator: a teaching case study           125 
Therefore, some corporate accelerators were launched in conjunction with such an 
accelerator company, which could usually be identified by the name of the program, 
as it often included the name of the accelerator partner, e.g. with the extension “pow-
ered by.” 
Arguments for the inclusion of an accelerator company consisted of the integration of 
accelerator execution know how and the increase of program credibility based on the 
proven track record of this company. Arguments for the in-house approach were the 
comparable lower cost and management complexity and the prevention of brand dilu-
tion through the accelerator company name extension. 
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered: 
- Is external support required or are the required capabilities available in the ac-
celerator team? 
- Does an external partner fit into the (annual) budget for the accelerator pro-
gram?  
- How can the company successfully run the accelerator program without exter-
nal support? 
 
(4) Inclusion of external support partners in curriculum 
With regards to the curriculum of the accelerator program, a decision about the inclu-
sion of potential external support partners had to be made. A major characteristic of 
existing accelerator programs was the provision of multifaceted support to the admit-
ted start-ups. This support not only included assistance in diverse areas such as le-
gal, marketing, supply chain, and strategy, but also in soft skill development such as 
pitch training. These competencies were usually not all available in the parent com-
panies, and external support partners were integrated into the curricula of existing 
programs. Whereas some programs focused on a leaner curriculum with less exter-
nal workshops and training sessions, others provided a more comprehensive and 
intensive concept with numerous external support partners.  
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Arguments for the inclusion of external support partners were the increase of pro-
gram credibility and attractiveness as well as a more holistic support to start-ups be-
yond the expertise of the parent company. Arguments for the inclusion of less exter-
nal support partners included the idea that too many workshops with external part-
ners could scare off start-ups due to too many obligations and too little freedom and 
that with the inclusion of more internal topic experts, it was possible to achieve a 
stronger interaction. 
In order to come to a design decision on this dimension, the following questions 
needed to be answered: 
- Which forms of support does the program need to provide to the start-ups dur-
ing the acceleration phase? 
- Which forms of support can the company provide with internal resources and 
which forms can it not? 
- How can the company find and select external support partners to work with 
the start-ups? 
- How is it possible to compensate external support partners for their engage-
ment? What are the right incentives?  
Pieter Haas and Martin Sinner reviewed these general design options for a corporate 
accelerator and discussed which choices were adequate for the SPACELAB acceler-
ator. They knew there was no clear right or wrong concept at this point in time and 
that the concept had to prove itself in practice. However, they were also sure that 
some design choices for the SPACELAB were more adequate to the specific context 
of Media-Saturn than others. Therefore, their discussions centered on these two 
main questions: 
- Which design choices should be made for the SPACELAB accelerator with re-
gards to each of the eight dimensions? 
- What are the potential risks connected to these choices and how can the 
company overcome them? 
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 Part 2: design choices made and program execution 
5.2.1 Media-Saturn SPACELAB concept 
In August 2015, Media-Saturn publicly announced the launch of the SPACELAB ac-
celerator, which was widely covered in the German business press including Han-
delsblatt and Gruenderszene. The SPACELAB was the first accelerator for start-ups 
in the consumer electronics retail segment, and it offered young companies the op-
portunity to improve their products and services during a comprehensive and inten-
sive acceleration phase of 20 weeks in the program in the city center of Munich, 
Germany.19 
The program included numerous forms of support for the admitted start-ups. Firstly, 
provision of investment capital of 30,000 Euro for each start-up, which was above the 
average of existing programs on the German market where it was typical to offer be-
tween 15,000 to 25,000 Euro of investment capital to admitted start-ups. Secondly 
and even more importantly was the multifaceted non-financial support. This included 
in addition to the provision of shared office space a holistic program curriculum with 
workshops of numerous renowned external topic experts such as GfK (Germany´s 
Society for Consumer Goods Research) for market analysis, EY for finance, Service-
plan for marketing, Bain & Company for strategy, and further support partners. Fur-
thermore, start-ups received the opportunity to make use of Media-Saturn´s exten-
sive channels and experience in consumer electronics retail with more than 5.5 mil-
lion customer contacts per day in 15 European countries through pilot testing of 
products and services in a Media-Market or Saturn store. This represented a unique 
opportunity for young start-ups to further develop and scale their offerings. In addition 
to these benefits, an extensive network of mentors from within and outside the Me-
dia-Saturn organization offered their expertise to the start-ups. Further advantages 
included access to the top management team of Media-Saturn, another unique op-
portunity for start-ups to improve their business through high-class and expert feed-
back that was typically difficult to access.20 
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As Martin Sinner described it, “Together with our partners and mentors we create an 
information density that really helps the start-ups to get to the next development 
stage.“21 
With the announcement for the launch of the SPACELAB accelerator program in Au-
gust 2015, applications were opened for the first batch of four to six start-ups that 
were about to start the program in late 2015. By this time, the SPACELAB team 
around Pieter Haas and Martin Sinner had made decisions on the detailed program 
design with regards to the discussed eight design dimensions for program focus and 
program organization. 
5.2.1.1 Media-Saturn SPACELAB: program focus 
(1) Locus of opportunity 
The SPACELAB was set up to exclusively focus on external start-ups. This approach 
mainly drew from the rationale that internal incubation of companies was a very cost-
ly and lengthy process, and with the SPACELAB promising external ideas were to be 
first identified and then tested during the program. Therefore, the SPACELAB fo-
cused only on external start-ups that were ready to grow and become further im-
proved within the program. The decision was also based on the fact that a dedicated 
incubation program for internal business ideas was already in place. Furthermore, in 
comparison to the incubation of its own corporate start-ups, the accelerator was ex-
pected to provide more efficient access to new business models and also to entre-
preneurial talent outside the company´s boundaries. Therefore, the decision to clear-
ly separate the accelerator program from corporate incubation and give the SPACE-
LAB an exclusive focus on external opportunities was made. However, it was also 
recognized that this choice presented the challenge of attracting the most promising 
and attractive start-ups in order to make the program a success.  
(2) Industry focus 
The SPACELAB focused on start-ups that had with their products or services offered 
a touch point somewhere along the value-chain of Media-Saturn and a connection 
with consumer electronics. This touch point might be with regards to the product port-
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folio, which included products such as smart home, wearables, or internet-related 
products. It also included the support processes of Media-Saturn´s value chain, 
which could involve purchasing, payment, logistics, or after sales services. The 
SPACELAB therefore had a clear focus on start-ups that might somehow benefit Me-
dia-Saturn, but with a broader perspective and not only with regards to potential 
products to be sold. This focus was considered necessary in order to achieve the 
program’s strategic objective to identify innovative products and promising business 
models and to be able to provide real value to the admitted start-ups based on the 
existing capabilities and extensive experience in the consumer electronics business 
of Media-Saturn. See Appendix 8 for an overview of the SPACELAB´s investment 
focus along the value chain of Media-Saturn. 
(3) Venture stage 
SPACELAB focused exclusively on start-ups that had passed the idea stage and had 
already developed at least a minimum viable product or prototype. As the key objec-
tive for the program was to work on common pilot tests and make use of the sales 
channels of Media-Saturn to make tests with customers in the electronics retail mar-
kets or online shops, admitted start-ups were required to be in a mature stage in 
which they could benefit from these activities. Furthermore, the start-ups were also 
required to consist of a complete team that covered all key expertise areas in order to 
be able to focus on the acceleration and scaling of their business throughout the pro-
gram. Lastly, the start-ups needed to be already registered companies, and the intel-
lectual property, if applicable, was with the respective legal entity and not with anoth-
er legal entity. This requirement ensured that Media-Saturn received access to the 
relevant knowledge and technologies. However, it was also recognized that start-ups 
at this stage might require a higher investment capital provision. However, the com-
pany intended to at least partially compensate start-ups through the provision of ex-
traordinary valuable non-financial services.  
(4) Equity involvement  
Participating start-ups in the SPACELAB received investment capital of 30,000 Euro, 
which was slightly higher than the average amount of investment capital provided in 
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other corporate accelerators, and it also accounted for the decision to focus on later 
stage start-ups. The capital was provided in the form of a convertible loan. This form 
of financing structure had an advantage in that it could be converted into equity, but it 
did not necessarily have to be converted. In other words, after the accelerator phase, 
Media-Saturn could decide if it wanted to become a shareholder of the start-up or 
not. This solution afforded Media-Saturn the option to become a shareholder of the 
respective start-ups after successful tests in the accelerator. Furthermore, this option 
also prevented additional management complexity and cost incurred by managing 
numerous minority stakes in start-ups with no future relevance for Media-Saturn. 
5.2.1.2 Media-Saturn SPACELAB: program organization 
(1) Connection to the parent company 
The SPACELAB accelerator was launched as an integral part of its online business 
division, which was created in 2014 to bundle all online pure-play activities of Media-
Saturn. The aim of this division was on the one hand to enhance the organic growth 
of existing online activities and also to grow through acquisitions and new online con-
cepts, meaning it was the ideal environment for the SPACELAB accelerator. A threat 
for hindering the development of start-ups through corporate structure was therefore 
not existent. The SPACELAB accelerator was integrated into the existing holding 
structure and had a direct reporting line to Media-Saturn CEO Pieter Haas. This ap-
proach also ensured proximity to the operational business units, which was relevant 
for close interaction and the execution of pilot tests within the sales channels of Me-
dia-Saturn.  
(2) Background of accelerator team 
With the creation of the online business division in 2014, Martin Sinner, who had a 
wide range of experience and a long career in the online and start-up scene, was 
appointed managing director. He took over responsibility for the SPACELAB acceler-
ator as the program was integrated into the existing online business division. In addi-
tion, Robin Brohl, who had an entrepreneurial background and experience in compa-
ny building and held an MBA degree from one of Europe´s leading business schools 
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for entrepreneurship, overtook operational responsibility for the SPACELAB. Conse-
quently, an accelerator team with extensive experience external to Media-Saturn was 
installed. In contrast to internal candidates, the external hires were considered to 
have the advantage of being unbiased, more focused on disruption, and not afraid of 
destroying long-term relationships by bringing new ideas into the organization. Over-
all, SPACELAB consisted of a lean team only that was supported by working stu-
dents and interns. 
(3) Inclusion of external accelerator partner 
The SPACELAB accelerator was launched without an external accelerator partner. 
On the one hand, it was a financial decision, as cooperation with an external acceler-
ator company would have resulted in high costs. On the other hand, it was also a 
branding decision, as with an external accelerator partner, the brand would have be-
come diluted with the inclusion of the accelerator company’s name. Furthermore, the 
integration of partners in the management of the program would have also increased 
management complexity, which was prevented by the selected in-house approach. In 
addition, Martin Sinner’s extensive experience in the start-up ecosystem was another 
reason for choosing the in-house approach. In order to run the program successfully 
without external support, the size of the program with batches of only four to six start-
ups was comparably small. Such programs were considered easier to execute than 
programs with more than 10 start-ups per batch. 
(4) Inclusion of external support partners 
The inclusion of external support partners in the curriculum and thereby into the ac-
tive execution of the program was an integral part of the SPACELAB concept. The 
main rationale was that Media-Saturn and SPACELAB could not provide all compe-
tencies required for the acceleration of the start-ups and to take them to the next lev-
el. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to integrate external expertise. The idea was for 
neither Media-Saturn nor the support partners to pay for the provision of this exper-
tise and integrate the support partners into the program instead of only acquiring their 
services. This approach allowed the numerous external partners to become more 
motivated about supporting start-ups in the SPACELAB, as doing so provided access 
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to potential future customers and allowed them to engage in relationship building and 
reputation building within the start-up ecosystem. They were also able to learn about 
accelerators and gain access to and interact with the top management team of Me-
dia-Saturn. Furthermore, SPACELAB required its partners to commit to a certain 
number of days and workshops for each batch of start-ups to ensure real commit-
ment and presence. Additionally, their offered support was usually provided by senior 
levels, which ensured that start-ups would benefit from high-quality guidance. 
Overall, the SPACELAB built a collaboration platform under which Media-Saturn 
brought together partners with diverse relevant expertise to support the development 
of the start-ups and which also significantly enhanced the program attractiveness. 
Support partners such as GfK, EY, Serviceplan were also integrated into accelerator 
processes such as screening and selection of relevant start-ups and decision making 
about further support. An important part of this concept was the two-day pre-
accelerator which made up the last step of the selection process. Conducted in co-
operation with strategy consultancies, pre-selected start-ups ran through this intense 
program and the final decision on which start-ups move into the accelerator was 
made. The first pre-accelerator was done in cooperation with Accenture and the se-
cond one with A.T. Kearney. The integration of such a variety of high-class external 
support partners could not be observed in any other corporate accelerator program in 
Germany, making it a unique characteristic of the SPACELAB accelerator. 
5.2.2 SPACELAB in the corporate accelerator landscape 
With the described characteristics, the SPACELAB accelerator represented a specific 
form of corporate accelerator called “strategic value chain investor.” The program 
had a clear strategic approach, and financial gains through investments in the start-
ups were not its main priority. This differentiated the program from other, mainly fi-
nancially oriented programs. Furthermore, it exclusively focused on external start-ups 
and was integrated into the existing Media-Saturn organization. This distinguished 
the SPACELAB from laboratory-like accelerator programs that were also open to in-
ternal business ideas and that provided a strongly protected environment out of cor-
porate structures for working with the start-ups. Additionally, the focus on later stage 
start-ups was executed in combination with the provision of investment capital in the 
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form of a convertible loan and a clear focus on relevance for the Media-Saturn value 
chain. These characteristics differentiated the SPACELAB from programs that fre-
quently had a looser cooperation with very early stage start-ups, sometimes even 
without the provision of capital at all and always without any equity involvement. Fur-
thermore, the comprehensive curriculum with the unmatched integration of numerous 
external support partners made the program unique. 
5.2.3 First batch participants 
The first batch with four start-ups entered the program in late 2015. All four start-ups 
offered services that had the potential to extend the value chain of Media-Saturn and 
provide additional services to the company’s customers. The similarities amongst 
their lines of work were in particular an integral part of the concept. 
The first company was expertiger, which offered remote service for PCs and laptops 
via hotline and shared screen. During the SPACELAB program, the company made a 
pilot test in six Saturn stores by providing vouchers for free installation of new PC or 
laptops.  
The second company was Deutsche Technikberatung, which offered on-site support 
service for all consumer electronics products, including installation, consulting, and 
troubleshooting in the city of Cologne, Germany. During the program, they conducted 
a customer acquisition campaign and offered shopping support in several local Sat-
urn stores.  
The third company was kaputt.de, an online platform for people with broken mobile 
phones and smartphones. The company provided tutorials, spare parts, and contacts 
to certified local repair shops. During the program, their offerings became listed as an 
“immediate phone repair service” in more than 60 Media-Saturn stores. 
The fourth company was myhomeservices, which offered a mobile app for digital 
storage of invoices and contracts with an integrated search for related spare parts, 
accessories, and additional services. Subsequent to the program, it was planned for 
the service to be rolled out in Media Markt stores in the Netherlands.  
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The first batch of the accelerator program was considered a success, as it provided 
new insights into additional services Media-Saturn could offer its customers. As 
Pieter Haas said: “The most fascinating aspect of the program is that we are all in the 
same ‘space,’ namely consumer electronics, but we all take clearly different ap-
proaches and thereby create completely different added value. Deutsche Techni-
kberatung, for example, with their service of providing technological support at home, 
can on the one hand almost be considered ‘old-school,’ but due to the increasing 
complexity customers face, it is more modern than ever. All the ideas in the SPACE-
LAB remind us of what is possible in the market of consumer electronics. If you com-
pare it to soft drinks, we offer in our stores the equivalents of Coca Cola or Pepsi, 
and the start-ups show us that there are also people who drink organic lemonade or 
smoothies.“22 This parallel artfully demonstrates the ways in which Media-Saturn was 
able to identify and work on possibly new services for its customers and also poten-
tial new customers, something that made the first batch of the SPACELAB program a 
success. 
5.2.4 Looking ahead  
The first batch of the SPACELAB graduated with a demo day in April 2015. At this 
event, the four start-ups pitched their products to the management of Media-Saturn, 
potential investors, and the interested public. More than 400 people attended the 
event in Munich, Germany. At the same time, the application for the second batch of 
start-ups opened, and interested start-ups already had the opportunity to pitch their 
ideas throughout the course of this event. The second batch was planned to start the 
program in summer 2016. 
One piece of information gleaned from the first batch was that it made sense to admit 
start-ups with similar business models at the same time. In the first batch, all start-
ups offered services centered on consumer electronics products. This relatedness 
amongst the business models also enabled the start-ups to learn from each other, 
and it allowed program organizers to tailor the workshops, making them specific to 
the needs of the start-ups. Therefore, Media-Saturn planned to admit start-ups that 
work on similar topics for following batches as well. 
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Due to the growing popularity of the program and the increased visibility in the start-
up ecosystem, the SPACELAB could extend its portfolio of support partners and was 
continuing to do so. As such, the accelerator as a collaboration platform with relevant 
partners for the support and acceleration of start-ups grew, further increasing the 
overall attractiveness of the program in the eyes of promising start-ups. The coopera-
tion with strategy consultancies for the final part of the selection process, the pre-
accelerator, was regarded as especially successful. Therefore, it was decided to con-
tinue this form of partnership in future batches.  
Based on this development, Pieter Haas explained what he liked to say about how 
SPACELAB would look in 5 years’ time: “SPACELAB is the accelerator for consumer 
electronics in Europe, and we have supported at least a few start-ups that are on 
their way to becoming successful young companies. And that our corporate culture 
has become more open through interaction with start-ups and that new concepts and 
ideas are more quickly tried out and, if successful, integrated into the company.” 23 
 Teaching note 
5.3.1 Synopsis 
Corporate accelerators are a recent phenomenon, and an increasing number of es-
tablished companies from diverse industries have launched these programs since the 
early 2010s. As the phenomenon is rather young and only very limited knowledge 
about the programs exists, companies that want to launch a corporate accelerator 
program are often in the dark with regards to how to do so.  
This two-part case study of the SPACELAB accelerator of Media-Saturn-Holding pro-
vides information about the potential design options companies have when setting up 
a corporate accelerator (Part 1), and it also provides detailed insights about how and 
why Media-Saturn has made the decisions regarding their SPACELAB accelerator 
(Part 2). Thereby the case provides a holistic view on a question that numerous 
managers in established companies are facing today: How to design a corporate ac-
celerator program? 
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5.3.2 Learning objectives 
The case study has two main learning objectives structured along its two parts. In the 
first part (“background and accelerator design options”), the case aims to establish 
the background of the Media-Saturn SPACELAB accelerator as well as facilitate a 
deeper understanding of the recent accelerator phenomenon by making transparent 
the potential design options companies have when setting up their corporate accel-
erator programs. This presentation of information equips students with a holistic 
overview of and detailed insights into eight relevant accelerator design dimensions. 
Furthermore, at the end of the first part of the case, students will be able to adopt the 
perspective of the management and discuss the potential accelerator design options 
for a real world situation of Europe`s leading consumer electronics company. 
In the second part (“design choices made and program execution”), the case pro-
vides in-depth insights into the Media-Saturn SPACELAB accelerator. This mainly 
includes the discussion of the design choices the management of Media-Saturn has 
made based on the defined objectives of the program, which are outlined in the first 
part of the case. This detailed discussion of the rationale for each selected design 
option allows one to gain a holistic understanding of the corporate accelerator pro-
gram and the inter-connections between some of the discussed dimensions.  
5.3.3 Position in course 
This case is appropriate for use in entrepreneurship, strategic management, and in-
novation management courses. The case fits well in the context of modules or dis-
cussions on corporate entrepreneurship and venturing, entrepreneurial strategies of 
established companies, entrepreneurial ecosystems, and managing corporate inno-
vation. Instructors will find the case appropriate for all levels, including undergraduate 
courses, and graduate and MBA courses, as well as executive education courses. 
5.3.4 Relevant reading / material 
Instructors can recommend the following articles for a general introduction on the 
accelerator phenomenon and the characteristics of existing programs: 
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- David L. Hoffmann and Nina Radojevich-Kelley, “Analysis of Accelerator 
Companies: An Exploratory Case Study of Their Programs, Processes, and 
Early Results,” Small Business Institute Journal, 8/2 (2012): 54-70.  
- Susan Cohen, “What Do Accelerators Do? Insights From Incubators and An-
gels,” Innovations Accelerating Entrepreneurship, 8/3 (2013): 19-25. 
- Yael V. Hochberg, “Accelerating Entrepreneurs and Ecosystems: the Seed 
Accelerator Model,” Innovation Policy and the Economy, 16 (2015). 
Furthermore, instructors can recommend the following article for understanding dif-
ferent options of start-up engagement for established companies:  
- Tobias Weiblen and Henry W. Chesbrough, “Engaging with Startups to En-
hance Corporate Innovation,” California Management Review, 57/2 (2015): 
66-90. 
Instructors might use the following three videos as an introduction to Media-Saturn-
Holding and the SPACELAB accelerator: 
- YouTube, “Media-Saturn Unternehmensfilm,“ September 26, 2013,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_pJF59fihI, accessed April 29, 2016.  
(German only) 
- YouTube, “Introducing: Deputy CEO of Media-Saturn & Mentor - Pieter Haas -
SPACELAB Tech Accelerator,“ November 4, 2015,  https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=GIxZ1oGASA0, accessed April 29, 2016. 
- YouTube, “Introducing: Mentor -  Klaus Lahrmann - Media-Saturn SPACELAB 
Tech Accelerator,“ October 28, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=o1PLbGP4ZmA, accessed April 29, 2016. 
5.3.5 Assignment questions 
1) Analyze the decision made by Media-Saturn to launch a corporate accelerator 
program. What are the potential benefits, drawbacks, and risks of launching a 
corporate accelerator in the given context of Media-Saturn? Which alternative 
options for a corporate accelerator exist? 
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2) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different options for each of 
the outlined eight dimensions for accelerator design in the context of Media-
Saturn. What would be your recommendations for the SPACELAB accelera-
tor? How can risks be mitigated? 
3) What do you think is crucial for a corporate accelerator to be successful? 
What do you think Media-Saturn should do to make the program a sustainable 
success? 
5.3.6 Teaching plan 
 
Question Position in course Focus and aim  Discussion length 
1 After reading part 1 Accelerator concept: 
Understanding the accelerator approach 
in general and its advantages and disad-
vantages in comparison to other forms of 
start-up engagement 
10-15 minutes 
2 After reading part 1 Design options: 
Understanding the different design op-
tions for corporate accelerators and de-
termine a recommendation for Media-
Saturn 
25-30 minutes 
3 After reading part 2 Strategic impact and execution:  
Stimulate discussion on potential strate-
gic benefits of accelerators and identify 
potential success factors for successful 
program implementation and execution 
10-15 minutes 
Table 13: Teaching plan 
5.3.7 Analysis 
Accelerator concept (Question 1): 
Analyze the decision made by Media-Saturn to launch a corporate accelerator pro-
gram. What are the potential benefits, drawbacks, and risks of launching a corporate 
accelerator in the given context of Media-Saturn? Which alternative options for a cor-
porate accelerator exist? 
The discussion for this first assignment question can be structured in two parts: first-
ly, the discussion of the specifics of the accelerator concept in general and secondly, 
the discussion about potential alternative options. 
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The first part of the discussion can be initiated by asking a basic question about cor-
porate accelerators that students know about. For example, the instructor might ask 
for examples from the industries or companies the students have experience in or 
about corporate accelerators located in geographical proximity. The instructor can 
then lead the discussion, going from examples to the potential benefits, drawbacks, 
and risks of those programs. Some of the typical answers to this question might be: 
Benefits: 
- Access to future promising online business models that complement the exist-
ing online and offline stores of Media-Saturn 
- Contact with entrepreneurial talent that might not exist in Media-Saturn 
- Identification and further development of potentially relevant future products 
and business models (“listening post” for disruption) 
- Longer periods of time for screening potential acquisition targets (work togeth-
er for several months before perhaps making a full acquisition) 
- Moderate levels of investment (up to 30,000 Euro) in comparison to classical 
corporate venture capital 
- First mover advantage, as no corporate accelerator for start-ups in the con-
sumer electronics exists in Europe 
- Publicity effects regarding customers by showing that Media-Saturn supports 
entrepreneurs and invests in future technologies  
- Employer branding by showing that Media-Saturn aims at being an agile com-
pany 
Drawbacks: 
- Proof-of-concept of most business ideas that are still outstanding 
- Admitted start-ups are still small, and they are young companies with less of 
an impact on the organization than M&A targets 
- Overall high process costs per target, as the number of start-ups per year is 
higher than it is with classical corporate venture capital 
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Risks: 
- Negative publicity in case of early program termination 
- Real impact and efficacy of corporate accelerator programs remain unclear 
and best practices are still missing 
Based on the discussion of potential benefits, drawbacks, and risks, the instructor 
can refer to business incubation and acquisitions as potential alternatives to a corpo-
rate accelerator program. After the instructor mentions that these alternatives can be 
considered as “make” (internal incubation) and “buy” (acquisitions), he or she can 
encourage students to think about the specifics of these options with regards to po-
tential benefits and drawbacks. Typical answers include the following: 
Internal incubation (“make”): 
Benefits: 
- Setting the topic and tailoring it specifically to the parent company´s need 
- Full control over development and progress of new products / business mod-
els 
- Providing an appealing environment and opportunities to work on for internal 
staff 
Drawbacks: 
- Frequently, lack of entrepreneurial talent within the organization 
- Direct P&L impact through high costs (especially driven by personnel cost) 
- Usually, lack of corporate support due to other priorities 
 
Target acquisitions (“buy”): 
Benefits: 
- Access to established business models / developed products  
- Ensuring transfer of knowledge and technology  
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Drawbacks: 
- Difficult deal sourcing and a long due diligence phase 
- Large investments are required as good targets have high value 
- High level of risk associated with potential benefits / synergies 
- Long decision-making process including board approval 
- Entire organization must support transaction and integration 
A structured board plan can support the discussion as shown in Appendix 9. 
Design options (Question 2): 
Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different options for each of the 
outlined eight dimensions for accelerator design in the context of Media-Saturn. What 
would be your recommendations for the SPACELAB accelerator? How can risks be 
mitigated? 
The instructor should go through the different dimensions introduced in the case to 
first achieve a common understanding of each dimension and then discuss the po-
tential arguments for the options of each dimension. The points listed below provide 
guidance for potential answers. Additionally, students should be encouraged to de-
rive their personal recommendation for each design dimension using the given con-
text of Media-Saturn. 
Program focus: 
(1) Locus of opportunity  
External only:  
- Clear program focus and separation from costly incubation  
- Extensive access to entrepreneurial talent 
External-internal mix:  
- Bring together intrapreneurs and entrepreneurs and achieve higher interaction 
amongst them 
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(2) Industry focus  
Broad industrial focus (not necessarily related to consumer electronics):  
- Insights from other industries  
- Possibility for out-of-the-box thinking 
Tight industrial focus (relevance for consumer electronics):  
- Potentially easier connections with the existing organization 
- Possibility to conduct pilot tests in Media-Saturn stores 
- Highest chance of finding relevant products or services for Media-Saturn value 
chain 
 
(3) Venture stage  
Early stage (not legally founded, no prototype, not necessarily full team): 
- Get access to most promising ideas as early as possible 
- Cheaper targets / start-ups easier to convince for accelerator 
Later stage (legally founded, at least prototype, full team): 
- Start-ups can better benefit from pilot tests during the acceleration phase 
- Access to technologies instead of ideas only – closer to proof of concept 
 
(4) Equity involvement  
Direct equity involvement: 
- Immediately ensuring stake in the company 
Equity involvement over convertible loan: 
- Conversion does not need to be executed if further cooperation is not desired 
No equity involvement: 
- Most attractive to convince start-ups to join the accelerator program 
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Program organization: 
(1) Connection to parent company  
Integrated: 
- Close connection to the operational business 
- Use of company infrastructure / back office 
Separated: 
- Independent environment without corporate interference 
 
(2) Background of accelerator team  
Internal: 
- Usually strong network in the parent company 
- Knowledge about corporate specifics 
External: 
- Integration of unbiased external perspectives 
- Usually strong experience in the start-up ecosystem 
 
(3) Inclusion of external accelerator partner  
Yes (e.g. Techstars): 
- Integration of accelerator execution know-how 
- Increase program credibility through a proven track record of accelerator part-
ners  
No (in-house approach): 
- Own branding / no brand dilution 
- Less costly 
Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH - the SPACELAB accelerator: a teaching case study           144 
- Less complex management  
(4) Inclusion of external support partner  
Yes (mainly external topic experts): 
- Increase program credibility via renowned support partners 
- Offer holistic support to start-ups beyond expertise of parent company 
No mainly (internal topic experts): 
- Too many workshops might scare off start-ups (too many obligations, too little 
freedom) 
- Stronger interaction with internal experts from parent company 
In addition to the advantages and disadvantages of each design option, it is also 
possible to identify interrelations between various design dimensions. The instructor 
can ask students to list some of those interrelations based on the preceding discus-
sion. The following interrelations should be identified: 
1) Locus of opportunity and external support partner:  
When focusing on external start-ups, the inclusion of well-known and high-
class support partners can increase the attractiveness of the program. This in-
creases the likelihood of winning the most promising start-ups for the program. 
2) Industry focus and connection to the parent company:  
Start-ups from a similar industry background might add the most value when 
closely connected with the existing parent company organization. This enables 
direct interaction and knowledge exchange about relevant topics for both sides 
and therefore supports learning. 
3) Venture stage and equity involvement:  
When focusing on start-ups that are beyond the idea stage and that have a 
prototype developed already, the provided investment capital and the level of 
equity in exchange for it must be aligned. The more mature the start-ups are 
supposed to be, the higher their valuations, which should have an impact on 
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the investment capital provided in order to convince the targeted start-ups to 
join the program.  
4) Background of accelerator team and external accelerator partner:  
Having an accelerator management team that has relevant experience in the 
start-up ecosystem or even in accelerator management can make hiring an 
external accelerator partner for program management redundant.  
A structured board plan can support the discussion as shown in Appendix 10. 
Strategic impact and execution (Question 3): 
What do you think is crucial for a corporate accelerator to be successful? What do 
you think Media-Saturn should do to make the program a sustainable success? 
The instructor should ask the students to think of corporate accelerator success fac-
tors and might collect their ideas on a flipchart or board. Then, these factors can be 
compared with the following factors, which were mentioned in the interviews con-
ducted with various accelerator managers: 
- Clearly define objectives and scope of program 
- Ensure commitment of and access to the top management team 
- Network in start-up ecosystem to attract outstanding entrepreneurial teams 
- Integrate parent company employees into the program and win their support 
- Deliver real value to the start-ups and not just exploit the participants for PR 
opportunities 
Finally, the instructor should encourage an open discussion about the specific 
measures that Media-Saturn could apply. Topics for discussion might include the fol-
lowing: 
- How Media-Saturn could measure the strategic impact of the program (this is 
especially hard to achieve with regards to cultural change) 
- What would be realistic targets to be achieved for Media-Saturn with regards 
to the integration of business models 
Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH - the SPACELAB accelerator: a teaching case study           146 
5.3.8 What happened 
After the graduation of the first batch of companies, the SPACELAB announced the 
start of the second batch of selected start-ups and started to accept applications for 
the program again. Mid-June 2016, pre-selected start-ups pitched their business ide-
as during a two-day pre-accelerator event, and in late June 2016, the start-ups that 
were ultimately selected moved into the SPACELAB offices in Munich.  
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Appendix 8: Investment focus of SPACELAB   
 
Source: SPACELAB website (www.ms-spacelab.com)  
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Locus of opportunity  
internal vs. external 
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Industry focus 
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Venture stage 
early vs. later 
Background of accelera-
tor team 
internal vs. external 
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Appendix 9: Benefits and drawbacks of various start-up engagement options 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
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6 Contribution and further research 
This dissertation discusses corporate venturing activities of established companies, 
providing detailed insights into this field of research for both academics and practi-
tioners. Building on two main areas within corporate venturing research, the hetero-
geneity and the non-financial dimension of activities, this dissertation significantly 
enhances the understanding of corporate venturing activities through four research 
papers. See Figure 14 for the individual contribution of each research paper to the 
two areas. 
 
Figure 14: Main contribution of research papers 
 Contribution to research 
This dissertation enriches research on the heterogeneity of corporate venturing ac-
tivities twofold. It does so first by making transparent differentiating characteristics of 
corporate venturing activities and second, by analyzing corporate accelerators as a 
recently very popular form of corporate venturing.  
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The understanding of the heterogeneity in corporate venturing activities is enhanced 
by identifying the various characteristics by which activities are different from each 
other and by integrating existing activities into one framework. By doing so, this dis-
sertation not only identifies differences in corporate venturing activities but also pro-
vides a comprehensive categorization of the variety of activities that are frequently 
named differently but consist of similar characteristics in existing research. This cate-
gorization into six clusters based on the locus of opportunity and the main program 
rationale enables researchers to conduct studies with clearly differentiated corporate 
venturing activities.  
In this context, the dissertation particularly underlines the relevance of the overall 
program rationale of corporate venturing activities, as it is identified as one of the 
most relevant characteristics for differentiation of activities in general. The discus-
sions in the various research papers show, that it is also relevant for understanding 
new activities such as corporate accelerators and incubators. In existing corporate 
venturing research however, many studies distinguish between internal and external 
activities only (e.g. Lai, Chiu, & Liaw, 2010; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006) which is a po-
tential source of varying results regarding the outcomes of activities. The presented 
findings in this dissertation provide an argument for the integration of the program 
rationale as differentiating characteristic into research, which might help to draw a 
clearer picture of the efficacy of corporate venturing activities and to shed light on the 
partly conflicting results of existing studies analyzing the innovative performance of 
companies applying corporate venturing activities (e.g. Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; 
Yang, 2012). 
With regards to recent activities in the corporate venturing landscape, this disserta-
tion provides a holistic understanding of corporate accelerator programs. It bases its 
findings on a comprehensive empirical analysis using multiple in-depth case studies 
compiled from interviews with program managers and start-ups associated with such 
programs as well as the analysis of publicly available information. As the sample of 
this analysis includes the entirety of active programs at the time of examination, this 
dissertation makes use of one of the most profound data sets in this field, thereby 
providing a detailed picture of the corporate accelerator phenomenon. It therefore 
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contributes significantly to corporate entrepreneurship research in enriching the still 
limited but growing discussion on corporate accelerator programs (e.g. Hochberg, 
2015; Kohler, 2016). Furthermore, by deriving four distinct types of corporate accel-
erators, this dissertation enriches corporate accelerator research with the first empiri-
cally derived typology, providing a basis for further examination, similar to existing 
typologies of earlier corporate venturing activities (e.g. Campbell, Birkinshaw, Morri-
son, & Batenburg, 2003; Miles & Covin, 2002). The understanding of corporate ac-
celerator programs witnesses significant gains through this analysis, as it is the first 
to show that current programs are not all the same but different from each other with 
regards to several characteristics and their main rationales. This finding provides the 
opportunity to tailor research according to the specific program types and not treat all 
programs equally, which leads to more specific results especially when analyzing 
potential outcomes such as financial contribution or innovation performance. 
These outlined results of the dissertation also make a contribution to theory building. 
Following the theory building process in management research (Carlile & Christen-
sen, 2004), this dissertation runs through the steps of building descriptive theory. 
With regards to the recent corporate venturing activity of corporate accelerators, the 
phenomenon is first observed and described in depth, and then it is classified into 
categories in the form of a typology of different activities. The third step of theory 
building, defining relationships, is conducted for corporate accelerator and incubator 
programs in the context of accessing knowledge by relating the different identified 
knowledge elements in these programs. With this contribution to theory, this disserta-
tion addresses the shortcomings of theoretical grounding in corporate venturing re-
search (Narayanan, Yang, & Zahra, 2009) and the lack of theoretical constructs in 
the field of corporate accelerators (Kohler, 2016). 
This dissertation also adds to research on the non-financial dimension of corporate 
venturing. First, it does so by creating transparency on the non-financial objectives of 
corporate venturing activities and by connecting these objectives with specific pro-
gram configurations in the corporate accelerator context. Second, it analyzes in detail 
one of the most frequently mentioned non-financial objectives: accessing external 
knowledge. 
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Non-financial objectives of corporate venturing activities are discussed in the light of 
existing research and explored empirically in the discussion corporate accelerator 
and incubator programs in this dissertation. Overall, this discussion underlines the 
high relevance of non-financial objectives for corporate venturing activities. The anal-
ysis of corporate accelerators shows that three out of the four derived program types 
focus mainly on non-financial objectives and have a strategic program rationale. 
These objectives include scanning the environment for new developments, which 
involves identifying and integrating new products or technologies. These different 
objectives of corporate venturing activities are not only identified and discussed in 
this dissertation, but they are also connected to different program configurations. 
These include organizational characteristics that deepen the understanding of how 
companies set up their corporate venturing activities in line with their overall program 
objectives. By doing so, contributions towards improving shortcomings in existing 
research are made by creating transparency on the understudied objectives of corpo-
rate venturing activities (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 2014; Ma, 2015) and by contrib-
uting to closing the gap of a general understanding of the strategic dimension of cor-
porate venturing activities (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Narayanan et al., 2009). 
As access to external knowledge is one of the main reasons for companies to en-
gage in corporate venturing activities, this dissertation puts special emphasis on ana-
lyzing knowledge in the corporate accelerator and incubator context. Significantly 
enriching the understanding of knowledge became possible through the identification 
of knowledge need, knowledge forms, and knowledge exchange as the three 
knowledge elements in those programs. The inductive derivation of these concepts 
and the discussion in the light of existing knowledge-related theories such as the 
knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996) and organizational knowledge crea-
tion theory (Nonaka, 1994) add to corporate entrepreneurship research in the field of 
corporate accelerators and incubators. With this contribution, the dissertation an-
swers calls for achieving a more holistic understanding of learning and knowledge in 
corporate venturing activities (Narayanan et al., 2009; Yang, 2012), enabling further 
research on the efficacy of such learning mechanisms.  
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 Contribution to practice 
Complementing the outlined contributions to research, this dissertation also provides 
valuable insights for practitioners, especially for managers in established companies 
who are in charge of corporate venturing activities or who are currently thinking about 
launching such an activity.  
First, practitioners benefit from transparency on different corporate venturing activi-
ties and the objectives behind providing them a holistic understanding of the defining 
characteristics for the large variety of activities. Managers can use these discussed 
and applied characteristics as guidance for holistically designing and defining clear 
objectives of their corporate venturing activities, which are widely considered major 
success factors.  
Second, practitioners especially benefit from profound insights into the corporate ac-
celerator landscape and the different program types. As many companies are cur-
rently seeking ways to interact with entrepreneurial start-ups, the detailed insights 
into the corporate accelerator landscape can support managers in their evaluation of 
relevance of such a program for their own company. Furthermore, if the company 
has already decided to launch or is already running a corporate accelerator program, 
this dissertation provides a detailed benchmark of other programs that can be used 
for setting up or improving the own program. Especially if managers are looking for 
ways to access knowledge relevant for their business, this dissertation provides a 
holistic picture on how companies do so and which mechanisms of knowledge ex-
change are typically applied under specific circumstances.  
Third, the provided case study looking at why Europe´s leading consumer electronics 
retailer Media-Saturn Holding has decided to launch its corporate accelerator pro-
gram and which specific decisions the management team had to make for designing 
the program in accordance with company- and industry-specific needs provides 
unique and detailed insights. It gives practitioners a complete overview of the re-
quired processes and decisions that must be made, beginning with the board´s deci-
sion to launch the corporate accelerator, moving on to the configurational and organ-
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izational set up, and leading to the program execution with the graduation of the first 
cohort of start-ups. 
In addition to the relevance of these findings for corporate managers of established 
companies, founders and managers of start-ups can also benefit from the results 
presented in this dissertation. For them, the question of whether or not to engage 
with an established company is often of high relevance. With the understanding of 
different corporate venturing activities and their rationales as discussed in this disser-
tation, founders can make more informed decisions on a potential cooperation with 
an established company. 
To sum up, this dissertation makes contributions to research and practice alike. It 
enhances corporate venturing research in several ways, and the findings provide ac-
ademics with promising avenues for further research, which will be discussed in the 
next paragraphs. Furthermore, practitioners benefit from unique empirical insights 
that support them in better understanding the recent trends in corporate venturing 
and in deriving implications for their companies.  
 Limitations and further research 
The research conducted in the context of this dissertation comes with limitations, 
which also serve as potential starting points for further research.  
First, the qualitative research approach, which was selected to explore specific cor-
porate venturing activities, does not allow for performance evaluation. Therefore, the 
four identified types of corporate accelerators and the different approaches of ac-
cessing knowledge through corporate accelerators and incubators do not imply rec-
ommendations for actions. Instead, these insights, based on one of the most com-
prehensive empirical analyses in the field of recent corporate venturing activities, 
provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomena in scope of the analysis. How-
ever, further research could take up this point by using the typology of corporate ac-
celerators to assess the effectiveness of each individual type. The four identified 
types build an ideal starting point for defining program type specific performance in-
dicators such as innovation rates or financial returns and assess program perfor-
mance accordingly.  
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Second, the analyzed programs in this dissertation consist of diverse industrial back-
grounds and are all located in Germany. As the corporate accelerator phenomenon is 
still comparably young in the corporate venturing landscape and the number of pro-
grams is limited, an analysis of a specific industry would not have been reasonable. 
However, the sample used in this dissertation covers the entirety of 13 active corpo-
rate accelerator programs in Germany in late 2015, which provides holistic insights 
from one of the most relevant countries for such programs. With a sample that in-
cludes programs from other countries, industry specific analyses might provide addi-
tional insights. It would be especially interesting to find out if companies with the 
same industrial background prefer the same types of corporate accelerator pro-
grams. As companies in the same industry are exposed to comparable challenges, 
these issues might also influence their design choices with regards to their corporate 
venturing activities. 
Third, in addition to corporate accelerators and incubators, companies are launching 
additional formats of start-up engagement, including pitch competition weekends, 
hackathons, or programs that initiate client relationships with start-ups graduating 
from accelerators. These examples show that the corporate venturing landscape is 
developing further and that companies are trying to find more and more ways to in-
teract with start-ups. Future research could be focused on such additional programs 
that companies launch in co-existence with their existing corporate venturing activi-
ties and the ways in which these different programs work together. With a continu-
ously increasing variety of forms of start-up engagement, companies face the com-
plex challenge of building their portfolio of activities. This poses a potential question 
future research could analyze, applying a theoretical lens such as for example trans-
action cost theory. 
Despite these limitations, this dissertation enriches research on corporate venturing 
activities and especially accounts for the increasing practical relevance by contrib-
uting pertinent insights for academia as well as practice, including the corporate as 
well as the start-up environment. 
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